•.• 


BANCROFT 
LIBRARY 

O 

THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


' 


December    1895, 


I_jeotu.x*@s  in.  tlie  Dei3a.rtm.ent  of"  Mlilitstr y 
Delivered  Before  tn.e  Olass  of  Oflfloer s.at  tn.e 
TJniteci  States  Infa,ntry  anci  Oa,va,lry  Son.ool, 
Fort  Ijea,venwortn.,  BLeunsas.  1S©3— 1©©5. 


MILITARY    GEOGRAPHY. 


LECTURES     IN    THE    DEPARTMENT    OF    MILITARY     ART, 

DELIVERED  BEFORE  THE  CLASS  OF  OFFICERS  AT  THE 

U.  S.  INFANTRY  AND  CAVALRY  SCHOOL, 

FORT  LEAVENWORTH,  KANSAS, 

1893-1895, 


COHSTTZEZSTTS. 

The  Military  Geography  of  Canada, 

Captain  ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER,  6th  Infantry,  Instructor. 

The  Military  Geography  of  Chili, 

Captain  EP.EN  SWIFT,  5th  Cavalry,  Assistant  Instructor. 

The  Military  Geography  of  Mexico, 

1st  Lieut.   A.  L.  MILLS,    1st  Cav,  Assistant  Instructor. 

The  Military  Geography  of  Central  America, 

1st  Lieut.  CARL  REICHMANN,  9th  Inf.,  Ass't  Instructor. 


("NITED    STATES    INFANTRY     AND     CAVALRY     SCHOOL, 
1895. 


Bancroft  Libnry 


ERRATA. 

Page  5,  line  2,  for  statesmen  read  statesmen  and  generals. 

Page  6,  line  8,  for  georgaphieal  read  geographical. 

Page  47,  line  32,  for  Novia  read  Nova. 

Page  53,  line  13,  for  Indian  read  Indian. 

Page  53,  line  14,  for  produeeda  read  produced  a. 

Page  56,  lines  5  and  6,  for  Tarcapaca  read  Tarapaca. 

Page  60,  line  21,  for  pretaining  read  pertaining. 

Page  62,  line  14,  for  rail-road  read  railroad. 

Page  62,  line  29,  for  Korner  read  Korner. 

Page  64,  line  6,  for  mould  read  would. 

Page  65,  line  7,  for  rail-road  and  rail-way  read  railroad  and 


Page  65,  line  14,  for  rail-roads  read  railroads. 

Page  69,  line  31,  for  verdue  read  verdure. 

Page  74,  line  12,  for  Mexicon  read  Mexican. 

Page  75,  line  4,  for  fundemental  read  fundamental. 

Page  75,  line  25,  for  Government  read  Government. 

Page  76,  line  28,  for  Polosi  read  Potosi. 

Page  81,  line  1,  for  indians  read  Indians 

Page  81,  line  17,  for  customery  read  customary. 

Page  83,  line  1,  for  warrented  read  warranted. 

Page  84,  line  1,  for  parallelling  read  paralleling. 

Page  84,  line  13,  for  canons  canons. 

Page  86,  line  13,  for  was  read  were. 

Page  87,  line  3,  for  /Softitfe  read  &ifti/fo. 

Page  93,  line  17,  for  indians  read  Indians. 

Page  117,  line  18,  for  definitely  read  definitely. 

Page  122,  line  32,  for  revivifications  read  revivification. 

Page  126,  line  20,  for  /ie  read  toe. 

Page  129,  line  6,  for  western  read  western. 


NOTE. 

It  being  impracticable  to  illustrate  the  following  lectures 
with  suitable  maps,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  maps  in  the 
Kncyclopsediu  Britannica  (Ninth  Edition)  presented  with  the 
subjects  America,  Canada,  Ontario,  Quebec,  New  Bruns- 
wick, and  Mexico,  or  to  the  maps  of  Canada,  Chili,  and  the 
West  Indies  in  Stieler's  ''Hand  Atlas." 


THE  MILITARY  GEOGRAPHY  OF  CANADA. 


By  Captain  ARTHUR  L.  WAGNER,  Sixth  U.    S.    Infantry. 
Instructor  in  Military  Art. 


O  n/~ 

\  A  /  HEN  one  nation  finds  itself  at  war  with  another,  its 
V  V  statesmen  are  at  once  confronted  with  the  problem 
of  so  shaping  the  conduct  of  the  war  as  to  gain  the  greatest 
possible  advantages  from  existing  conditions;  to  encounter 
the  forces  of  the  enemy  unde  such  circumstances  as  to  gain 
the  greatest  probability  of  success,  to  reap  the  greatest 
results  from  victory,  and  suffer  the  least  from  defeat;  and,  in 
brief,  so  to  conduct  the  war  as  to  lead  to  an  honorable  peace 
with  the  least  outlay  of  blood  and  treasure,  and  to  relieve 
their  own  people,  as  much  as  possible,  from  the  burden  of 
misery  inseparable  from  the  state  of  war. 

As  we  know  from  our  studies  in  the  Art  of  War,  the 
question  which  first  arises  is,  whether  to  assume  the  offensive 
or  await  the  enemy  in  a  defensive  position.  This,  as  Ha-mley 
says,  will  depend  upon  many  considerations,  to  wit, — the 
relative  strength  of  the  opposing  forces, — the  political  policy 
of  the  nation, — the  relative  capacity  of  the  belligerents  for 


6 


the  prompt  mobilization  and  concentration  of  their  forces, — 
<>r  certain  geographical  considerations  which  may  give  to  one, 
and  deny  to  the  other,  the  power  of  assuming  the  offensive. 
Then,  if  the  offensi  ve  be  chosen,  conies  the  question  of  the 
selection  of  an  object;  in  which  also  political  and  geographi- 
cal considerations  enter;  the  selection  of  a  theatre  in  which  the 
same  considerations  are  to  be  weighed;  and  finally  the  choice 
of  a  line  of  operations,  in  which  georgaphical  considerations 
are  generally  paramount,  as  affecting  the  all-important  mat- 
ters of  supply,  of  the  composition  of  the  forces,  and  the 
general  strategy  of  the  campaign. 

Taking  these  questions  ID  their  order,  we  find  in  the  first 
a  greater  field,  perhaps,  for  the  diplomat  than  for  the  general; 
i  i  the  second  and  third,  military  circumstances  increase  in 
importance;  and  in  the  fourth,  political  considerations  gener- 
ally (though  not  always)  vanish,  and  the  solution  depends 
upon  military  conditions  alone.  It  is  impossible,  however, 
to  weigh  any  of  these  questions  without  being  influenced  by 
geographical  considerations,  from  the  time  the  war-policy  of 
the  nation  is  discussed  in  the  cabinet,  until  the  problem  is 
wrought  out  to  a  practical  solution  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Hence  arises  the  importance  of  the  study  of  military 
geography;  which  may  be  described  as  the  study  of  geogra- 
phy with  reference  to  the  operations  of  armies;  and 
which  from  its  very  nature,  necessarily  embraces  many 
features  of  political  as  well  as  physical  geography. 

To  a  student  of  the  Art  of  War,  the  study  of  the  mili- 
tary geography  of  any  country  is  an  interesting  one;  but  it  is, 
perhaps,  only  when  the  study  is  applied  to  countries  whose 
interests  are  closely  bound  to  our  own,  whose  foreign  policy 
may  cla.sh  with  that  of  the  United  States,  and  whose  territor- 
ies may  be  the  theatre  of  operations  of  our  armies — or  t< 
tho-e  parts  of  our  own  land  which  may  feel  the  tread  of  the 
invader — that  it  becomes  to  us  a  study  of  importance  second 
to  no  branch  of  the  Art  of  War.  Applied  thus  to  the  Do- 
minion of  Canada,  the  subject  becomes  one  of  great  moment 


to  every  American  officer. 

British  America  embraces  all  of  the  North  American 
continent  north  of  the  main  portion  of  the  United  States?, 
excepting  Alaska  and  Danish  America.  With  the  exception 
of  Newfoundland  and  Labrador,  it  is  all  comprised  in  the 
Dominion  of  Canada,  which,  with  a  population  of  only 
5,000,000,  has  an  area  of  3,500,000  square  miles— an  area 
nearly  equal  to  that  of  Europe.  It  comprises  the  provinces 
of  Ontario,  Quebec,  New  Brunswick,  Nova  Scotia,  Prince 
Edward  Island,  Manitoba,  and  British  Columbia,  and  the 
territories  known  as  Assinaboia,  Saskatchewan,  Alberta 
Athabasca,  North  West  Territory,  Keewntin,  Northern 
Territory,  and  North  East  Territory.  A  glance  at  the  map 
shows  us  that  this  immense  country  is,  roughly  speaking, 
bounded  on  the  east  by  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  on  the  west  by 
the  Pacific,  and  on  the  south  by  the  United  States;  while  on 
the  north  its  boundary  is  lost  in  the  region  of  perpetual  ice 
and  snow.  For  us,  the  southern  boundary  of  the  Dominion 
is  the  only  one  which  requires  careful  examination;  for  Cana- 
da is  unassailable  on  the  north,  while  she  can  be  attacked  on 
the  east  and  west  only  by  a  nation  superior  to  Great  Britain 
in  naval  power — in  other  words,  three  sides  of  the  irregular 
quadrangle  which  forms  the  Dominion  of  Canada  are  practi- 
cally safe  from  assault. 

The  boundary  line  between  the  United  States  and  Canada 
begins  in  Passamaq noddy  Bay  and  follows  the  St.  Croix 
River  to  its  head  waters;  then  goes  due  north  to  the  St.  John 
River;  passes  up  the  St.  John  to  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Fran- 
cis River;  ascends  the  latter  river  about  thirty  miles;  then 
runs  in  a  southwesterly  direction  on  an  irregular  line  (almost 
coincident  with  the  crest  of  the  watershed  of  the  Atlantic  and 
the  St.  Lawrence)  to  the  45th  parallel  of  north  latitude; 
along  this  parallel  to  the  St.  Lawrence  River;  up  the  St. 
Lawrence,  Lake  Ontario,  Niagara  River,  Lake  Erie,  Detroit 
River,  Lake  St.  Clair,  St.  Glair  River,  Lake  Huron,  and  St. 
Mary's  River  to  Lake  Superior;  through  Lake  Superior  to 


the  mouth  of  Pigeon  River;  up  a  chain  of  lakes  and  small 
rivers  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods;  then,  from  the  outlet  of 
this  lake  into  Rainy  River,  across  to  the  point  known  as  the 
Northwest  Angle  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods;  due  south  to  the 
49th  parallel  of  north  latitude;  then,  in  a  great  sweep  across 
the  Continent,  along  this  parallel  to  the  Gulf  of  Georgia;  and 
then  down  this  gulf,  passing  west  of  the  San  Juan  Island, 
through  the  Juan  de  Fuca  Strait,  to  the  Pacific.  One-third 
of  this  great  boundary  line  consists  of  natural  frontier. 

The  great  physical  divisions  of  the  United  States  known 
as  the  Atlantic  Slope,  Pacific  Slope,  and  Mississippi  Valley, 
each  with  a  more  or  less  pronounced  declination  towards  the 
equator,  have  in  the  Dominion  of  Canada  their  continuation 
or  counterpart  with  a  general  slope  to  wards  the  Arctic  Ocean. 
The  main  chain  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  running  parallel  to 
the  Pacific  coast,  marks  the  eastern  boundary  of  the  Pacific 
Slope  of  Canada;  a  region  some  400  miles  wide  (from  east  to 
west)  and  1500  miles  long,  possessing  "a  mild  and  humid 
atmosphere  as  far  north  as  the  55th  parallel,  but  inhospitable 
and  barren  beyond  the  boundary."  East  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains  lies  the  Great  Northern  Plain,  the  southern  bound- 
ary of  which  is  the  watershed  between  the  waters  of  Hudson's 
Bay  and  those  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  or  the  Great  Lakes,  and 
the  greater  part  of  which  may,  roughly  speaking,  be  said  to 
be  coincident  with  the  50th  parallel;  while  south  of  James 
Bay,  the  boundary  between  the  Plain  and  the  Atlantic  Slope 
consists  of  the  Height  of  Land  and  the  Watchish  Mountains, 
trending  in  a  direction  generally  parallel  to  the  St.  Lawrence 
River,  and  about  150  miles  from  it.  The  greater  portion  of 
this  region  has  been  well  described  as  a  "bleak  and  bare 
waste,  overspread  with  innumerable  lakes,  and  resembling 
Siberia  both  in  physical  character  of  its  surface  and  the  rigor 
of  its  climate." 

The  Pacific  Slope  of  the  Dominion  may  be  dismissed 
from  our  consideration  in  a  very  few  words.  In  one  sense, 
British  Columbia  is  more  exposed  to  invasion  than  Canada 


proper,  the  boundary  line  being  mainly  an  artificial  one;  but 
the  roads  leading  across  the  frontier  are  few  and  poor,  and 
though  there  are  now  two  railroads*  penetrating  the  heart  of 
the  province  from  the  south,  which  would  greatly  facilitate 
the  supply  of  an  invading  army,  there  is  no  objective  in  the 
main  portion  of  the  province  of  sufficient  importance  to  justify 
military  operations  of  any  magnitude.  The  two  points  of 
special  importance,  Victoria,  (the  capital)  and  Esquimault 
(the  great  naval  station)  are  both  on  Vancouver's  Island,  safe 
from  attack  so  long  as  England  maintains  her  supremacy  on 
the  sea. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  consider  the  Alaska-Canada 
frontier  at  all,  though  Colonel  Strange  in  his  able  paper  on 
the  "Military  Aspect  of  Canada"  seems  to  regard  Alaska  as  a 
possible  secondary  base  for  the  Americans.  If  our  navy  were 
what  \ve  should  like  it  to  be,  but  what  we  may  despair  of  its 
ever  being,  we  might  protect  Alaska;  but  we  could  make  no 
earthly  use  of  it  as  a  base,  owing  not  only  to  the  difficulty, 
under  the  best  conditions,  of  transporting  an  army  thither, 
but  to  the  absence  of  any  sane  objective  after  we  got  there. 
Under  existing  conditions,  if  war  should  occur  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  our  flag  would,  doubtless, 
be  speedily  lowered  in  Alaska,  to  be  raised  again  only  as  a 
result  of  American  victories  in  other  theatres. 

The  Atlantic  Slope  of  Canada  comprises  all  the  older, 
more  populous,  and  wealthier  provinces  of  the  Dominion. 
In  it  would  lie  all  the  important  theatres  of  war  if  we 
were  engaged  in  a  conflict  with  Great  Britain;  and  a  consid- 
eration of  its  geography  is,  therefore,  a  matter  of  especial 
consequence  ro  the  American  military  student.  This  portion 
of  Canada  embraces  the  provinces  of  Ontario,  Quebec,  New 
Brunswick,  Nova  Scotia  and  Prince  Edward  Island;  though 
the  last  named  province  may  be  neglected  as  not  lying  within 


*The  Spokane  Falls  and  Northern  ;ui(l  the  extension  of  the  Great 
Korthern  K.  R.  Iron)  Everett  to  New  Westminster. 


10 


any  probable  theatre  of  operations. 

Mountain*. — Quebec  is  generally  mountainous,  The 
portion  of  this  province  lying  south  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is 
traversed  through  almost  its  entire  length  by  the  Notre  Dame 
(or  Green)  mountains,  a  continuation  of  the  Appalachian 
range,  running  almost  parallel  to  the  St.  Lawrence  River, 
and  terminating  at  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence  in  a  high  table- 
land having  an  elevation  of  1500  feet.  The  highest  peaks  of 
these  mountains  are  about  4000  feet  high. 

North  of  the  St.  Lawrence  the  Laureutian  Range,  begin- 
ing  in  Labrador,  trends  in  a  south-westerly  direction,  and 
skirts  the  north  shore  of  the  great  river  to  the  vicinity  of 
Quebec,  where  it  leaves  the  banks  of  the  stream.  It  then 
keeps  nearly  parallel  with  the  river,  but  some  miles  back  from 
the  shore,  until  about  thirty  miles  west  of  Montreal,  where  it 
skirts  the  Ottawa  River  for  a  hundred  miles,  leaps  the  river, 
as  it  were,  and  trends  in  the  direction  of  Kingston.  From 
the  vicinity  of  that  city,  the  range  extends  north-westward 
to  the  shores  of  the  Lakes  Huron  and  Superior,  and  finally 
tapers  off  into  the  levels  of  the  Great  Northern  Plain.  "Some 
of  the  hills  of  the  Laurentian  Range  are  1300  feet  high,  and 
below  the  city  of  Quebec  their  altitude  is  8000  feet. 

In  the  northern  and  northwestern  portion  of  New  Bruns- 
wick are  several  hill  ranges,  of  altitude  varying  from  1200 
to  2000  feet.  In  the  southern  part  a  considerable  range  of 
hills  runs  almost  parallel  to  the  coast  of  the  Bay  of  Fundy, 
and  at  a  distance  of  20  or  30  miles  from  it. 

In  Nova  Scotia  are  several  chains  of  high  hills  (some 
having  an  altitude  of  1100  feet)  running  generally  parallel 
to  the  coast.  These  hills  lie  nearer  to  the  coast  of  the  Bay 
of  Fundy  than  to  that  of  the  Atlantic.  The  principal  chain, 
known  as  the  Cobequid  Mountains,  runs  east  and  west,  par- 
allel to  the  path  by  which  an  invading  army  would  enter 
from  the  isthmus  joining  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick, 
and  thus  might  have  a  strategic  value  of  some  importance. 
Topography  <n\<]  I'm/I  net*. — The  southern,  or  most  popu- 


11 


lous  part  of  Ontario  is,  generally  speaking,  a  plain;  though 
it  is  rather  undulating,  and  along  the  shores  of  Lakes  Erie 
and  Ontario  is  in  many  places  broken  by  shelving  rocks  and 
precipices.  The  province  is  often  termed  "The  Garden  of 
Canada,"  and  is  a  region  of  surpassing  fertility.  Its  average 
yield  of  wheat,  oats  and  barley  exceeds  that  of  our  best 
States.  It  produces  fruits  of  various  kinds  in  great  abun- 
dance, is  without  a  superior  as  a  sheep-raising  country,  and 
its  exports  of  cattle  and  bread-stuffs  are  large. 

The  province  is  generally  well  cultivated,  and  has  fairly 
good  roads.  On  the  whole,  it  is  well  suited  to  military  ope- 
rations. The  heavily  timbered  region  lies  almost  altogether 
north  of  the  probable  theatre  of  operations;  and  the  products 
of  the  province  would  greatly  facilitate  the  supply  of  an  in- 
vading army. 

In  the  province  of  Quebec,  wheat,  barley,  oats,  rye  and 
hay  are  produced  in  large  quantities,  and  the  exports  of  cat- 
tle and  beef  are  considerable.  "Dense  forests  cover  enor- 
mous tracts  of  territory,"  and  the  province,  as  a  whole,  is 
heavily  wooded.  The  country  has  a  great  number  of  good 
wagon  roads.  Artillery  could  thus  be  easily  transported ; 
but,  owing  to  the  mountainous  and  wooded  nature  of  the 
province,  an  invading  army  would,  doubtless,  require  a  mini- 
mum of  artillery  and  cavalry  and  a  maximum  of  infantry. 
The  products  of  this  province,  too,  would  greatly  facilitate 
the  supply  of  armies  operating  in  it. 

Except  in  the  mountainous  region  already  referred  to, 
the  surface  of  New  Brunswick  is  generally  undulating. 
Though  the  country  is  not  infertile,  the  agricultural  products 
are  not  sufficient  for  home  consumption.  Hay  is  produced 
in  great  quantities,  but  the  province  is  not  suited  to  the 
operations  of  cavalry  or  the  extended  use  of  artillery,  being 
one  of  the  most  heavily  wooded  regions  in  the  world.  The 
supply  of  an  invading  army  would  receive  scanty  assistance 
from  the  products  of  this  province,  and  its  operations  would 
be  impeded  by  natural  features  which  would  lend  great  ad- 


12 


vantages  to  the  defense. 

Nova  Scotia  is  a  more  productive  province  than  the  one 
just  considered,  cereals  and  fruits  growing  in  abundance. 
The  country  contains  extensive  forests,  but  its  roads  are 
numerous,  and  of  excellent  quality.  The  obstacles  that 
would  be  encountered  by  an  invading  army  would,  however, 
be  found  in  other  natural  obstacles  than  those  yet  considered. 

Rivers. — The  waterways  of  Canada,  whether  we  consider 
the  creations  of  the  Almighty  or  the  work  of  man,  demand 
the  chief  attention  ot  any  one  who  considers  the  Dominion 
either  from  a  commercial  or  military  point  of  view.  No 
country  in  the  world  has  a  more  complete  system  of  water 
communication.  First  of  all  is  the  St.  Lawrence  River, 
draining  the  Great  Lakes  and  extending  from  its  head  at 
Lake  Ontario  728  miles  to  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  This 
noble  stream,  which  from  its  very  source  is  a  river  of  the  first 
magnitude,  has  an  average  width  of  about  one  and  three- 
fourth  miles  from  Montreal  to  Quebec,  narrowing  to  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  at  Cape  Diamond  near  the  latter  city. 
Seven  miles  below  Quebec  it  is  4  miles  wide;  22  miles  further 
down  the  width  is  11  miles;  at  the  mouth  of  the  Saguenay 
it  expands  to  a  width  of  16  miles;  and  at  Cape  Chat  it  has  a 
magnificent  sweep  of  39  miles  from  shore  to  shore.  The 
largest  ocean  vessels  can  ascend  to  Montreal. 

We  may  regard  the  Saguenay  River  as  part  of  the  east- 
ern boundary  of  the  possible  theatre  of  Military  operations 
in  Canada.  Above  this  river  are  many  others  emptying  into 
the  St.  Lawrence ;  the  principal  ones  on  the  north  being  the 
Montmorency,  the  St.  Anne,  the  Batiscum,  the  St.  Maurice, 
the  Du  Loup,  the  Assomption,  and  the  great  tributary,  the 
Ottawa,  600  miles  long,  with  its  tributaries  Du  Nord,  Petite 
Nation,  Du  Lievre  and  Gatineau  on  the  north,  and  the  Pete- 
wawa,  Bonne  Cliere,  Madawaska,  Mississippi  and  Rideau  on 
the  south.  The  St.  Lawrence  river  system  is  completed  by 
numerous  tributaries  on  the  south,  of  which  the  principal 
ones  are  the  Richelieu,  the  Yamaska,  the  St.  Francis,  the 


13 


Beconcour,  en  1  the  Ohaudiere. 

Emptying  into  Lake  Ontario  on  the'Canada  side  are  the 
Moira  and  the  Trent  rivers;  into  Lake  Erie,  the  Grand  River; 
and  into  Lake  St.  Clair,  the  Thames  and  the  Sydenham. 
With  the  exception  of  the  last  two  rivers,  the  courses  of 
these  tributary  streams  are  all  perpendicular  to  the  path  of 
an  invading  army  from  Detroit  to  Quebec  on  the  left  of  the 
St  Lawrence — or  from  Rouse's  Point  or  Montreal,  on  the 
right  of  the  great  river  to  the  same  objective. 

Among  the  rivers  of  the  eastern  provinces  of  Canada, 
the  St.  John  is  the  most  important.  Navigable  for  large 
vessels  as  far  as  Fredericton,  88  miles  from  its  mouth,  and 
with  its  course  partly  perpendicular  and  partly  parallel  to  a 
line  of  operations  east  from  Maine,  it  might,  in  the  event  of 
a  war  with  Great  Britain,  play  a  great  strategical  part  which 
we  will  consider  later.  The  Restigouche,  Mirimichi,  and 
other  streams  in  the  northern  part  of  New  Brunswick  lie  too 
far  out  of  any  probable  theatre  to  call  for  notice.  At  the 
head  of  the  Bay  of  Fundy  is  the  Petitcodiac  River,  navigable 
for  ships  25  miles  from  its  mouth,  and  for  schooners  of  80 
tons  burden  12  miles  further.  From  the  head  of  ship  navi- 
gation it  is  less  than  15  miles  across  the  isthmus  to  Shediac 
Bay,  measured  from  the  points  Moncton  and  Shediac  which 
are  connected  by  rail.  Thirty  miles  further  to  the  east,  the 
same  isthmus  again  narrows  its  width,  from  Cumberland 
Basin  to  Bay  Verte  being  about  15  miles.  Two  excellent 
positions  are  thus  made  to  order,  as  it  were,  and  we  shall  in  a 
proper  place,  consider  their  great  military  value. 

As  to  the  rivers  of  Nova  Scotia,  we  will  only  note  that 
in  mapping  out  a  route,  from  the  isthmus  to  Halifax,  we  find 
the  path  crossed  by  the  Phillip,  Wallace,  Salmon,  and  Shu- 
benacadie  rivers,  while  the  line  of  the  invading  army  would 
be  parallel  to  the  general  direction  of  the  Stewiacke  and 
Musquodoboit.  All  these  rivers  are  navigable  for  small  craft, 
and  the  Shubenacadie  is  navigable  for  vessels  of  large  size. 

Canals. — Let    us  now  consider  the  admirable  system  of 


14 

canals,  by  which  the  defects  of  the  natural  system  of  Cana- 
dian waterways  have  been  remedied,  and  its  advantages  in- 
creased. Immediately  above  Montreal  the  navigation  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  is  obstructed  by  the  St.  Louis  or  Lachine 
Rapids.  Other  rapids  obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  river 
between  Montreal  and  Prescott  (about  100  miles  above),  the 
total  fall  of  the  river  from  the  latter  to  the  former  city  being 
206J  feet.  These  obstacles  are  overcome  by  means  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  canals,  which  consist  of  the  Lachine  canal,  8J 
miles  long;  the  Beauharnois  Canal,  11J  miles  long;  the  Corn- 
wall Canal  11^  miles  long,  and  the  Williamsburg  Canals, 
three  in  number,  aggregating  12-J  miles  in  length,  or  27^ 
miles  including  intervening  spaces  of  river  navigation.  The 
total  length  of  these  canals  is  43J  miles.  The  Lachine  Canal 
is  on  the  Island  of  Montreal.  The  Beauharnois,  about  25 
miles  above  Montreal.  The  Cornwall  is  about  45  miles,  and 
the  Williamsburg  about  18  miles,  below  Prescott.  The 
locks  of  the  Lachine  Canal  are  270  feet  in  length  by  40  feet 
in  width,  with  a  depth  of  14  feet,  and  the  upper  canals  are 
being  enlarged  coriespondingly.  These  canals  will  then  ren- 
der practicable  the  passage  of  vessels  of  large  size,  as  far  as 
Prescott.  Above  that  city  the  navigation  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence is  without  obstruction,  and  vessels  can  pass  through 
Lake  Ontario  to  Port  Dalhousie,  the  outlet  of  the  Wellancl 
Canal.  This  canal  gives  a  passage  from  Lake  Ontario  to 
Lake  Erie,  which  would  otherwise  be  barred  by  the  impracti- 
cable Niagara  River,  and  is  27  miles  long.  Its  locks  are  275 
feet  long  by  45  feet  wide,  and  the  depth  of  water  on  the  sills 
is  14  feet.  On  emerging  from  the  Welland  Cannl  at  Port 
Colborne,  a  vessel  can  pass  without  hindrance  up  the  lakes  as 
far  as  Chicago  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  St.  Mary's  canal  on 
the  other.  A  canal  at  Sault  Ste.  Mario,  a  mile  long  and  17 
feet  deep,  gives  a  passage  into  Lake  Superior.  As  this  canal 
belongs  to  the  United  States,  and  could  easily  be  destroyed  if 
ii  could  not  be  defended.  Great  Britain  has  had  the  foresight 
to  construct  a  similiar  canal  lying  entirely  within  her  terri- 


15 


ton*.  This  ca:ial  commences  at  the  navigable  channel  of  the 
St.  Mary's  River,  opposite  the  town  of  Sault  Ste.  Marie,  and 
extends  upstream  5,300  feet,  to  the  foot  of  St.  Mary's  Island, 
thence  westward  3,500  feet  to  the  head  of  the  island,  thence 
westward  9,300  feet  through  shoals,  until  the  navigable  chan- 
nel of  the  river,  above  the  rapids,  is  again  reached,  at  an 
elevation  of  18  feet  above  the  lower  entrance  to  the  lock. 
The  canal  has  one  lock,  in  the  middle  section,  900  feet  in 
length,  60  feet  wide,  and  20  feet  3  inches  of  water  upon  the 
mitre  sills  at  low  water. 

The  lakes  are  thus  open  to  any  vessel  of  the  British  navy 
that  can  pass  through  the  canals  mentioned;  in  other  words, 
when  the  improvement  of  the  canals  is  completed,  they  will 
be  open  to  any  vessel  drawing  less  than  14  feet  of  water.  In- 
cluding the  vessels  now  building,  England  has  just  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-six  such  vessels,  three  of  them  armored. 

With  one  exception,  all  the  British  canals  mentioned  lie 
on  the  left  side  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  The  Beauharnois 
Canal,  which  is  south  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  only  20  miles 
from  the  northern  boundary  of  New  York,  was  the  weak  link 
in  the  chain  of  canals,  as  its  defense  would  be  difficult,  and 
its  capture  fraught  with  serious  results  to  the  British  Empire. 

This  fact  was  recognized  by  Great  Britain;  and  measures 
have  been  taken  to  remedy  the  serious  defect  by  which  the 
seizure  or  destruction  by  the  Americans  of  a  canal  less  than 
12  miles  long  might  absolutely  prevent  the  reinforcement  of 
the  British  naval  forces  on  the  lakes,  or  its  withdrawal  in  case 
of  disaster.  The  Soulanges  canal  is  being  constructed  on  the 
north  side  of  the  St.  Lawrence.  It  is  14  miles  long,  with 
five  locks,  which  are  270  feet  in  length,  45  feet  wride,  and  14 
feet  deep.  The  Rideau  canal  gives  a  water  passage  from 
Kingston  to  Ottawa,  and  thence  down  the  Ottawa  River  and 
Lai'hine  canal  to  Montreal.  This  canal  does  not  at  present 
admit  of  the  passage  of  vessels  of  a  draught  greater  than  four 
and  one-half  feet,  and  is,  consequently  of  no  strategic  iriinor- 


16 


tance.  It  is  a  significant  fact,  however,  that  it  was  construct- 
ed, sixtv  years  ago,  "with  a  view  to  the  defense  of  the 
province,"  and  that  its  enlargement  is  contemplated.  Its 
new  locks  will  have  a  depth  of  nine  feet,  and  will  accomo- 
date  fifty-four  vessels  now  on  the  list  of  the  British  navy. 
But  even  when  the  enlargement  of  the  Rideau  Canal  is  com- 
pleted, its  strategic  importance  will  be  less  than  that  of  the 
proposed  Ottawa  and  Georgian  Bay  Canal,  by  which  vessels 
will  be  able  to  go  from  Montreal  (by  the  Lachine  Canal, 
Ottawa  River,  Lake  Nipissing,  French  River,  and  Georgian 
Bay)  into  Lake  Huron.  To  obtain  the  fullest  strategic  value 
of  the  latter  canal  the  construction  of  two  others  is  requisite, 
and  both  are  now  under  construction  by  the  Dominion  Gov- 
ernment. One  of  these  canals  is  to  connect  Toronto  with 
Georgian  Bay  by  way  of  Lake  Simcoe,  the  other  is  to  join 
Hamilton  with  Port  Franks  on  Lake  Huron.  With  these 
canals  completed,  the  loss  of  the  Beauharnois  and  Soulanges 
Canals  could  be  regarded  by  the  British  with  comparative 
complacency. 

The  Trent  River  Navigation  is  "composed  of  a  chain  of 
lakes  and  rivers  extending  from  Trenton,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Trent,  Bay  of  Quinte,  north  shore  of  Lake  Ontario,  to  Lake 
Huron."  This  system  may  be  dismissed  without  serious  con- 
sideration. It  does  not  admit  of  the  passage  of  vessels  of  a 
draught  of  five  feet;  and  as  it  would  confer  no  strategic  ad- 
vantages not  obtained  by  the  canals  just  mentioned,  and  as  it 
seems  in  its  present  condition  to  answer  all  the  demands  of 
local  traffic,  its  enlargement  does  not  seem  probable. 

There  is  another  waterway  of  less  importance,  perhaps, 
than  the  Welland  and  St.  Lawrence  canals,  but  which  may 
nevertheless  be  of  great  value  to  Great  Britain,  or  perhaps  to 
the  United  States,  in  case  of  war  between  the  two  nations. 
Forty-six  miles  below  Montreal  is  the  mouth  of  the  Richelieu. 
This  river  is  navigable  up  to  Lake  Champlain,  by  means  of  a 
lock  and  dam  at  St.  Ours  (14  miles  above  the  mouth),  and 
the  Cliiimhly  Canal,  12  miles  long  (32  miles  further  up),  for 


17 


Vessels  drawing  six  and  one-half  feet.  A  new  canal  is  pro- 
posed from  Caughnawauga,  on  Lake  St.  Louis,  to  connect 
with  the  Chambly  Canal,  thus  admitting  of  quick  water  trans- 
port from  Montreal  to  Lake  Champlain  via  St.  Johns.  The 
Chambly  Canal  is  to  be  enlarged  to  the  same  dimensions  as 
the  Welland,  and  the  new  canal  is  to  be  constructed  <  n  the 
same  scale.  The  possession  of  the  Richelieu  canal  system 
would  give  to  the  British  navy  access  to  Lake  Champlain— 
a  fact  sufficient  to  demonstrate  its  importance. 

It  is  evident  that  while  the  Canadian  canals  are  admira- 
bly adapted  to  the  requirements  of  commerce,  their  projectors 
did  not  labor  under  the  idea  that  disputes  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  are  always  sure  to  be  settled  by 
arbitration. 

Railways. — The  Canadian  system  of  water  communication 
is  supplemented  by  an  extensive  system  of  railways,  the  most 
important  of  which  have  a  general  direction  almost  parallel 
with  the  general  course  of  the  waterways.  Stretching  across 
the  continent,  from  Halifax*  to  Vancouver,  with  a  total 
length  of  about  3000  miles,  is  the  Canadian  Pacific  Railroad. 
This  road,  in  commercial  aspects  one  of  the  greatest  in  the 
world,  is  furthermore  of  great  strategical  value  to  Great 
Britain.  If  left  intact,  it  could,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Pacific  steamers,  in  a  space  of  forty  days,  transfer  troops 
from  the  banks  of  the  Ganges  to  the  shores  of  the  St.  Law- 
rence; and  would  enable  England  speedily  to  place  an  Anglo- 
Indian  army  any  where  in  Canada.  But,  fortunately  for  us, 
the  portion  of  the  road  from  Lake  Superior  to  the  Pacific 
runs  parallel  to  our  boundrj  and  within  easy  striking  distance 
of'it;  while  the  branch  from  Montreal  to  Halifax  not  only 
lies  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  St.  Lawrence  for  safety,  but  a 
part  actually  lies  within  the  borders  of  the  State  of  Maine. 
Col.  Strange,  writing  more  than  a  decade  ago,  says:  "I  have 

•'•From  Moncton,  N.  B.,  the  Canadian  Pacific  trains  run  to  Hali- 
fax over  the  Intercolonial  R.  K. 


18 


not  taken  note  of  the  wilderness  between  Lake  Superior  and 
the  Pacific,  as  it  can  scarcely  be  said  to  contain  a  military 
objective;  an  army  could  not  subsist  in  it,  and  in  any  case  we 
could  not  defend  it,  unless  the  Canadian  Pacific  Railway  is 
constructed." 

Since  Col.  Strange  wrote  the  railway  has  been  con- 
structed. It  now  furnishesin  itself  an  objective  in  the  region 
referred  to,  and  from  the  very  situation  of  the  road,  all  the 
efforts  of  the  British  Empire  probably  could  not  save  it  from 
the  destructive  forays  of  cowboys  from  Montana  and  North 
Dakota.  The  Montreal  and  Halifax  branch  would,  so  far  as 
being  a  part  of  the  system  of  British  communications  is  con- 
cerned, cease  to  exist  as  soon  as  war  was  declared.  But  the 
strategic  value  of  the  Canadian  Pacific,  though  greatly  im- 
paired by  these  conditions,  is  still  very  great.  A  great  arm 
of  the  road  runs  from  Windsor,  through  Toronto  and  Mon- 
treal, to  Quebec,  with  brandies  extending  to  Hamilton, 
Kingston,  Brockville,  Prescott  and  Ottawa. — in  brief,  con- 
necting the  most  important  strategic  pointsof  the  Dominion  by  a 
railroad  behind  the  great  natural  wet-ditch  of  the  Canadian 
fortress.  Of  secondary,  but  not  insignificant,  importance,  is 
that  portion  of  the  main  line  between  Montreal  and  Port 
Arthur,  on  Lake  Superior,  with  its  branch  from  Sudbury  to 
SaultSte.  Marie.  This  part  of  the  road  is  connected  later- 
:ally  by  a  branch  of  the  Grand  Trunk  from  North  Bay  (on 
Lake  Nipissing)  to  Toronto,  and  a  small  road  from  Renfrew 
to  Sharon  Lake. 

The  Michigan  Central  R.  R.,  after  leaving  theboundary 
of  the  United  States,  runs  from  Windsor  to  Welland,  at 
which  point  it  branches  to  Buffalo  on  the  right,  and  to  Clifton 
and  Niagara  on  the  left.  From  St.  Clair  Junction  a  branch 
extends  to  Courtright  on  St.  Clair  River,  from  St.  Thomas  a 
short  branch  runs  to  London,  and  from  two  points,  not  far 
from  Detroit  branches  run  respectively  to  Amherstburg  and 
Sea  Cl iff  Park,  both  on  Lake  Erie.  On  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  the  rolling 


19 


stock  of  this  road  might,  perhaps,  be  speedly  assembled  on 
American  soil;  but  the  Canadian  part  of  the  road  would  still 
exist  as  a  part  of  the  British  lateral  communications. 

We  will  next  consider  the  Grand  Trunk  Railway,  which 
is,  perhaps,  the  most  important  of  all.  One  branch  of  this 
road  runs  from  Windsor  to  Fort  Erie;  another  from  Sarnia 
to  Hamilton  arid  Niagara  Falls,  and  a  third,  from  Sarnia, 
through  Toronto,  Kingston,  Brockville,  and  Prescott,  to  Mon- 
treal. These  branches  are  joined  laterally  by  a  number  of 
railways  belonging  to  the  same  system,  which  not  only  con- 
nect the  main  lines,  but  are  extended  to  points  on  Lake 
Huron,  Georgian  Bay,  Lake  Nipissing  and  various  points  in 
the  interior  of  Ontario.  From  Coteau  Junction  a  branch 
runs  to  Ottawa.  From  Montreal  the  main  line  continues  to 
Richmond,  at  which  point  it  divides  into  two  branches,  one 
running  to  Portland,  Maine,  and  the  other  to  Levis,  opposite 
Quebec.  From  the  latter  branch  is  a  sub-branch  running 
from  Arthabaska  to  a  point  opposite  Three  Rivers.  It  is 
evident  that  the  part  of  this  road,  east  of  Montreal,  loses  much 
of  its  strategic  value,  as  it  lies  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  for  safety,  and  a  portion  of  it  lies  within  our  own 
territory. 

At  Levis,  the  Grand  Trunk  unites  wir.h  the  Intercolonial 
R.  R.  The  latter  road  follows  the  St.  Lawrence  for  more 
than  a  hundred  miles,  then  turns  to  the  right,  skirts  the  upper 
part  of  Chaleur  Bay,  and  continues  in  a  southerly  direction 
to  Halifax.  At  Moncton  the  road  branches  east  to  Point 
Duchene  (near  Shediac,  on  Northumberland  Sound)  and  west 
to  St.  John,  N.  B.  From  Truro,  N.  S.,  the  "Eastern  Exten- 
sion" runs  to  Mulgrave  Wharf  on  the  Strait  of  Canso.  It 
is  evident  at  a  glance  that  the  Intercolonial  R.  R.  would  be 
of  great  value  to  Great  Britain  in  case  of  war  with  this 
country,  as  a  means  of  preserving  lateral  communication  be- 
tween the  New  Brunswick  and  St.  Lawrence  theaters. 

From  St.  John,  N.  B.,  the  New   Brunswick  R.    R.,  as  far 


20 

as  its  junction  with  the  Maine  Central,  forms  a  part  of  the 
Canadian  Pacific.  Through  Frederic-ton  a  branch  of  the  N. 
B.  R.  R.,  connects  the  Intercolonial  and  Canadian  Pacific. 
Another  branch  from  the  same  city  and  one  from  St  Andrews 
unite  at  Newburg  Junction  (near  Woodstock),  and  the  road 
then  continues  near,  and  in  the  general  direction  of  the  Maine 
frontier  as  far  as  Edmunds  ton;  a  continuation  from  that  point 
to  Riviere  du  Loup  being  now  in  process  of  construction. 

The  roads  mentioned  comprise  all  the  principal  railways 
of  the  Dominion,  and  are  the  strategic  railroads  par  excellence 
of  ( 'anada.  There  are  a  few  other  lines,  but  they  are  so  short, 
and  their  military  value  is  so  insignificant,  that  a  description 
of  them  would  only  tend  to  confuse  the  subject,  without 
adding  any  information  of  importance.* 

The  Strategic  Ensemble. — Bearing  in  mind  the  directions 
and  relative  positions  of  the  waterways  and  railroads  just 
described,  we  can  appreciate  the  appositeness  of  Colonel 
Strange's  description  of  the  country  in  question.  "Canada,'' 
he  says,  "is  a  long  strip  of  communications,  its  main  artery, 
the  St.  Lawrence,  being  the  fosse  of  a  natural  fortress,  open 
during  the  summer  season  (winter  operations  may  be  deemed 
impracticable  in  this  climate)  to  the  gunboats  of  Great  Britain, 
and  to  them  alone  as  long  as  the  fortress  of  Quebec  is  kept  in 
a  defensive  condition.  *  *  *  *  The 

Grand  Trunk  Railway  and  others  on  the  south  shore 
are  now  supplemented  by  railways  on  the  north  shore  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  and  the  lakes,  with  their  usual  telegraphic 
lines,  the  whole  forming  a  series  of  communications  which 
have  always  enabled  Canadian  troops  to  act  upon  what  are 
practically  interior  lines,  arid  so  concentrate  readily  upon  im- 
portant strategic  points,  as  was  proved  in  the  late  Fenian 


"'•  In  the  article  "Canada,"  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  (Ninth 
I'M  it  ion)  mentions  eighteen  Canadian  railroads,  All  the  important 
roads  there  mentioned  are  included  in  the  railway  systems  described 
above. 


21 


raids." 

That  Colonel  Strange  is  ri^ht  in  saying  that  the  St. 
Lawrence  is  open  to  British  gunboats,  and  to  them  alone,  as 
long  as  the  fortress  of  Quebec  is  kept  in  a  defensive 
condition  cannot  be  denied.  The  treaty  of  1817  limits 
the  naval  force  to  be  maintained  by  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  to  the  following  vessels  on  each  side,  namely: 

On  Lake  Ontario,  one  vessel,  not  exceeding  one  hundred 
tons  burden,  and  armed  with  one  eighteen  pounder  cannon; 

On  the  upper  lakes,  two  vessels  not  exceeding  like  burden 
each,  and  armed  with  like  force; 

On  the  waters  of  Lake  Champlain,  one  vessel  not  exceed- 
ing like  burden,  and  armed  with  like  force. 

Each  nation  is  also  forbidden  by  the  treaty  to  build  ves- 
sels of  war  on  the  lakes. 

It  would,  therefore,  be  impossible  for  the  United  States 
to  place  a  fleet  of  gunboats  on  the  lakes  without  sending  them 
around  (by  way  of  the  ocean  and  the  St.  Lawrence)  past 
Quebec;  for  we  cannot  build  gunboats  on  the  lakes  in  time  of 
peace  without  such  violation  of  the  treaty  as  to  furnish  a  casus 
belli;  and  after  war  breaks  out  the  opportunities  for  unmo- 
lested naval  construction  are  gone.  Quebec  is  strongly  forti- 
fied, and  can  be  further  strengthened  to  such  a  degree  that 
nothing  larger  than 'a  bird  could  pass  by  on  the  river  without 
the  permission  of  the  British  commandant.  England,  on  the 
contrary,  could  assemble  a  great  fleet  on  the  St.  Lawrence 
without  violating  the  treaty,  and,  at  the  first  sound  of  war, 
could  send  it  thence  through  her  own  canals  into  the  great 
lakes. 

The  disadvantage  under  which  this  unfortunate  treaty 
places  us  c^n  be  overcome  only  by  a  careful  preparation,  in 
time  of  peace,  of  strategic  canals  within  our  own  borders. 
The  enlargement  of  the  Erie  Canal  (including  the  Oswego 
branch)  would  enable  gunboats  to  pass  from  the  Hudson  into 
Lake  Erie  and  Lake  Ontario.  The  Oneida  Ship-canal 


22 

would  also  be  of  great  value.  The  proposed  route  of  this 
canal  is  from  Oswego  by  means  of  the  Os\v ego  Canal  to  a 
point  near  Phoenix;  thence  by  means  of  a  new  canal  and  the 
Oueida  River  to  Oneida  Lake;  thence  by  the  lake  and  the 
Oneida  Canal  to  the  Erie  Canal  at  Durhamville.  The  en- 
largement of  the  Champlain  and  Erie  Canal  (from  Lake 
Champiain  to  the  Hudson)  or  the  construction  of  a  new  canal 
from  Whitehall  to  Fort  Edward  would  be  of  very  evident 
strategic  value. 

The  Hennepin  Ship-canal  is  designed  to  connect  the 
Mississippi  with  Lake  Michigan.  The  proposed  route  for 
this  canal  is  from  Watertown,  111.,  to  Hennepin,  then  by  the 
Illinois  River  (14  miles)  to  LaSalle,  and  from  that  point  to 
Chicago,  via  the  Illinois  and  Michigan  Canal  enlarged. 

The  improvement  of  the  navigation  of  the  Wisconsin  and 
Fox  rivers,  and  their  connection  by  means  of  a  canal  would 
unite  by  water  Prairie  du  Chien  and  Green  Bay — in  other 
words,  it  would  give  water  communication  between  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  Lake  Michigan. 

All  these  plans  seem  to  have  been  more  or  less  seriously 
contemplated  by  our  Government,  and  the  construction  or 
improvement  of  the  canals  in  question  may  be  hoped  for.  It 
is  a  significant  fact,  however,  that  the  advocates  of  the  im- 
provements in  our  internal  waterways  seem  to  consider  the 
commercial  advantages  alone — advantages  so  marked  that  the 
most  bitter  opponents  of  the  canals  are  those  who  are  working 
in  the  interests  of  the  railroads;  and  the  strategic  value  of 
the  canals  (like  most  other  military  matters)  seems  to  have 
been  generally  ignored  by  our  people. 

Yet  the  strategic  value  of  the  canals  would  be  beyond 
computation.  Our  naval  depots  for  the  lake  fleets  could  be 
established  in  safety  far  within  our  own  borders;  and  in  case 
of  war  an  armada  of  gunboats  could  be  sent  from  the  Missis- 
sippi into  the  Lakes  a  full  month  earlier  in  the  year  than  a 
similiar  naval  force  could  be  sent  thither  from  the  Gulf  of 
St.  Lawrence.  The  canals  joining  the  Mississippi  and  the 


23 


Lakes  are  not  designed,  however,  to  have  a  depth  equal  to 
that  of  the  Canadian  canals;  the  minimum  depth  of  the  Hen- 
nepin  Canal  being  specified  at  eight  feet,  and  that  of  the 
Winconsin  Canal  at  five. 

The  Ohio  and  Erie  Canal  (from  Portsmouth  to  Cleve- 
land) and  the  Miami  and  Erie  Canal  (from  Cincinnati  to 
Toledo)  could  not  easily  be  sufficiently  enlarged  to  serve  as 
ship-canals. 

We  may,  however,  question  the  correctness  of  Colonel 
Strange's  judgment  in  deeming  winter  operations  impractica- 
ble in  Canada.  Our  own  troops  have  endured,  in  winter 
campaigns  in  Montana  and  the  Dakotas,  weather  of  greater 
severity  than  they  would  be  called  upon  to  face  in  most  parts 
of  Canada;  and  the  all-but-successful  campaign  against  Que- 
bec made  by  the  ill-clad  and  half-starved  soldiers  of  Mont- 
gomery and  Arnold,  who  conducted  siege  and  assault  late  in 
December,  shows  that  "Field-Marshal  Frost"  is  not  such  a 
formidable  British  ally  as  Colonel  Strange  would  have  us 
believe.  In  fact,  without  a  naval  superiority  to  Great  Bri- 
tain, our  best  hopes  of  success  must  be  found  in  a  winter 
campaign.  I  am  by  no  means  inclined  to  underestimate  the 
hardships  and  difficulties  of  a  campaign  in  the  terrible  rigor 
of  a  Canadian  winter;  but  I  shall  endeavor,  further  on,  to 
show  that  a  winter  campaign  in  the  Dominion  would  be 
attended  with  results  that  could  scarcely  be  hoped  for  in 
summer. 

Climate. — Although  Canada  is  always  regarded  as  a  cold 
country,  its  climate  is  one  of  extremes  of  heat  and  cold.  The 
temperature  at  Toronto  varies  from  12°  below  to  91°  above 
zero,  Fahrenheit.  At  Montreal  the  limits  are  17°  below  and  96° 
above.  At  Quebec  the  thermometer  ranges  from  24°  below 
to  91°  above  zero.  At  Halifax  the  lowest  point  is  9° 
below,  the  highest,  88°  above;  while  the  greatest  extremes  of 
heat  and  cold  seem  to  be  found  at  Fredericton,  N.  B.,  where 
the  mercury  has  been  known  to  drop  in  winter  to  35°  below 
zero,  and  in  summer  to  rise  to  100°  above. 


24 

Cities. —The  cities  of  Canada  are  so  well  known  tliat 
nothing  but  a  brief  description  of  them  is  here  requisite. 

First  in  commercial  importance  is  Montreal  (situated  on 
an  island  of  the  same  name)  having  a  population  of  216,650, 
and  covering  an  area  of  eight  square  miles.  The  St.  Law- 
rence is  here  crossed  by  three  bridges,  one  of  which  is  the 
celebrated  Victoria  bridge,  an  iron  tubular  structure  nearly 
two  miles  long,  supported  on  twenty-four  piers  of  solid  mason- 
ry. As  a  railroad  centre,  the  head  of  unimpeded  ocean 
traffic;*  the  outlet  of  the  Canadian  system  of  canals;  in  brief, 
as  the  connecting  link  between  the  ocean  and  the  Lakes, 
Montreal  is  a  point  of  immense  commercial  and  strategical 
value,  and  has  been  termed  "the  key  and  the  capital  of 
Canada."  In  strategic  importance  it  is  second  to  Quebec 
alone. 

Toronto  (population  181,220)  is,  in  commercial  conse- 
quence, the  second  city  of  the  Dominion,  and  is  the  capital  of 
Ontario.  It  owes  its  importance  to  its  excellent  harbor  on 
Lake  Ontario  and  to  the  junction  here  of  several  important 
railroads.  It  is  also  a  considerable  manufacturing  city. 

Quebec,  the  capital  of  the  province  of  the  same  name, 
has  a  population  of  63,090,  and  is  thus  the  third  city  in 
Canada.  From  a  strategic  point  of  view,  it  is  the  most  im- 
portant place  in  the  Dominion,  completely  controlling  the 
St.  Lawrence,  to  which  it  can  admit  friendly  vessels  and  from 
which  it  can  bar  out  all  hostile  fleets.  The  history  of  every 
war  fought  on  Canadian  soil  shows*  that  the  possession  of 
Quebec  is  essential  to  the  mastery  of  Canada.  The  place  is 
described  as  "the  most  picturesque  and  the  most  strongly  for- 
tified city  on  the  Continent."  It  was  formerly  a  walled  city, 
but  several  of  the  old  fortifications  have  been  demolished , 
and  some  of  the  gates  have  been  removed.  The  chief  forti- 


-:' Vessels  drawing  Tt\  feet  can  ascend  the  St.  Lawrence  as  far  as 
Montreal. 


25 


fication  is  the  Citadel,  which  stands  on  Cape  Diamond,  333 
feet  above  the  river,  and  covers  an  area  of  forty  acres.  A 
large  factory  for  the  fabrication  of  small-arm  cartridges  and 
artillery  projectiles  is  located  at  Quebec.  The  harbor  of  the 
city  is  excellent,  and  its  extensive  docks  are  among  the  best 
in  the  world. 

Hamilton,  Ontario,  is  a  considerable  manufacturing  cen- 
ter, has  a  good  harbor  on  Lake  Ontario,  and  is  the  junction 
of  several  railroads  connecting  it  with  Lake  Erie,  Lake  Hu- 
ron and  Georgian  Bay.  The  population  of  Hamilton  is 
48,980. 

Ottawa,  on  the  Ottawa  River,  is  the  capital  of  the 
Dominion.  Like  the  city  of  Washington,  its  importance 
rests  almost  exclusively  upon  its  character  as  the  political 
heart  of  the  country.  Its  population  is  44,154. 

Next  in  size  is  St.  John,  the  chief  city  of  New  Bruns- 
wick, with  a  population  of  39, 179.  It  has  an  excellent  har- 
bor, which  never  freezes,  and  which  is  protected  by  strong- 
batteries.  It  is  a  port  of  importance,  a  considerable  manu- 
facturing city,  and  has  good  communications  with  the  interior 
by  means  of  the  Intercolonial  and  New  Brunswick  railroads. 

Halifax  (population  38,536)  is  the  chief  city  of  Nova 
Scotia.  It  has  an  excellent  harbor,  and  is  the  winter  port 
for  the  Dominion  of  Canada — the  St.  Lawrence  being  frozen 
over  in  that  season.  The  hill  on  which  the  city  stands  is 
commanded  by  a  citadel  a  mile  in  circumference  and  of 
great  strength,  and  the  harbor  is  defended  by  several  forts 
and  batteries.  It  is  the  only  place  in  the  Dominion  which 
still  has  a  garrison  of  British  regular  troops,  and  it  is  a  naval 
station  of  great  importance. 

Kingston  owes  its  strategic  importance  to  its  situation  on 
Lake  Ontario  at  the  point  where  the  St.  Lawrence  issues 
from  the  lake,  and  to  its  location  at  one  extremity  of  the 
Rideau  Canal.  It  is  an  important  naval  station,  audits  popu- 
lation is  19,264. 


26 

London,  Ontario,  (population  31,977)  is  of  considerable 
importance  as  a  railroad  centre,  as  are  also  Guelpli  and  Strat- 
ford, in  the  same  province.  Sarnia,  on  St.  Glair  River,  and 
Windsor,  opposite  Detroit,  are,  from  their  positions,  of  some 
strategic  importance. 

Population. — The  population  of  Canada  may  be  broadly 
divided  into  two  great  classes — Anglo-Saxon  and  French. 
The  former  class  consists  mainly  of  the  descendants  of  early 
British  colonists  in  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick,  of  later 
immigrants,  and  the  descendants  of  Tories  who  emigrated 
from  the  United  States  to  the  British  provinces  after  Ameri- 
can independence  had  become  assured.  The  Anglo-Saxon 
Canadians  resemble,  in  most  respects,  the  people  of  our 
Northern  States.  They  are  energetic,  enlightened,  progres- 
sive and  independent;  and  to  them  the  prosperity  of  the 
Dominion  is  almost  altogether  due. 

The  French  Canadians  are  descended  from  the  old  colo- 
nists of  the  days  of  Froutenac  and  Montcalm,  and  now  num- 
ber about  1,083,000.  They  are  limited  mainly  to  the  pro- 
vince of  Quebec,  of  which  they  furnish  the  great  bulk  of  the 
population.  They  resemble  their  Anglo-Saxon  compatriots 
in  L./ift,  but  in  scarcely  anything  else.  They  are  slow,  con- 
sarvative,  and  as  completely  priest-ridden  as  the  peasantry  of 
Spain  or  Bohemia.  Secured  in  their  own  language,  laws, 
and  religion  by  the  treaty  of  Paris  in  1763,  their  manners 
and  customs  have  remained  unchanged,  and  the  province 
to  day  presents  the  appearance  of  a  portion  of  France  under 
the  folds  of  the  British  flag — but  it  is  the  France  of  Louis 
Quinze,  and  has  nothing  in  common  with  the  Republic  of  the 
present  day.  Ever  since  the  conquest  of  Canada  the  French 
Canadians  have  been  loyal  to  the  British  crown;  but  theirs 
has  been  the  loyalty  of  self-interest  rather  than  affection,  and 
has  been  largely  a  matter  of  obedience  to  their  church,  which 
has  in  Quebec  an  influence,  authority  and  sway,  such  as  no 
church  lias  in  any  other  part  of  the  British  Empire.  Indus- 


27 


trious  and  humble,  the  typical  French  Canadian  passes  a 
monotonous  existence  in  working  hard,  saving  money,  hear- 
ing mass,  and  obeying  the  biblical  injunction  to  propagate 
and  multiply.  As  a  result,  the  population  of  Quebec  not 
only  steadily  increase?,  but  overflows  into  New  England, 
where  in  some  localities  it  is  begining  to  root  out  the  native 
population;  for  a  French  Canadian  can  grow  rich  on  wages 
that  would  mean  starvation  to  an  American.  Many  of  these 
people  return  to  Canada;  and  there  is  a  constant  passing  to 
and  fro  which  serves  to  bind  the  province  in  sympathy  with 
its  great  neighbor,  and  doubtless  engenders  in  a  considerable 
degree  such  friendship  for  the  United  States  as  grows  out  of 
the  natural  affection  of  a  man  for  his  treasury.  Though  this 
friendship  springs  spontaneously  from  the  pocket-book  rather 
than  the  heart,  it  is  perhaps  none  the  less  potent  for  that 
reason;  and  it  may,  and  doubtless  does,  inspire  the  population 
of  Quebec  with  an  aversion  to  war,  and  a  desire  for  peace, 
with  the  United  States. 

But,  though  the  French  Canadians  are  doubtless  sincere- 
ly desirous  of  remaining  at  peace  with  the  United  States, 
their  attitude  in  the  event  of  a  declaration  of  war  w7ould  be 
decided  entirely  by  the  policy  of  their  church,  and  it  may  be 
doubted  that  the  priests  would  consent  to  any  change  that 
would  make  them  mere  ministers  of  religion  instead  of  politi- 
cal factors.  If  war  should  come  upon  this  peacefully  inclined 
population,  it  is  probable  that  they  would  accordingly  enter 
with  heart  and  soul  upon  the  defense  of  the  British  flag.  Sir 
George  Cartier  declared  that  the  last  gun  in  defense  of  Brit- 
ish supremacy  in  Canada  would  be  fired  by  a  French  Cana- 
dian, and  Sir  James  Carmichsel  Smith  states  that  during  the 
entire  war  of  1812  not  a  single  French-Canadian  militiaman 
deserted. 

In  addition  to  these  two  great  classes  of  population  there 
are  many  Irish,,  English,  Scotch,  Germans,  Dutch  and 
Americans  in  Canada,  besides  a  considerable  sprinkling  of 


28 

Welsh,  Scandinavians,  Icelanders  and  Russian  Mennouites. 
The  ubiquitous  African  is  found  in  the  Dominion  to  the 
rxUMit  of  22,000,  being  mainly  a  somber  reminiscence  of  the 
ante-bellum  "underground  railway." 

Military  Forces. — I  cannot,  within  the  bounds  of  this  lecture, 
give  an  extended  description  of  the  military  forces  of  Canada. 
\Ve  must,  however,  have  some  knowledge  of  the  strength 
and  composition  of  the  enemy's  armies  before  we  can  utilize 
our  geographical  knowledge  in  deciding  upon  a  general  plan 
of  campaign. 

The  militia  of  Canada  is  divided  into  four  classes,  as 
follows: — 

1st  class:  Unmarried  men  and  childless  widowers  from 
eighteen  to  thirty  years  or  age. 

2d  class:  Unmarried  men  and  childless  widowers  from 
thirty  to  forty-five  years  of  age. 

3d  class:  Widowers  with  children  and  married  men  from 
eighteen  to  forty-five  years  of  age. 

4th  class:  Men  from  forty -five  to  sixty  years  of  age. 

This  force  is  divided  into  active  and  reserve  militia. 

The  active  militia  consists  of  2,024  cavalry,  1,639  field 
artillery,  2,099  garrison  artillery,  243  engineers,  and  28,948 
infantry,  giving  a  total  of  34,953  men,  all  of  whom  are  taken 
from  the  first  class.  If  a  sufficient  number  of  men  is  not 
obtained  from  that  class  by  volunteering,  the  quota  is  filled 
by  draft.  The  period  of  training  is  only  twelve  days  each 
year. 

Each  company  of  Canadian  militia  consists  of  three  offi- 
cers and  forty-two  non-commissioned  officers  and  men.  In 
mobilizing  the  militia  for  war,  it  is  the  intention  of  the  Cana- 
dian authorities  to  increase  each  company  to  a  strength  of 
eighty-seven  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  by  the  addi- 
tion of  privates  from  the  reserve,  and  it  is  estimated  that  a 
call  to  arms  would  raise  the  militia  at  once  to  a  strength  of 
nearly  65,000  men.  The  present  militia  system  was  estab- 
lished in  1868,  since  which  time  about  30,000  men  have  been 


29 


trained  each  year.  Three  years  is  the  period  of  service  in 
the  active  militia,  but  many  of  the  men  do  not  serve  more 
than  two.  It  is  estimated  that  there  are  accordingly  upwards 
of  200,000  men  in  Canada  who  have  served  in  the  ranks, 
and  acquired  some  knowledge  of  the  rudiments  of  drill  and 
target  practice/ 

There  are  Cavalry,  Artillery  and  Infantry  schools  for 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  active  militia. 
Since  1865,  more  than  15,000  students  have  taken  certificates 
of  qualification  for  their  respective  ranks  on  the  completion 
of  a  three  months  course.  Many  of  these  men  would  be 
available  as  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  should  the 
reserve  militia  be  called  out. 

There  is  a  military  college  at  Kingston,  which  is 
modeled  after  West  Point.  It  has  graduated  185  cadets 
qualified  for  staff  positions.  The  staff  and  engineering 
school  attached  to  the  Koyal  Military  College  has  granted 
some  sixty  certificates  to  qualified  active  militia  officers. 

The  active  militia  would  probably  be  immediately  avail- 
able at  the  outbreak  of  war,  as  their  mobilization  could  be 
quickly  effected;  for  the  Canadian  government  has  so  far 
adopted  the  German  system  as  to  divide  the  Dominion  into 
twelve  military  districts,  each  of  which  i.s  sub-divided  into 
regimental  and  company  districts — each  district  and  sub-dis- 
trict having  its  own  commanding  officer  and  staff,  its  muster- 
rolls  prepared,  and  everything  in  readiness  for  prompt 
mobilization.  The  concentration  and  supply  of  these  forces 
would,  however,  be  a  matter  of  great  difficulty;  for  "the 
weakest  spot  in  the  Canadian  militia  system  is  the  total 
absence  of  any  nucleus  ot  transport." 

If  the  Canadians  were  to  accomplish  feats  of  organization 
and  mobilization  equal  to  those  of  the  Germans,  and  were  to 
call  out  the  four  classes  of  their  militia,  they  might  produce 
an  army  of  800,000  men.  But  such  results  are  obtained 
only  when  popular  clamor  absolutely  demands  war;  when 


30 

each  man  feels  that  his  religion,  his  well-being,  or  his  per- 
sonal freedom  is  in  jeopardy;  or  when  from  some  great  cause, 
his  combative  ness  has  been  roused  to  the  highest  degree. 
The  presence  of  people  in  Canada  favorably  disposed  to  the 
United  States,  of  those  actually  hostile  to  Great  Britain,  of 
internal  difficulties  owing  to  racial  antipathies,  and  of  many 
other  conditions,  must  be  ignored  if  we  imagine  this  great 
aggregate  possible. 

It  is  more  probable  that  the  first  call  would  bring  out 
about  60,000  Canadian  militia,  essentially  the  same  hi  quali- 
ty as  our  National  Guard.  The  Canadian  militia  has,  doubt' 
less,  improved  since  the  day  when  the  "Queen's  Own"  of 
Toronto  ran  away  from  the  Fenians;  the  American  militia 
is  certainly  better  than  it  was  when  it  fled  from  the  field  of 
Bladensburg.  The  Canadian  militia  would,  doubtless,  be 
increased  more  or  less  from  the  reserve.  Under  the  stimulus 
of  victory  it  might  even  grow  into  a  formidable  army;  but 
under  the  depressing  influence  of  defeat  it  would  suffer  the 
disintegration  characteristic  of  all  militia  armies  in  adversity. 

Colonel  Strange  expects  entirely  too  much,  I  think, 
from  the  militia  of  the  Dominion.  He  says  of  Canada: 
"The  history  of  her  struggles  against  invasion  showed  that 
she  could  and  did,  with  the  assistance  of  but  few  British 
troops/ bear  the  brunt  of  it  with  her  militia,  who,  almost 
unaided,  rolled  back  the  tide  of  war  from  her  shores.  Before 
the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  1814-15,  not  a  single 
American  post  or  sentry  remained  on  the  Canadian  shore, 
while  we  were  in  posession  of  Fort  Michilimachinac  and 
other  points  in  what  is  DOW  the  State  of  Michigan." 

We  may  as  well  take  issue  with  Colonel  Strange  right 
here  as  to  the  accuracy  of  his  historical  statements.  Canada 
was  not  defended  by  her  militia,  "with  the  assistance  of  but 
few  British  tioops."  In  1814  it  was  defended  by  a  body  of 
veteran  British  regulars  exceeding  in  number  the  largest 
army  that  the  United  States  ever  placed  on  the  Northern 


31 


Frontier;  and  while  the  impotence  of  our  attempts  to  conquer 
Canada, — owing  to  incompetent  generals,  a  misplaced  reliance 
on  militia,  perverse  governors  thwarting  the  efforts  of  the 
National  Executive,  and  the  influence  of  a  powerful  peace 
party, — must  ever  be  a  source  ol  mortification  to  every  true 
American,  we  may  remind  Colonel  Strange  that  American 
soldiers  more  than  once  saw  the  backs  of  troops  who  had 
passed  victoriously  through  the  carnage  of  Badajos  and  had 
stood  in  triumph  on  the  bloody  field  of  Salamanca. 

In  a  later  paper  by  Colonel  Strange  on  "Canadian 
Defense,"  reprinted  in  the  number  of  the  Journal  of  the 
Military  Service  Institution  for  January,  1891,  that 
gentleman  speaks  of  the  militia  law  of  Canada  as  "theoreti- 
cally perfect;"  but  adds  that  "its  practical  result  depends  upon 
its  administration,  which,  from  the  meager  pittance  applied 
by  Parliament,  is  faulty." 

In  1885  the  Canadian  government  mobilized  a  force  of 
men  5500  by  an  order  dated  March  27  of  that  year,  and  in 
two  weeks  had  concentrated  it  in  the  Saskatchewan  valley. 
A  speedy  suppression  of  the  Kiel  rebellion  was  the  result. 
From  the  small  number  of  troops  called  out,  this  prompt 
action  was,  however,  hardly  a  fair  indication  of  the  time  that 
would  be  required  lor  the  mobilization  and  concentration  of 
the  entire  militia  force  of  the  Dominion.  An  anonymous 
but  able  Canadian  correspondent  of  the  Military  Service 
Institution  in  an  article  on  "Mobilization  and  Concentra- 
tion of  the  Canadian  Militia,"  published  in  June,  1887,  esti- 
mates that  a  total  militia  force  of  81,900  men  could  be 
assembled  for  the  defense  of  the  frontier  line  from  Quebec  to 
Detroit;  but  he  adds,  "the  complete  work  of  mobilization, 
from  the  raising  of  men  through  all  the  stages  of  arming, 
equipping,  clothing  and  combining  into  units,  up  to  the  final 
concentration  at  the  strategic  points,  would  occupy  an  inter- 
val of  time  which  could  only  be  calculated  by  months."  A 
paper  in  the  same  magazine  for  December,  18S6,  gives  a 


32 

description  of  the  annual  training  of  the  Canadian  militia, 
from  which  I  infer  that  those  troops  are  not  one  whit  superior 
in  efficiency  to  our  own  organized  National  Guard.  Of  the 
twelve  days  training  each  year,  it  seems  that  one  day  is  con- 
sumed in  reaching  carnp,  one  in  leaving  it,  one  in  marching 
through  town  on  a  holiday  parade,  and  one  in  sham  battle 
nonsense,  leaving  only  seven  days  for  real  military  "work, 
Sunday  being,  of  course,  a  day  of  rest. 

I  am  not  inclined  to  underestimate  the  fighting  capacity 
of  the  Canadians — their  history  shows  them  ever  to  have  been 
a  brave  and  warlike  people — but  their  forces  are  merely  mili- 
tia, which  could  become  really  efficient  only  in  the  course  of 
many  months  of  successful  (or  at  least  not  disastrous)  war. 
The  military  importance  of  Canada  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a 
base  for  the  military  operations  of  a  powerful  empire  which 
controls  the  ocean  and  is  capable  of  putting  forth  great 
strength  on  land. 

The  regular  army  of  Great  Britain  consists,  in  round 
numbers,  of  200,000  men.  The  Regular  Army  Reserve,  the 
Militia,  the  Volunteers  and  the  Indian  Native  Army  swell 
this  force  to  a  total  war  strength  of  772,000  men,  without 
including  14,000  armed  constabulary  in  Ireland,  and  190,000 
native  military  police  in  India.  Of  course  this  force  could 
not  all,  nor  even  a  great  portion  of  it,  be  concentrated  on  any 
one  theater;  for  the  vast  extent  of  the  British  Empire  and 
the  smoldering  discontent  of  millions  of  British  subjects 
require  the  distribution  of  this  huge  army  among  many  dif- 
ferent regions  of  the  globe.  We  know,  however,  that  Eng- 
land easily  sent  40,000  regular  troops  to  Egypt  in  1882,  and 
there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  she  could, withoutsacrificingher 
security  in  other  quarters,  place  in  Canada  two  highly  orga- 
nized, perfectly  equipped,  and  thoroughly  efficient  army 
corps  and  a  division  of  cavalry.*  She  could  spare  these 

*0olonel  Maurice  in  ''The  Balance  of  Military  Power  in  Europe," 
says  that  the  British  Government  is  aiming  to  "work  up  to  the  stan- 
dard of  putting  two  army  corps  and  a  cavalry  division 
into  a  condition  for  effective  action  abroad."  As  to  the  practicability 
of  being  able  to  reach  that  standard,  Colonel  Maurice  does  not  seem 
to  entertain  the  slightest  doubt. 


33 


troops,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  she  has  abundant  trans- 
portation for  them.  Great  Britain  could,  thei},  begin  the 
American  Avar  with  some  70,000  regular  troops — the  best  in 
Europe — and  about  60,000  militia.  We  could  oppose  this 
army  at  first  with  25,000  regulars  and  112000  organized 
militia.  Our  ultimate  preponderance  in  military  strength 
cannot  be  doubted;  but  I  do  not  share  the  views  of  those  who 
think  the  conquest  of  Canada  would  be  a  military  promenade 
for  the  American  Army. 

EFFECT  OF  THE    GEOGRAPHICAL    CONDITIONS    UPON    MILITARY 
OPERATIONS. 

As  a  means  of  forming  an  estimate  of  the  military  value 
of  these  various  conditions  of  the  physical  and  political  geog- 
raphy of  Canada,  let  us  suppose  that  a  war  has  broken  out 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The  first 
question,  "Shall  we  assume  the  initiative,  or  wait  in  a  defen- 
sive position  the  assault  of  the  enemy?"  is  quickly  answered. 
As  to  our  Atlantic,  Gulf,  and  Pacific  sea-board,  circumstances 
plainly  demand  the  adoption  of  the  latter  course.  As  to 
Canada,  the  natural  aggressiveness  of  our  people,  combined 
with  a  confidence  born  of  our  traditions,  will  demand  the 
adoption  of  a  vigorous  offensive. 

In  the  selection  of  an  object,  it  is  of  paramount  impor- 
tance so  to  direct  our  efforts  as  to  isolate  the  Canadians  as 
much  as  possible  from  Great  Britain,  and  to  separate  the 
different  provinces  from  each  other.  Quebec  is  the  most 
important  objective,  for  its  possession  by  us  would  prevent 
the  naval  or  military  reinforcement  of  the  British  armies  or 
fleets  above  that  point,  and  history  proves  that  it  is  the  key 
to  the  conquest  of  Canada.  Though  we  should  therefore 
regard  Quebec  as  our  ultimate  objective,  we  cannot  make  it 
our  immediate  one.  The  old  line  of  invasion,  via  the  Kcn- 
nebec  and  Chaudiere  rivers,  followed  by  Arnold — difficult  to 
the  last  degree  for  his  small  force— may  be  regarded  as  alto- 
gether impracticable  for  the  large  army  that  would  now  be 


34 


required  for  the  reduction  of  the  strongest  place  on  the 
Continent. 

The  route  via  Richmond  and  Arthabaska  would  lend  a 
flank  to  the  attacks  of  the  British,  and  expose  our  communi- 
cations to  assault  from  Montreal.  The  only  other  route  is 
tlie  one  adopted  by  Montgomery — the  line  via  Montreal:  and 
the  reduction  of  that  city  must  be  first  effected,  in  order  to 
protect  the  flank  of  the  army  marching  down  the  St.  Law- 
rence. Moreover,  that  river  is  desirable  for  the  transporta- 
tion of  heavy  ordnance,  without  which  the  siege  of  Quebec 
would  be  a  farce.  Finally  the  control  of  the  river  by  vessels 
of  war  or  heavy  floating  batteries  is  necessary,  in  order  that 
the  city  may  be  invested — otherwise  the  investing  army 
would  be  cut  in  two  by  the  stream.  We  are,  then,  at  first, 
neither  in  a  position  to  reach  nor  .to  reduce  Quebec. 

The  capture  of  Montreal  is  a  necessary  stepping-stone  to 
the  reduction  of  Quebec.  But  there  are  many  other  reasons 
why  we  should  choose  Montreal  as  our  primary  objective. 
We  have  already  seen  that  the  Canadian  canals  give  entrance 
to  British  war-vessels  into  the  Great  Lakes.  The  capture  of 
Montreal  would  cut  Canada  in  two;  it  would  give  us  posses- 
sion of  the  Beauharnois  and  Lachine  canals,  and  protect  the 
country  above  from  naval  attacks  by  any  vessels  except  such 
as  might  have  ascended  the  St.  Lawrence  before  the  surren- 
der of  that  city;  and  the  ultimate  capture  of  such  vessels 
would  be  certain.  Moreover,  it  would  place  us  in  possession 
of  the  metropolis  and  chief  railroad  centre  of  the  Dominion, 
thus  causing  such  embarrassment  to  the  trade  of  the  Cana- 
"dians  as  to  bring  them  to  a  realizing  sense  of  the  inconven- 
ience, if  not  the  horrors,  of  war.  Finally,  it  would  place  us 
in  the  best  possible  position  for  operating  in  any  direction 
that  military  circumstances  might  require. 

The  operations  against  Montreal  would  be  of  such  im- 
portance as  to  demand  the  efforts  of  a  great  army.  This 
army  should  have  its  primary  base  at  Albany,  a  point  easily 


35 


reached  by  rail  or  water  from  all  parts  of  the  country.  A 
secondary  base  would  be  at  Rouse's  Point.  The  enemy  would 
probably  be  first  met  at  Fort  Isle-aux-Noix  near  the  frontier; 
and  would  almost  certainly  be  encountered  in  force  at  St. 
John's,  as  that  place  is  a  strategic  point  of  importance, 
commanding  the  junction  of  several  railroads,  the  Richelieu 
Canal,  and  the  Vermont  Central  R.  R.  bridge  over  the  Rich- 
elieu River.  If  dilatory  mobilization  and  concentration  on 
our  part  should  give  time  to  the  British,  we  should  probably 
find  them  strongly  intrenched  at  St.  John's;  at  any  rate,  in 
this  vicinity  would  be  fought  the  battle  for  the  control  of  the 
Richelieu  Canal  and  the  possession  of  the  Montreal  angle 
formed  by  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Richelieu.  Victory  here 
would  enable  us  to  hold  the  waterways  as  far  down  as  Sorel, 
would  cause  the  retreat  of  the  British  to  the  Island  of  Mon- 
treal, and  would  give  us  possession  of  the  Beauharnois  Canal. 
Proximity  to  its  base,  and  the  fact  that  its  front  would  cover 
its  line  of  retreat,  would  save  our  army  from  heavy  disaster 
in  case  of  defeat. 

Arrived  opposite  Montreal,  the  American  commander 
would  find  himself  confronted  by  a  serious  problem.  The 
river  here  is  navigable  for  the  largest  vessels  of  the  British 
navy,  and  is  a  mile  and  a  quarter  wide.  Just  above  the  city 
the  stream  narrows  to  half  a  mile,  but  the  water  rushes 
through  the  narrow  channel  at  the  rate  of  eighteen  miles  an 
hour.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  bridges  would  be  ren- 
dered impassable  at  the  first  approach  of  the  Americans.  A 
passage  of  the  St.  Lawrence  at  Montreal  by  a  large  army 
while  the  river  was  open,  opposed  as  it  would  be  by  a  formi- 
dable force  on  land,  aided  by  naval  vessels  in  the  river  or  by 
the  active  alliance  of  nature  in  the  foaming  rapids,  would 
require  military  genius  of  the  highest  order,  and  would  be 
an  achievement  worthy  of  ranking  with  Napoleon's  passage 
of  the  Danube  at  the  Island  of  Lobau.  But  even  if  our 
army  were  baffled  for  months  in  attempting  the  passage,  the 


36 


approach  of  winter  would  change  matters  for  the  better;  and 
ail  ice-locked  river  would  place  the  island  and  city  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Americans  as  surely  as  the  Dutch  ships  frozen 
in  the  Helder  were  at  the  mercy  of  Pichegru's  hussars.  An 
advantage  of  immense  importance  that  would,  in  the  mean- 
time, be  derived  from  the  mere  presence  of  our  army  before 
Montreal,  would  be  the  holding  in  check  of  all  naval  and 
military  reinforcements  for  Ontario;  for,  as  the  fall  of  the 
city  would  cut  off  the  retreat  of  such  reinforcements,  the 
British  would  hesitate  to  place  them  in  jeopardy  by  sending 
them  beyond  the  menaced  city. 

It  seems  clear,  then,  that  Montreal  should  be  our  first 
objective,  and  that  we  should  here  assume  the  initiative 
promptly  and  with  as  large  and  efficient  an  army  as  possible. 
This  army,  from  the  nature  of  the  theatre,  should  be  com- 
posed of  a  large  proportion  of  infantry,  with  field  artillery 
not  exceeding  three  guns  to  each  thousand  men  of  other 
arms,  and  with  only  enough  cavalry  for  screening  and  recon- 
uoitering  duty.  The  army  should  not  be  encumbered  with 
heavy  artillery;  for  its  movements  should  be  made  with  the 
utmost  celerity,  and,  once  before  Montreal,  its  siege  trains 
could  be  speedily  forwarded  by  rail  and  water  from  Albany. 
A  large  force  should  be  detached  to  seize  and  occupy  Rich- 
mond, thus  holding  an  important  railroad  junction,  protect- 
ing the  right  wing  of  the  army  before  Montreal  from  attack 
from  Quebec,  covering  Vermont  from  invasion,  and  main- 
taining communication  between  the  army  at  Montreal  and 
one  in  Maine  which  we  will  consider  later. 

An  army  operating  from  Albany  as  its  primary  base, 
with  a  secondary  base  at  Watertown,  should  move  against 
Prescott  and  the  Williamsburg  canals.  A  successful  passage 
of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  capture  of  the  canals  would  snap 
the  water  communications  of  the  British  at  an  important 
point;  and  if  the  passage  were  absolutely  secured,  the  army 
would  be  in  a  position  to  operate  against  Kingston,  or  to 


37 


move  down  the  left  bank  of  the  river  against  Montreal.  In 
the  latter  case,  however,  the  British  would  have  the  advan- 
tage of  interior  lines,  and  the  movement  against  Montreal 
should  not  be  undertaken  unless  the  army,  after  masking 
Kingston  with  a  strong  detachment,  could  still  be  superior  to 
any  force  that  it  might  encounter.  Otherwise  the  move- 
ment would  be  an  imitation,  on  the  same  theatre,  of  the  dis- 
mal strategy  of  Amherst  in  1760,  and  Wilkinson  in  1813  — 
the  former  undeservedly  successful  and  the  latter  deservedly 
unsuccessful.  If  the  activity  of  the  British  military  and  na- 
val forces  on  the  St.  Lawrence  should  protect  Prescott  and 
the  canals  by  barring  the  river,  this  army  could,  at  least, 
defend  New  York  from  incursions  of  the  enemy,  protect  the 
left  flank  of  the  army  operating  against  Montreal,  and  in 
case  of  need  be  drawn  in  to  the  assistance  of  that  force.  It 
would  probably  be  the  part  of  wisdom  to  limit  the  strength 
of  the  army  in  question  to  the  numbers  sufficient  to  insure 
the  destruction  of  the  canals  and  the  defense  of  the  New 
York  frontier. 

Hamilton  would  be  an  objective  of  great  importance; 
mainly  as  furnishing  a  base  for  further  operations.  In  the 
case  of  Montreal,  to  designate  the  object  is  to  name  the  thea- 
tre; but  with  Hamilton  such  is  not  the  case.  Ontario  can  be 
invaded  from  the  west  as  well  as  from  the  east;  and  an  army 
based  on  Detroit  and  Port  Huron  would  have  as  secure  a 
starting  point  as  one  invading  from  Buffalo  and  Niagara. 
But  the  operations  would  not  be  so  decisive.  If  in  the  former 
case  we  were  in  complete  naval  control  of  Lake  Erie,  the 
theatre  would  give  us  the  advantage  of  a  reentering  base;  but 
otherwise  the  enemy,  if  beaten  back,  would  continually  cover 
his  line  of  retreat,  would  abandon  only  such  territory  as  was 
actually  wrested  from  him,  and  would  draw  nearer  to  his  re- 
inforcements with  each  step  in  retreat.  On  the  other  hand, 
an  army  invading  from  the  Niagara  frontier  would  at  once 
break  the  general  line  of  the  enemy,  and  a  successful  battle 


would  probably  mean  the  reduction  of  the  province.  A 
glance  at  the  map  shows  that  if  we  were  to  undertake  simul- 
taneous movements  from  Buffalo  and  Detroit,  the  Canadians 
would  have  the  advantage  of  interior  lines  with  excellent 
communications.  Instead  of  invading  by  double  lines,  we 
should,  then,  throw  our  greatest  weight  on  the  side  of  Buffa- 
lo; but  the  Detroit  line  should  not  (as  we  shall  see)  be  alto- 
gether neglected;  and  under  certain  circumstances  it  might 
even  become  the  most  important  line  of  all. 

A  large  garrison  of  regular  troops  should  be  continually 
kept  at  Forts  Porter  and  Niagara;  and  at  the  first  sound  of 
war  they  should  be  thrown  across  the  frontier,  seizing  and 
holding  the  International  R.  R.  bridge  between  Fort  Erie 
and  Buffalo,  and  the  Roebling,  Keefer  and  Cantilever  bridges 
below  the  falls  of  Niagara.  Pushing  on  with  the  utmost 
celerity,  they  could  then  seize  the  Welland  Canal  and  blow 
up  its  locks,  If  unable  to  maintain  its  position  on  the  canal, 
this  force  could  then  fall  back  and  occupy  bridge-heads  at 
che  bridges  mentioned  until  the  main  army  should  begin  its 
passage.  Unless  the  Ottawa  and  Georgian  Bay  Canal  were 
completed  and  in  successful  operation,  the  destruction  of  the 
Welland  Canal  would  insure  the  safety  of  the  upper  lakes. 
LieutenantSchenck  in  his  valuable  essay  on  "Our  Northern 
Frontier,"  states  that  within  100  miles  by  rail  of  the  Welland 
Canal,  the  Canadians  have  9,000  militia  with  42  gnus,  com- 
pletely armed  and  equipped;  but  he  fails  to  note  that  the 
mobilization  of  this  force  would  require  some  appreciable 
time.  Recognizing  the  value  of  the  initiative,  the  slowness, 
at  best,  of  militia  assemblement,  and  the  superiority  of  regu- 
lar troops,  it  seems  probable  that  a  force  of  two  regiments  of 
regular  infantry  with  a  squadron  of  cavalry  and  two  or  three 
batteries  of  light  artillery  would,  if  acting  promptly  and 
with  celerity,  be  amply  sufficient  for  the  destruction  of  the 
canal. 

A  victory  in  the  Niagara  peninsula  would  almost  certainly 


39 


put  us  in  possession  of  Hamilton.  If  defeated  we  could  fall 
back,  covering  our  line  of  retreat,  to  our  base.  The  enemy 
if  defeated  would  doubtless  retire  either  to  Toronto  or  Lon- 
don. In  the  former  case  he  would  sacrifice  all  the  territory 
lying  between  the  lakes;  and  (unless  we  have  read  the  history 
of  militia  wrongly)  he  would  lose  by  desertion  masses  of  men 
from  that  region.  In  the  latter  case,  he  would  give  up  his 
communications  with  the  forces  farther  east;  and  a  second 
defeat  would,  probably,  cause  the  capture  or  dispersion  of 
his  army.  In  either  case,  then,  the  entire  railway  system 
between  Detroit  and  Toronto  would  fall  into  our  hands;  we 
should  have  a  bass  at  Detroit  as  well  as  at  Buffalo;  new 
levies  or  other  inferior  troops  could  cross  at  Datroit  and  Port 
Huron  to  occupy  the  conquered  country  and  guard  the  com- 
munications; and  the  victorious  army,  easily  supplied  and 
reinforced,  could  then  safely  attack  in  succession  Toronto, 
Trenton  and  Kingston,  even  though  the  enemy  were  in  naval 
control  of  Lake  Ontario.  The  capture  of  these  important 
points  would  doubtless  ba  a  costly  matter  iu  men,  material, 
and  above  all,  in  time.  If,  however,  the  canals  near  Pres- 
cotthad  been  destroyed  in  the  meantime,  the  defense  of  these 
places  would  be  greatly  crippled  so  far  as  naval  assistance  is 
concerned;  and  in  any'event  they  might  be  masked  while  the 
army  pushed  on  to  the  capture  of  Ottawa  and  the  reinforce- 
ment of  our  first  army  at  Montreal  or  Quebec.  The  army 
operating  from  Buffalo  should  be  composed  of  the  regular 
proportion  of  the  three  arms. 

The  relations  between  Russia  and  England  might  neces- 
sitate the  retention  in  India  of  a  great  British  military  force. 
But  national  friendships  and  enmities  are  essentially  fickle; 
and  arrangements  with  Russia  might  enable  England  to  send 
a  formidable  Anglo-Indian  army  against  us.  At  any  rate, 
unless  Great  Britain  were  actually  at  war  with  the  Czar,  we 
should  be  obliged  to  provide  against  a  reinforcement  of  the 
Canadian  armies  by  troops  from  India.  A  small  army  com- 


40 


posed  of  volunteers  raised  in  Minnesota  and  the  Dakotas 
should  be  assembled  at  St.  Vincent  and  sent  against  Winni- 
peg, which  place  should  be  captured  and  strongly  held,  the 
railroads  to  the  east  and  south  being  carefully  guarded,  and 
the  railway  west  of  the  city  being  utterly  wrecked  for  miles. 
Raiding  parties  should  be  sent  from  various  parts  of  the  fron- 
tier of  Montana,  with  instructions  to  blow  up  bridges  and 
viaducts,  and  tear  up  the  road  to  the  utmost  degree  in  their 
power.  An  attempt  should  be  made  to  destroy  the  Canadian 
Pacific  in  British  Columbia,  but  further  than  sending  a  small 
force  for  this  purpose,  the  operations  of  our  armies  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  would,  as  we  have  already  seen,  be  necessarily 
limited  to.;  the  defensive. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  things  in  a  rather  favorable 
aspect  for  the  Americans.  Let  us  suppose,  however,  that 
the  war,  while  of  a  nature  of  a  surprise  to^us,  has  been  pre- 
meditated by  Great  Britain.  Her  146  war-vessels  suitable 
for  service  on  the  lakes,  while  probably  not  all  available  for 
duty  in  American  waters,  permit  her  to  assemble  a  large  fleet 
on  the  St.  Lawrence;  a  force  is  posted -on  the  Niagara  River, 
covering  the  Welland  Canal,  and  strongly  intrenched;  the 
St.  Lawrence  canals  are  strongly  guarded,  and  a  large  army 
in  an  intrenched  camp  at  St.  John's  bars  the  way  to  Mon- 
treal; in  other  words  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  cross  the  St. 
Lawrence  or  the  Niagara,  and  the  British  navy  has  free 
access  to  Lakes  Ontario  and  Erie.  The  Detroit  route  now 
becomes  of  paramount  importance.  Vessels  taken  from  our 
merchant  marine  on  the  lakes,  regardless  of  cost,  are  sunk  in 
the  channel  of  the  Detroit  River,  and  the  passage  of  the 
British  fleet  is  further  barred  loy  submarine  mines.  If  the 
Ottawa  and  Georgian  Bay  canals  be  completed,  similar  ob- 
structions are  placed  in  St.  Clair  River.  We  thus  secure  a 
passage  into  Canada,  which  passage  will  be  greatly  facilitated 
\)y  the  completion  of  the  tunnel  of  the  Detroit  River.  Our 
worst  strategic  line  now, becomes  our  only  one.  We  must 


41 


beat  the  enemy  back  upon  his  natural  line  of  retreat,  and 
drive  him  upon  his  reinforcements.  The  war  will  be  long, 
bloody,  costly,  and  bungling — in  fact  it  will  be  just  such  a 
war  as  we  have  carried  on  more  than  once  in  the  past.  Our 
military  force  must  be  enormous,  because  we  shall  have  long 
lines  of  communication,  and  they  will  be  everywhere  exposed 
to  combined  naval  and  military  expeditions — "naval  raids' 
if  I  may  be  allowed  to  coin  that  term.  Still,  by  sheer  dint 
of  superior  numbers  and  resources,  we  should  probably  be 
able  to  reach  Ottawa,  open  new  communications  via  the 
Canadian  Pacific  to  Sault  Ste.  Marie  and  Winnipeg,  and 
push  on  to  Montreal  in  spite  of  the  British  gunboats  control- 
ling the  lakes.  It  would  be  a  case  in  which  "the  longest 
way  round  would  be  our  shortest  way  there" — because  it 
would  be  our  only  way.  Even  in  this  case,  unless  such 
places  as  Kingston  were  masked  by  very  large  detachments, 
their  reduction  might  occupy  as  much  time  as  the  capture  of 
.St.  John's  and  Montreal  by  the  first  army  considered.  Our 
lack  of  preparation  and  our  want  of  naval  force  would  place 
us  at  a  heavy  disadvantage. 

We  will  suppose,  however,  thatthe  canals  have  been 
seized  as  already  indicated,  and  operations  carried  on  as 
already  described.  Thus  far,  it  may,  I  think,  be  safely 
claimed  that  the  military  geography  of  Canada  has  favored 
the  Americans  quite  as  much  as  it  has  their  adversaries.  But 
in  the  eastern  theatre  the  geographical  balance,  so  to  speak, 
is  heavily  against  us.  After  the  capture  of  Montreal  our 
next  steps  are  by  no  means  easy.  If  the  St.  Lawrence  were 
controlled  by  our  navy,  it  would  be  an  easy  matter  to  trans- 
port the  heaviest  kind  of  ordnance  by  water  from  the  arsenal 
at  Troy  to  the  trenches  before  Quebec;  but  otherwise  we 
should  be  under  a  very  serious  disadvantage;  for  the  trans- 
portation of  heavy  ordnance  by  rail  would  necessarily  be  a 
matter  of  considerable  time  and  difficulty.  Besides  the  ad- 
vantages of  its  situation  and  fortifications,  Quebec  would, 


42 


therefore,  have  the  advantage  of  heavier  ordnance  than  we 
could  readily  bring  against  it.  Its  capture  by  regular  ap- 
proaches would  be  impossible;  and  its  reduction  by  blockade 
would  be  a  matter  of  the  most  serious  difficulty.  For  the 
latter  purpose,  the  complete  investment  of  the  city  would  be 
requisite;  and  this  would  be  quite  impossible  with  the  St. 
Lawrence  cutting  our  lines  in  two  and  bearing  a  British  fleet 
upon  its  bosom.  Winter,  it  is  true,  would  close  the  river; 
but  during  the  open  season  all  the  resources  in  men,  muni- 
tions, and  supplies  that  the  British  Empire  could  afford 
would  have  access  to  the  beleaguered  city.  It  would  only  be 
when  the  Americans,  succeeding  in  building  a  formidable 
fleet  of  war-vessels  or  floating  batteries,  should  send  them 
down  the  St.  Lawrence  beyond  Quebec,  or  by  heavy  batteries 
on  the  shore  combined  with  some  system  of  booms  and  sub- 
marine mines,  should  succeed  in  permanently  barring  the 
passage  of  the  British  fleet  to  the  city,  that  the  place  would 
succumb  to  the  slow  process  of  starvation.  In  any  event, 
whether  resulting  in  success  or  disaster  to  us,  the  siege  of 
Quebec  would  be  one  of  the  most  memorable  in  the  annals  of 
war. 

With  the  British  navy  controlling  the  St.  Lawrence,  the 
American  advance  from  Montreal  would  be  a  matter  of  ex- 
treme' difficulty.  If  our  army  were  to  move  entirely  by  the 
left  bank  of  the  river,  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  could  hold 
Quebec,  while  with  the  assistance  of  the  navy  a  large  part  of 
the  British  army  could  advance  via  Richmond  against  our 
communications,  secure  in  its  own  retreat  so  long  as  the  fleet 
patrolled  the  river.  If  our  advance  were  made  entirely 
along  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  ths  investment  of  Quebec 
on  the  north  bank  would  be  practicably  impossible.  If  Mon- 
treal were  captured  in  the  winter  (as  it  probably  would  be; 
the  march  upon  Quebec  would  be  very  much  simplified,  as 
the  river  when  frozen  would  cease  to  exist  as  an  obstacle 
parallel  to  the  path  of  our  army.  Otherwise  it  would  be 


43 


necessary  to  advance  from  Montreal  on  the  left  bank  and 
from  Richmond  on  the  right;  thus  moving  by  independent 
lines  against  an  enemy  able  to  concentrate  upon  either.  A 
military  superiority  such  as  to  render  the  American  force  on 
each  line  able  to  cope  successfully  with  the  entire  force 
guarding  Quebec  would,  therefore,  be  necessary.  The  com- 
munications of  the  army  operating  from  Richmond  would 
probably  be  via  the  Vermont  Valley  R.  R.,  and  its  base  of 
supplies  might  be  shifted  from  Albany  to  Springfield  or 
Bellows  Falls.  This  force  would  also  serve  to  maintain  com- 
munications between  the  army  from  Montreal  and  another 
important  army  which  it  is  now  time  to  consider. 

The  theatres  thus  far  considered  do  not  lend  themselves 
readily  to  offensive  returns  by  the  British;  but  on  our 
extreme  eastern  frontier  we  are  peculiarly  open  to  invasion. 
A  British  army  based  upon  the  St.  John  River  from  Freder- 
ick ton  to  St.  John  could  invade  the  state  of  Maine  with  a  de- 
gree of  impunity  not  pleasant  for  us  to  contemplate.  Having 
the  active  support  of  a  fleet  superior  to  anything  that  wo 
could  oppose  to  it,  this  army  could  advance  westward,  estab- 
lishing a  secondary  base  at  St.  Andrew,  and  moving  upon 
Bangor.  The  complete  naval  control  of  the  coast  would  give 
the  enemy  many  of  the  advantages  of  a  reentering  base;  for 
it  would  enable  him  to  make  combined  naval  and  land  opera- 
tions against  our  communications,  with  much  injury  to  us 
and  but  little  danger  to  himself.  The  capture  of  Bangor 
would  be  greatly  facilitated  by  the  fleet;  and  the  British 
army  could  advance  as  far  west  as  Portland  without  uncover- 
ing its  communications  by  its  front,  its  left  flank  protected  by 
the  sea,  and  its  right  covered  by  a  region  impracticable  for 
the  operations  of  a  large  force.  The  extent  to  which  the  com- 
munications of  an  American  army  operating  in  Maine  would 
be  endangered  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  all  the  railroads  by 
which  the  army  could  be  supplied  lie  within  about  thirty 
miles  of  the  coast,  and  thus  within  easy  reach  of  the  enemy  V 


44 

incursions.  Oil  the  other  hand,  the  British  communications 
would,  as  we  have  seen,  be  safe  from  serious  menace,  and  even 
a  heavy  defeat  would  not  mean  ruin. 

The  object  of  a  British  invasion  of  Maine  would  be  to 
deflect  the  American  efforts  from  unfavorable  theatres  to 
those  favorable  to  the  British.  A  successful  invasion  of  thr 
State,  especially  if  accompanied  by  an  ostentatious  proclama- 
tion of  its  annexation  to  the  British  Dominions,  would  so 
rouse  popular  indignation  in  our  country  that  the  demand  for 
the  recovery  of  Maine  would  be  even  more  potent  in  influenc- 
ing the  conduct  of  the  war  than  was  the  cry  "on  to  Rich- 
mond" thirty  years  ago;  and  other  operations  might  be  for- 
gotten in  a  desire  to  drive  the  "insolent  invader"  from  our 
own  soil.  An  invasion  of  Maine  might  be  conducted,  then, 
as  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  British  armies  in  Quebec  or 
Ontario,  or  it  might  be  made  from  the  first  the  supreme  mili- 
tary effort  of  Great  Britain . 

The  military  geography  of  the  state  of  Maine  is  alto- 
gether in  favor  of  an  invader.  The  Penobscot,  Kennebec, 
and  Androscoggin  rivers,  would,  it  is  true,  be  obstacles  lying 
directly  across  his  path;  but  we  know  that  such  obstacles 
have  no  further  strategic  value  than  causing  delay  to  the 
invader — a  delay  which  would  in  each  case  be  minimized  by 
the  cooperation  of  his  navy. 

If  England  were  able,  as  she  might  be,  to  seize  the  initi- 
ative promptly  and  to  send  a  powerful  naval  and  military 
expedition  from  Halifax  or  St.  John,  N.  B.,  against  Port- 
land, the  capture  of  that  city  would  give  her  all  the  advan- 
tages that  could  be  gained  by  marching  across  the  State  to 
that  point.  The  place  would  be  at  once  fortified  by  the  cap- 
tors, and  its  supply  would  be  assured  from  the  sea.  It  would 
furnish  a  convenient  base  for  minor  operations  against  various 
points  of  the  New  England  coast,  which  would  serve  to  annoy 
us  and  to  distract  our  military  plans.  Moreover,  to  anyone 
familiar  with  the  Art  of  War,  it  is  evident  at  a  glance  that 


the  occupation  of  Portland  by  the  British  would  protect  the 
eastern  provinces  from  invasion;  for  they  would  have  the 
communications  of  the  invading  army  by  the  throat.  It 
would  be  necessary  to  recapture  Portland,  or  to  mask  it  with 
an  efficient  force,  at  least  equal  in  strength  to  the  army  hold- 
ing it,  before  an  American  army  could  advance  against  New 
Brunswick. 

If  the  British  in  Portland  found  their  position  effectually 
masked,  and  discovered  that  the  American  army  was  pushing 
on  towards  New  Brunswick,  their  fleet  could  quickly  transfer 
them  back  to  the  St.  John  River.  If  the  Americans  assem- 
bled in  great  force  for  the  siege  or  assault  of  Portland,  the 
withdrawal  of  the  British  could  be  affected  in  the  same  way, 
as  easily  as  Moore's  army  withdrew  from  Corurma.  If, 
instead  of  seizing  Portland  by  a  combined  military  and  naval 
expedition,  the  British  were  invading  Maine  by  marching 
across  the  State,  their  army  could,  in  the  face  of  superior 
numbers,  fallback  to  the  same  base;  and  the  army  thus  based 
on  the  St.  John  would  be  in  a  position  to  reinforce,  or  receive 
reinforcements  from,  the  army  at  Quebec  or  Montreal  so  long- 
as  the  New  Brunswick  and  Intercolonial  railways  remained 
intact. 

It  seems  clear,  then,  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  a  large 
and  effective  army  should  be  assembled  by  us,  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment,  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  Maine.  Boston, 
Salem,  Newburyport,  Portsmouth,  Portland,  Bath,  Belfast, 
and  Bangor,  should  be  strongly  defended  as  a  measure  of  pro- 
tection to  the  communications  of  this  army,  which  should 
have  its  primary  base  on  the  Merrimac  River,  with  succes- 
sive bases  at  Lewiston,  Augusta  and  Bangor.  Raids  should 
be  early  and  persistently  made  against  the  New  Brunswick 
and  Intercolonial  railroads,  which  should  be  damaged  as  com- 
pletely as  possible,  and  kept  continually  broken,  so  as  to  de- 
stroy the  lateral  communications  of  the  British  armies.  The 
nearness  of  these  roads  to  the  Maine  frontier  renders  them 


46 

peculiarly  open  to  the  attacks  of  raiding  forces;  but,  on  the 
other  hand  the  nature  of  the  country  makes  the  operation 
unusually  difficult  for  cavalry — the  only  force  with  which 
raiding  is  possible.  It  may  be  confidently  asserted,  however, 
that  cavalry  which  can  operate  in  Arizona  and  Colorado 
would  be  able  to  surmount  the  natural  difficulties  of  Maine 
and  New  Brunswick. 

The  geographical  difficulties  of  our  army,  instead  of 
diminishing,  would  increase  with  the  commencement  of  the 
invasion  of  New  Brunswick.  The  St.  John  River  forms  for 
the  enemy  a  rectangular  reentering  base,  controlled  as  far  a* 
Frederickton  by  his  navy,  and  forming  a  serious  obstacle 
above  that  point.  An  attempt  by  our  army  to  cross  the 
eastern  side  of  this  angle  would  be  opposed  in  front  by  the 
fleet,  and  would  lend  an  exposed  flank  and  communications 
to  British  attacks  from  the  other  side.  An  attack  upon  the 
northern  face  of  the  angle  could  be  met  by  a  retarding  force, 
while  a  heavy  attack  from  the  east  could  be  made  against 
our  flank.  A  passage  in  the  vicinity  of  Woodstock  would 
compel  a  separation  of  our  army  under  penalty  of  a  complete 
exposure  of  our  communications.  In  addition  to  these  diffi- 
culties, the  protection  of  our  communications  would  require 
the  deta'.-ameut  of  a  force  for  the  capture  or  masking  of  St. 
Andrew.  It  is  fortunate  for  us  that  we  could  assemble  final- 
ly in  this  theatre  an  army  much  larger  than  the  British;  for 
the  numerical  superority  would  be  urgently  needed. 

Nor  would  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  be  ended  by  a 
successful  passage  of  the  St.  John.  The  Maine  Central  R. 
R.  would  constitute  a  line  of  supply  via  Bangor,  McAdam, 
and  Woodstock  to  Fredericton;  but  from  Fredericton  to  St. 
John  there  are  no  railway  com'munications  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river,  and  that  stream  would  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
British  navy.  The  construction  of  about  35  miles  of  railroad 
would  be  necessary  in  order  that  we  might  reach  Chipman, 
from  which  point  there  is  a  railroad  to  Norton  on  the  Inter- 


47 


colonial.  The  somewhat  circuitous  railway  communications 
resulting  would  require  strong  detachments  for  their  protec- 
tion. The  Keswick,  Nashwaak,  Salmon  and  Washedemoak 
rivers  would  form  obstacles  lying  directly  across  the  path  of 
our  army  and  affording  the  enemy  facilities  for  delaying  us 
with  a  rear  guard  while  conducting  his  retreat  in  safety. 

St.  John  would  offer  us  some  of  the  disadvantages  of 
Quebec.  Though  a  strung  natural  position,  strengthened  by 
batteries,  it  does  not  approximate  in  impregnability  to  the 
old  Walled  City  of  the  North;  but  it  has  the  advantage  of  a 
never-freezing  harbor.  Until  we  could  assemble  on  the  St. 
John  River  a  naval  force  superior  to  the  British  fleet,  or  line- 
the  stream  with  batteries  powerful  enough  to  drive  away  the 
enemy's  vessels,  the  reduction  of  St.  John  would  be  well-nigh 
impossible. 

It  may  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  entire  British 
army  in  New  Brunswick  would  not  shut  itself  up  in  St.  John. 
Easily  defended  by  permanent  batteries  and  the  navy,  that 
place  could  be  entrusted  to  a  comparatively  small  force,  with 
full  confidence  that,  owing  to  its  position  on  the  flank  of  our 
communications,  we  should  not  dare  to  neglect  it,  but  should 
have  to  mask  it  with  a  force  much  larger  than  the  garrison. 
The  main  force  of  the  British  would  doubtless  retreat  behind 
the  Petitcodiac  River,  \vhere  it  would  find  a  position  of  re- 
markable strength.  With  a  front  of  less  than  fifteen  miles, 
the  army  could  rest  its  right  flank  on  Northumberland  Sound 
and  its  left  on  the  Petitcodiac,  a  great  part  of  its  front  covered 
by  a  small  river,  and  a  railroad  running  along  the  rear  of  the 
position.  The  flanks  could  not  be  turned,  the  navy  could 
deliver  a  flanking  fire  along  the  lines,  reinforcements  could 
l>e  speedily  sent  from  one  part  of  the  line  to  any  other,  and 
supply  from  the  sea  and  by  rail  from  Novia  Scotia  would  be- 
sure  and  easy.  I  have  not  been  able  to  learn  the  exact  nature 
of  the  topography  of  this  place;  but  unless  it  presents  disad- 
vantages not  hinted  at  by  any  ordinary  map,  it  would  he  a 


48 

position  not  one  whit  inferior  to  the  Lines  of  Torres  Vedras; 
for  while  there  would  be  no  Monte  Junto  to  divide  the  assail- 
ant's front,  the  position  is  scarcely  more  than  half  as  long  as 
Wellington's  famous  lines,  the  navy  (from  the  nature  of  the 
position  and  the  increased  power  of  its  ordnance)  could  lend 
a  greater  degree  of  assistance  than  it  was  able  to  give  the  Iron 
Duke,  and  the  rail  road  would  give  advantages  not  dreamed  of 
eighty-four  years  ago  in  Portugal.  St.  John  would  be  connected 
with  the  lines  by  about  120  miles  of  waterway,  by  means  of 
which,  should  the  New  Brunswick  metropolis  prove  unten- 
able, its  garrison  could  be  withdrawn  to  the  lines  of  Petitco- 
diac.  Should  the  freezing  of  the  river  deprive  the  line  of  the 
support  of  the  navy,  and  thus  expose  a  flank,  a  position  of  al- 
most equal  strength  could  be  taken  up  thirty  miles  to  the 
rear,  where  the  army  would  form  on  about  the  same  front  as 
before,  its  left  resting  on  Cumberland  Basin,  its  right  on  Bay 
Verte.  On  the  left  is  a  high  hill,  occupied  in  colonial  times 
by  the  French  Fort  Beausejour,  while  a  great  portion  of  the 
front  is  covered  by  the  marshes  of  Missaguash  and  Tantemar. 
In  fact,  the  absence  of  the  railway  in  rear  of,  and  parallel  to, 
the  lines  is  the  only  point  in  which  this  position  is  inferior  to 
the  one  on  the  Petitcodiac;  while  the  marshes  covering  its 
fiont  would  make  it  much  stronger  as  a  purely  defensive 
position. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  consider  at  length  the  strategic 
features  of  Nova  Scotia.  Without  great  naval  strength  we 
probably  could  not  overcome  the  lines  on  the  Nova  Scotian 
isthmus,  if  Great  Britain  saw  fit  to  make  a  strong  exertion  at 
that  point,  and  an  invasion  of  Nova  Scotia  would  be  out  of 
the  question.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  had  a  navy  superior 
to  that  of  England  in  American  waters,  we  could  land  a  force 
at  any  point  on  the  coast  of  Nova  Scotia,  and  the  defense  of 
the  province  would  be  so  difficult  that  it  probably  would  not  be 
seriously  undertaken.  It  may,  however,  be  well  to  note  that  if 
f though  having  a  naval  inferiority)  we  should  force  the  lines 


49 


on  the  Isthmus,  it  would  be  an  evidence  of  such  enormous 
military  superiority  as  to  make  a  rapid  retreat  upon  Halifax 
the  only  thing  left  to  our  adversaries;  but  the  Philip  and 
Wallace  rivers,  the  Cobequid  mountains,  and  then  the  Sal- 
mon and  Shubeuacadie  rivers  would  furnish  fine  obstacles 
for  the  use  of  the  British  rearguard;  and,  if  skilfully  com- 
manded, their  army  could  safely  reach  Halifax.  We  should 
then  have  a  repetition  of  the  old  problem;  namely  the  reduc- 
tion of  a  city  strongly  fortified,  fully  garrisoned,  assisted  by  a 
powerful  fleet,  and  open  the  year  round  to  supply  from  tin- 
sea. 

It  is,  I  think,  evident  that  with  a  suitable  naval  force 
cooperating  with  our  armies,  the  conquest  of  Canada,  if  not 
speedy,  would  be  at  least  sure.  But  in  the  absence  of  such 
naval  auxiliary  the  situation  could,  perhaps,  be  best  expressed 
by  a  Celticism:  England  could  not  hold  Canada,  and  we 
could  not  conquer  it.  In  other  words,  our  military  power, 
properly  directed,  would  enable  us  to  conquer  Canada  from 
the  Georgian  Bay  to  the  city  of  Quebec,  and  perhaps  to  the 
Xova  Scotian  isthmus.  But  the  capture  of  Quebec,  the  in- 
vasion of  Nova  Scotia,  and  the  reduction  of  Victoria  and 
Esquimault  would  be  well-nigh  impossible  while  the  British 
fleets  w^re  superior  to  Our  own,  unless  the  English  comman- 
ders on  sea  and  land  should  display  the  most  pitiful  incapacity, 
and  our  own,  the  most  dazzling  genius.  Let  me  not  be  mis- 
understood: I  do  not'  say  that  the  United  States  could  not 
conquer  Canada.  I  mean  that  a  complete  conquest  as  the 
result  of  the  operations  of  war  alone,  uninfluenced  by  inter- 
nal troubles,  foreign  alliances,  or  financial  difficulties  on  one 
side  or  the  other,  could  probably  be  effected  by  us  only  when 
we  had  provided  ourselves  with  a  naval  force  superior  to  any 
armada  that  Great  Britain  could  send  to  the  American 
waters. 

It  is  impossible  within  the  limits  of  a   single  lecture,    to 
uive  more  than  the  barest  epitome  of  this  important  subject. 


50 


Many  weighty  considerations  have  necessarily  been  omitted. 
I  do  not  profess  to  have  indicated  the  only  lines  of  invasion, 
or  counter  invasion,  nor  to  have  outlined  all  the  military  pos- 
sibilities presented  by  the  geography  of  Canada.  We  may  be 
sure,  however,  that,  whatever  be  the  plans  of  campaign  or 
the  conduct  of  the  war,  the  next  invasion  of  Canada,  whether 
successful  or  unsuccessful,  will  furnish  an  illustration  of  the 
truth  of  Von  Moltke's  apothegm:  "Geography  is  three- 
fourths  of  the  science  of  war." 

[BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTH. — The  following  works  have  been  con- 
sulted in  the  preparation  of  this  lecture:  Military  Aspect  of  Canada, 
by  Col.  Strange;  Canadian  Defense,  by  the  same  author;  Strategic 
Value  of  the  Inland  Canal  Navigation  of  the  United  States,  by  Lieut. 
T.  H.  Bliss;  Our  Northern  Frontier,  by  Captain  T.  M.  Woodruff; 
Our  Northern  Frontier,  by  Lieut.  A.  D.  Schenck;  The  Operations  of 
1870  and  1885  in  the  N.  W.  Territories  of  Canada;  Notes  on  the  Ca- 
nadian Militia;  Precis  of  the  Wars  in  Canada,  by  General  Sir  James 
Carmichael  Smith,  Bart. ;  Bancroft's  History  of  the  United  States, 
Vol.  V.;  Hildreth's  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  VI.;  Lossing's 
Field  Book  of  the  Revolution;  Logging's  Field  Book  of  the  War  of 
1812:  Parkman's  Montcalm  and  Wolfe;  Encyclopaedia  Britannica, 
Ninth  Edition.  Valuable  information  has  also  been  obtained  from 
the  Bureau  of  Military  Information.] 


51 


THE  MILITARY  GEOGRAPHY  OF  CHILI. 


By  Captain  EBEN  SWIFT,  Fifth  Cavalry. 
Assistant  Instructor  in  Military  Art. 


(      HI! 


HILI  occupies  a  long,  narrow  strip  of  country  lying  be- 
^'"  x  tween  the  Andes  and  the  Pacific,  with  an  average 
width  of  120  miles  and  a  coast  line  of  over  10,000  miles.  On 
the  east  its  boundary  follows  the  main  divide  of  the  most  im- 
passible mountain  range  in  the  world — a  mountain  range  which 
runs  up  as  high  as  22,000  feet  and  is  crossed  only  by  a  few 
muletracks  cut  out  of  the  solid  rock  at  twice  the  elevation  of 
the  highest  point  of  the  Union  Pacific  Rail-road.  Outhe  west 
the  coast  is  beaten  by  a  sea  which  has  been  misnamed  Pacific. 
Unlike  the  northern  continent  this  line  has  few  indentions; 
good  anchomges  are  scarce,  being  mostly  open  and  exposed. 
At  the  north  the  region  along  the  coast,  like  that  of 
Peru,  consists  of  a  series  of  deserts  separated  from  each  other 
by  narrow  valleys  which  are  watered  by  rivers  taking  their 


source  in  the  mountains.  Throughout  these  lands  rain  is 
unknown  and  the  deserts  are  dry,  sandy  plains,  broken  some- 
times by  rugged  heights  or  by  hills  of  shifting  sand.  By 
day  the  tropical  sun  beats  upon  the  earth  and  produces  a 
suffocating  heat;  at  night  the  temperature  falls  25  to  30  de- 
iTivi-s  and  the  extreme  of  cold  is  encountered. 

The  largest  of  these  barren  tracts  is  the  desert  of  Ata- 
cama,  extending  for  several  hundreds  of  miles  along  the 
coast,  without  water,  without  verdure  and  without  roads. 
The  number  of  travelers  who  have  dared  to  penetrate  into 
these  deserts  has,  until  recently,  been  small.  They  would 
prefer  to  go  to  the  coast  and  to  make  their  trips  by  sea. 

To  travel  in  such  a  country  you  must  carry  fuel,  food, 
forage  and  water.  If  you  have  two  wheeled  vehicles  you 
must  cut  a  road  for  yourself  in  many  places.  The  trials  of 
the  small  armies  which  have  campaigned  there  have  been 
told  many  times,  and  the  difficulties  must  surely  increase 
immensely  with  the  size  of  the  army.  In  the  Campaign  of 
Tacnwa,  to  be  noticed  hereafter,  the  provision  for  water  had 
to  be  made  at  a  rate  of  10,000  gallons  per  day,  which  was 
small  indeed  for  an  army  of  10,000  men  with  their  animals. 

The  valleys  at  the  north  are  no  more  suitable  for  an 
army  of  foreigners  than  the  deserts  themselves  for  the  climate 
is  deadly  to  strangers. 

In  the  central  portions  of  the  country  the  deserts  dis- 
appear, the  valleys  are  wider,  the  rivers  longer,  aud  consider- 
able areas  are  available  for  cultivation  and  pasture;  the  cli- 
mate is  healthy,  the  rainfall  is  very  great,  and  in  fact  nearly 
every  condition  is  different  from  that  just  described. 

At  the  south  Chili  controls  the  Straits  of  Magellan  and 
ends  on  the  barren  islands  of  Cape  Horn. 

The  rivers  are  mostly  mountain  torrents,  running  by 
short^  straight  courses  from  the  mountains  to  the  sea.  Several 
are  navigable  for  a  short  distance,  and  the  longest  is  a  little 
over  two  hundred  miles  in  length. 


53 


With  an  area  of  over  300,000  square  miles,  which  is  as 
large  as  Texas  with  Western  Kansas  tacked  on,  there  is  only 
eighteen  per  cent,  of  arable  laud.  One  fourth  of  this  area  lies 
near  the  snow  line,  one  fourth  is  near  the  level  of  the  sea,and 
from  north  to  south,  or  east  to  west,  all  extremes  will  be 
found.  Hence  portions  of  the  country  are  mutually  depen- 
dent upon  each  other.  A  blockade  of  certain  ports  leaves 
the  population  in  the  hopeless  condition  of  the  inhabitants  of 
a  barren  island.  This  state  of  affairs  existed  many  times  in 
the  last  war. 

The  population  was  estimated  at  three  and  a  quarter 
millions  in  1890,  which  at  that  time  was  smaller  than  a  half 
dozen  of  our  states.  The  mixture  of  white  and  indian  blood 
seems  to  have  produceda  race  not  inferior  to  the  Spanish  of 
the  Sixteenth  Century  and  not  unworthy  of  the  very  last 
native  tribe  to  be  conquered  by  the  whites. 

There  are  few  generalities  which  apply  to  such  a  land, 
except  that  it  is  particularly  inaccessible  from  without  and 
that  its  inhabitants  have  been  aggressive  and  warlike  from 
their  earliest  traditions. 

Looking  at  Chili  from  a  military  point-of-view,  with  an 
eye  to  its  opportunities  for  attack  from  without  and  its  capac- 
ity for  resistance  from  within,  it  will  be  profitable  to  study 
some  of  the  wars  of  which  we  have  knowledge,  m  the  same 
theater.  In  this  way  we  will  discover  that  a  certain  general 
character  has  been  given  to  all  military  operations;  invading 
armies  have  been  forced  to  follow  similar  lines  and  all  strategy 
has  been  made  the  same  by  the  nature  of  the  country. 

We  know  that  the  Incas,  a  hundred  years  before  the 
discovery,  conquered  the  country  as  far  south  as  the  Maule" 
river.  They  took  the  hard  road  through  the  deserts. 

The  Lieutenants  and  Successors  of  Pizarro  carried  their 
conquests  further  to  the  Bio-Bio  river;  but  were  driven  back 
again  and  their  cities  were  destroyed.  It  is  stated  that  the 


54 

first  century  of  this  conflict  cost  Spain  :i  hundred  thousand 
lives  and  eighty  millions  of  ducats. 

The  way  through  the  desert  is  not  the  only  road  from 
the  north.  Another  road  may  be  had  along  the  high,  snow 
covered  plateaus  and  passes  of  the  Andes.  Almagro,  the 
companion  of  Pizarro,  with  an  army  of  Spaniards  end  In- 
dians, took  this  route.  He  assembled  at  Jujuy,  crossed  to 
Coquimbo  and  fought  battles  with  the  natives  in  the  neigh- 
borhood where  Santiago  now  stands.  He  met  with  great  diffi- 
culties and  great  suffering  and  retreated  finally,  taking  the  way 
of  the  desert.  Valdivia  came  next  and  accomplished  the  per- 
manent settlement  of  the  Spaniards.  He  came  by  the  deserts. 

In  these  campaigns  little  reliance  could  be  placed  on  the 
sea.  The  natives  used  rafts  which  were  not  suited  to  naval 
warfare  or  to  long  expeditions.  The  number  of  ships  avail- 
able to  the  Spaniards  on  that  coast  was  not  sufficient  to  fur- 
nish a  solid  support. 

In  1810  the  Spanish  colonies  in  South  A  merica  revolted. 
In  Chili  the  rebels  were  at  first  driven  from  the  country,  but 
receiving  assistance  from  Buenos  Ayres  in  1817,  they  collect 
ed  an  army  of  four  thousand  men  and  crossing  the  mountains 
at  the  Uspallata  Pass  they  defeated  the  royalists  in  two  de- 
cisive battles.  The  independence  of  the  country  wns  not 
assured,  however,  until  the  rebels  called  to  their  service  the 
celebrated  English  Admiral,  Lord  Cochrane.  This  comman- 
der with  an  inferior  force  blockaded  the  Spanish  fleet,  cap- 
tured their  base  of  supplies  at  Valdivia,  and  in  fact  obtained 
control  of  the  sea. 

The  freedom  obtained  by  this  means  gave  opportunity 
for  further  operations.  Peru  was  still  under  Spanish  domin- 
ion when  the  Chilian  army  of  4,000  men  embarked  on  the 
transports  of  the  fleet  and  sailed  north.  They  were  landed  u 
few  miles  south  of  Liriia,  advanced  on  the  capital  and  de- 
clared the  independence  of  the  country  on  July  28,  182 J. 

The  countries  were  at  war  in  1836  again,    in   the   same 


55 


way  am]  with  the  same  result.  The  Chilians  again  entered 
the  capital  of  Peru,  and  destroyed  its  army  in  the  battle  of 
Yungai. 

Alter  this  the  deserts  which  had  been  considered  to  be 
the  most  worthless  parts  of  creation,  began  to  assume  a  great 
importance.  They  were  found  to  contain  immense  mineral 
wealth  and  the  sandy  covering  of  the  ground  hid  inexhaust- 
ible supplies  of  nitrate  of  soda — used  largely  as  a  fertilizer  in 
Europe.  The  jealousy  of  neighboring  states  and  their  con- 
flicting interests  brought  on  the  war  of  1879.  Peru  and  Bo- 
livia, owning  the  nitrite  provinces,  were  allied  against  Chili. 
Chili  was  first  in  the  field  with  five  hundred  men  and  occupied 
the  seaport  of  Antofagasta  at  the  edge  of  the  desert  of  Atacama 
on  February  1st.  Other  troops  followed  quickly  and  finally 
16,000  men  were  assembled  there  under  drill  and  instruction. 
The  Alliescollected  2,500  at  Tacua,4,000  at  Arica,  and  14,000 
at  Inquiqui. 

Meanwhile  the  main  struggle  for  supremacy  was  going  on 
at  sea.  It  was  ended  in  October  by  the  capture  of  the  Peru- 
vian ironclad  Huascar.  After  this  the  plans  of  the  Chilians 
developed  rapidly  and  received  no  check.  Arms,  ammuni- 
tion and  war  material  arrived  from  Europe  and  were  distri 
buted  to  their  troops. 

Early  in  November,  after  ten  months  in  preparations, 
the  army  of  10,000  men  embarked  at  Antofagasta  and  sailed 
to  Pesagua.  It  seems  that  this  would  have  occurred  much 
sooner  if  the  Peruvian  Navy  had  been  sooner  disposed  of. 
Pisagua  is  a  poor  roadstead,  like  most  places  along  the  coast, 
but  its  strategical  advantages  were  of  importance.  It  placed 
the  Chilian  army  midway  between  the  allied  forces  massed  at 
Arica  and  Inquiqui  and  was  intended  to  cut  off  the 'retreat  of 
the  main  allied  army.  As  matters  turned  out  the  Chilians 
did  not  get  the  full  advantage  which  it  would  seem  they  had 
a  right  to  expect  from  their  position.  They  pushed  a  divisi- 
on to  Dolores,  where  they  were  attacked  by  the  allies  from 
Inquiqui.  Reinforcements  were  brought  up  and  the  allies 


56 


were  beaten,  hut  the  Chilians  did  not  follow,  did  not  know 
the  direction  ot  the  hostile  retreat  and,  in  fact,  failed  to  cut 
them  off.  The  main  body  of  the  allies  retreated  to  Tarapaca, 
and  the  garrison  of  Iiiquiqui  itself  evacuated  that  place  and 
unde  good  its  retreat.  A  body  of  Chilians  marching  to  Ta- 
rcapaca,  expecting  to  encounter  a  disorganized  rear-guard,  was 
roughly  handled  by  the  main  allied  force  which  then  made 
good  its  retreat  to  Arica  without  being  harassed  or  delayed. 
To  us  it  will  seem  strange  that  the  opportunity  was  missed  to 
destroy  or  capture  this  allied  force,  but  we  must  Dot  fail  to 
consider  the  difficulties  on  the  Chilian  side,  campaigning  in  a 
desert  where  cavalry  horses  and  animals  of  the  train  must  be 
transported  by  sea  and  landed  at  an  unprotected  anchorage. 
You  can  easily  see  what  great  and  careful  provision  would 
have  to  be  made  to  transport  such  an  army  even  one  day's 
march  into  the  interior. 

At  Pisagua  the  Chilians  were  fortunate  in  finding  the 
great  works  for  the  distillation  of  sea  water  and  casks  for  its 
preservation  and  transportation.  In  these  provinces  the 
water  used  is  mostly  obtained  in  this  way.  An,  invading 
force  would  generally  nnd  these  things  destroyed  by  the 
enemy,  and  the  fact  points  to  one  of  the  many  odd  conditions 
which  attend  a  campaign  in  that  country. 

The  allies  now  collected  8,000  or  9,000  men  at  Tacna 
and  Arica.  The  Chilians  perfected  their  organization  and 
equipment  and  made  ready  for  the  second  campaign. 

On  February  24,  1880,  10,000  men  embarked  at  Pisa- 
gua and  under  convoy  of  the  fleet  went  up  the  coast  and 
landed  at  the  port  of  Pacocha.  A  second  division  of  3,000  or 
4,000  men  followed.  The  strategy  employed  was  the  same 
as  in  the  first  campaign.  The  Chilians  now  closed  all  the 
roads  by  which  the  allies  south  of  Pacocha  might  reach 
Peru.  The  difficulties  and  obstacles  to  be  encountered  were 
-imiliar  in  this  campaign  to  those  in  the  first,  but  the  Chili- 
ans had  more  success.  They  successfully  maneuvered  their 


jirmy  in  the  desert,  made  roads  for  their  wagons  in  places, 
and  fought  the  allies  in  the  battle  of  Tacna.  The  result  of 
this  battle  was  to  beat  and  desperse  the  army  of  the  allies. 
The  capture  of  Arica  followed  and  the  second  campaign  closed 
in  June,  1880.  Since  then  the  Nitrite  provinces  have  re- 
mained in  control  of  Chili. 

Bolivia  did  not  oppose  the  Chilian  armies  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Tacna  but  another  campaign  was  nrceseary  to  subdue 
Peru.  The  capital  was  surrounded  by  a  large  army  and  was 
provided  with  excellent  means  of  defense.  To  capture  it,  it 
was  calculated  that  an  effective  field  force  of  25,000  men 
would  be  needed.  To  bring  such  a  force  to  the  colors  and  to 
garrison  the  conquered  provinces  as  well  as  to  have  suitable 
reserves  at  home  required  greater  efforts  and  larger  prepara- 
tions than  had  ever  been  made  before  in  that  country.  In 
August  of  1880  the  Lima  campaign  was  decided  on.  New 
battalions  were  mobilized,  additional  transports  were  obtained, 
and  the  army  and  navy  was  reorganized,  and  at  the  end  of 
three  months  more  the  first  division  of  the  new  expeditionary 
force  embarked  at  Tacna.  They  landed  upon  that  spot 
where  sixty  years  before  the  republican  troops  had  disembarked 
to  undertake  the  capture  of  Lima  for  the  first  time.  This 
divison  continued  its  inarch  up  the  roads  to  the  north.  The 
fleet  conveyed  the  remainder  to  a  point  on  the  coast  nearer  to 
Callao.  Finally  the  army  was  collected  on  the  Lurin  River, 
eight  or  nine  miles  from  the  entrenchments  of  Chorillos. 

One  of  the  features  of  the  campaign  is  here  shown.  The 
Peruvians  were  in  doubt  as  to  the  direction  of  the  Chilian 
advance  and  had  to  make  preparations  to  resist  an  advance 
from  the  north  as  well  as  from  the  south.  Much  useless 
labor  in  fortifications  had  been  expended  at  the  north  when 
the  Chilians  landed  at  the  south  and  there  indicated  their  in- 
tentions. 

The  battles  of  Chorillos  and  Miraflores  were  favorable  to 
the  Chilians  and  placed  Lima  in  their  possession  for  the  third 
time. 


58 


Up  to  1891  Chili  could  boast  of  an  absence  of  those  fre- 
quent civil  wars  which  have  ruined  the  development  and 
disturbed  the  peace  of  all  other  Spanish-American  Republics. 
It  seemed  to  be  peopled  by  a  race,  more  serious,  more  stable, 
and  more  patriotic  than  that  of  any  other  country  of  similar 
origin.  Its  laws  seemed  better,  its  development  more  secure, 
than  any  others  up  to  the  very  moment  when  the  revolution 
broke  out. 

The  conflict  came  from  a  quarrel  between  the  president 
of  the  republic  and  the  congress.  The  army  declared  for  the 
president  Balmaceda,  and  the  navy  took  the  side  of  the  oppo- 
sition. 

The  army  at  that  time,  January  7,  1892,  was  composed 
of  about  5,000  men  of  all  arms  with  Headquarters  at  Santia- 
go, and  a  battalion  of  500  men  stationed  at  the  Forts  of  Val- 
paraiso. This  standing  army  was  a  nucleous  for  the  forces 
called  out  and  as  the  country  had  on  hand  all  equipments 
necessary  for  an  army  of  75,000  men  the  Government  had  no 
difficulty  in  uniforming  and  arming  all  recruits. 

The  field  artillery  and  mountain  batteries  were  of  Krupp's 
make.  The  Infantry  were  armed  with  the  Gras,  Beaumont, 
and  Comblain  rifles — weapons  which  were  not  of  the  latest 
type  of  military  fire-arms,  but  still  good  arms  and  probably  as 
efficient  as  our  own  Springfield.  The  Cavalry  had  a  twelve- 
shot  Winchester. 

The  coast  fortifications,  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities, 
were  insignificant  with  the  exception  of  those  at  Valparaiso 
where  19  guns  were  mounted,  commanding  all  the  water 
approaches. 

The  available  navy  consisted  of  seven  vessels  of  a  good 
type,  well  armed  and  manned. 

Both  the  Army  and  the  Navy  contained  many  veterans 
of  the  war  with  Peru  and  Bolivia  eleven  years  before.  But 
the  command  of  the  Government  forces  was  in  the  hands  of 
!  wo  men  of  nearly  equal  power,  who  did  not  agree  on  military 


59 


or  other  matters  and  were  probably  jealous  and  distrustful  of 
each  other.  The  latest  developments  of  modern  tactics  had 
not  reached  them  for  they  adhered  to  the  use  of  mass  forma- 
tions and  they  underrated  the  raw  and  newly  recruited  army 
of  their  enemies.  On  the  other  side  Colonel  Del  Canto  com- 
manded the  forces  of  Congress.  He  also  was  distinguished 
in  former  wars,  but  he  was  wise  enough  to  place  himself  in 
the  hands  of  a  German  officer,  Emil  Korner  by  name,  who 
came  to  organize  a  military  school,  but  who  now  joined  the 
congressional  army.  To  the  skill  and  energy  of  this  one  man 
the  final  result  seems  to  be  due. 

The  novel  condition  was  now  presented  of  one  side  with 
an  army  and  the  other  side  with  a  navy.  Such  a  state  of  affairs 
was  unfavorable  to  both  sides,  with  the  advantage  in  favor  of 
the  Government  at  the  outset.  So  long  as  the  navy  remained 
without  a  base  of  supplies  on  land,  from  which  it  could  obtain 
coal,  provisions,  recruits  and  revenues,  it  could  not  count  on 
success  or  maintain  itself  long.  This  was  afterwards  shown 
in  Brazil,  when  Admiral  De  Mello  revolted  with  the  fleet, 
but  the  character  of  the  country  was  different  and  he  could 
not  establish  himself  firmly  on  land,  and  after  wandering 
about  like  a  pirate  for  a  while  he  was  finally  entirely  defeated. 

These  facts  were  appreciated  at  once  by  the  party  of  the 
Congress.  They  seized  as  many  large  steamers  as  possible 
for  use  as  transports.  In  a  short  time  they  had  thirteen  large  ves- 
sels and  some  smaller  ones,  capable  on  the  whole  of  carrying 
a  force  of  10,000  men  with  artillery,  animals,  ammunition 
and  stores.  In  the  selection  of  a  base  they  chose  to  fasten 
on  to  the  nitrate  provinces  at  the  north  in  order  to  obtain 
money  by  seizing  the  revenues  arising  from  the  custom  duties 
on  the  exports  of  nitre.  The  provinces  were  protected  by 
very  few  troops  and  the  raid  was  successful.  The  mining 
camps  afforded  a  good  recruiting  ground.  In  the  matter  of 
money,  recruits,  and  security  from  attack,  they  had  thus  se- 
cured an  ideal  base.  It  is  true  that  nothing  in  the  way  of 


60 

provisions  or  any  other  supplies  could  be  obtained  there,  but 
they  had  control  of  the  sea  and  the  ports  of  Peru  were  near 
at  hand  where  they  had  free  access.  In  fact  foreign  merchant- 
men during  the  whole  war  plied  freely  between  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  rebel  ports. 

To  equip  a  brand-new  field  army  many  things  were 
needed  which  were  entirely  lacking,  but  when  the  money  is 
available  the  supplies  will  be  gotten  in  the  course  of  time. 
One  effort  of  the  Congressists  to  obtain  these  necessary  arti- 
cles resulted  in  the  Itiita  incident  which  came  near  getting 
our  own  country  involved  in  a  war.  This  attempt,  as  is  well 
known,  resulted  disastrously  for  the  Congressional  party,  but 
in  the  month  of  May,  a  little  over  four  months  after  the  be- 
giuing  of  the  revolution,  they  finally  succeeded  in  lauding  a 
cargo  of  10,000  Manlicher  rifles  and  ammunition  and  a  large 
quantity  of  field  artillery,  blankets  and  other  military  stores. 

Colonel  Korner  applied  himself  with  great  energy  to 
the  task  of  organizing,  disciplining  and  drilling  the  new 
troops.  A  noteworthy  part  of  his  system  was  to  call  together 
the  chiefs  and  officers  of  the  different  commands,  and  to  give 
lectures  on  various  matters  pretaining  to  the  military  art — 
particularly  giving  attention  to  detailed  instruction  in  the 
open  order  of  fighting.  On  the  evening  before  the  last  bat- 
tle of  the  war  he  perfected  all  the  details  and  explained  them 
to  each  brigade  and  regimental  commander,  drawing  with 
charcoal  on  the  floor  of  a  room  the  positions  of  the  enemy 
and  the  movements  of  the  various  fractions  of  his  own  army. 

His  success  in  forming  a  modern  army  in  three  months 
may  be  judged  by  results.  We  tried  it  in  1861  and  the  re- 
sult was  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  in  which  few  laurels  were 
gathered  by  either  side. 

When  all  details  were  ready  the  army  of  the   constitu 
tioualists,9,000  men  in  three  brigades,embarked  uponit<  trai 
ports,  and  under  protection  of  the  navy,  went   to   Quinten 


61 


Bay,  where  it  was  safely  disembarked  on  August  20.     (Quin- 
teros  to  Valparaiso  15  miles.) 

The  army  of  the  Government  was  placed  as  follows: 

7,000  at  Santiago. 

7,000  at  Valparaiso. 

7,500  at  Concepcion. 

8,500  at  Coquimbo. 

2,500  scattering. 


32,000  men  in  all. 

The  railroad  running  from  Valparaiso  by  Santiago  to 
Concepcion  should  have  been  able  to  concentrate  f  of  this 
force  in  a  few  hours.  But  the  force  at  Coquimbo,  consisting 
of  the  best  of  the  troops,  was  so  far  away  that  it  was  cut  off' 
from  participation  in  the  war.  The  troops  were  constantly 
drilled  and  maneuvered  and  were  supposed  to  be  in  a  high 
state  of  efficiency. 

The  plan  of  the  Congiessional  leaders  was  to  act  by 
surprise.  To  carry  out  such  a  plan  it  was  necessary  to  dis- 
embark rapidly,  to  cut  the  telegraph  line  to  Valparaiso,  to 
make  a  difficult  march  and  pass  a  mountain  torrent  where 
there  were  only  two  fords.  Their  careful  preparations  were 
not  entirely  successful.  The  fleet  was  drifted  northward  by 
the  ocean  currents  so  that  the  work  of  disembarking,  instead 
of  beginning  at  daylight,  was  delayed  four  hours.  The  plan 
to  cut  the  telegraph  by  sympathizers  on  shore  failed,  and  the 
Government  was  promptly  notified.  The  roads  were  difficult 
and  when  the  Congressional  troops  reached  the  Aconcagua 
river  they  found  the  passage  barred  by  an  equal  force  of  the 
enemy. 

The  Government  troops  had  apparently  an  easy  task  to 
defend  an  impassible  stream,  crossed  by  only  two  fords  which 
could  not  be  flanked.  But  they  made  such  a  faulty  disposi- 
tion at  the  ford  at  the  mouth  of  the  stream  that  the  crossing 
was  not  properly  commanded  by  the  artillery.  Korner  dis- 
covered this  promptly  and  at  once  led  a  brigade  across  with 


62 

little  trouble,  turned  the  flank  and  caused  the  complete  de- 
feat of  the  Government  troops.  This  was  the  battle  ol 
Concon. 

The  Government  troops  then  occcupied  the  strong  posi- 
tion of  Vina  del  Mar  in  front  of  Valparaiso  and  brought  up 
reinforcement?  from  Santiago  and  Concepcion.  The  Con- 
gressists  did  not  venture  to  attack. 

The  original  plan  of  campaign  had  therefore  failed  be- 
cause the  Government  was  not  taken  by  surprise  as  was 
expected. 

Valparaiso  is  accessible  on  the  land  side  by  only  two 
roads,  and  this  fact  imight  be  generalized  to  show  the  difficul 
ties  of  operating  in  every  other  part  of  Chili.  One  road  is 
by  Vina  del  Mar  and  the  rail-road,  entering  the  city  on  the 
north.  The  other  is  the  old  road  formerly  used  before  the 
rail-road  was  built.  It  was  then  in  poor  repair  and  entered 
the  city  from  the  south. 

It  was  decided  to  strike  over  to  this  last  road  by  difficult 
paths.  It  was  a  bold  and  dangerous  move.  It  was  almost  a. 
desperate  undertaking  to  cut  entirely  loose  from  the  fleet  and 
all  communications,  marching  over  roads  which  in  the  rainy 
season  were  as  bad  as  any  in  our  own  country,  and  fighting 
a  battle  in  a  position  where  defeat  would  be  ruin.  Looking 
for  a  similarity  in  the  Vicksburg  Campaign  we  see  at  once 
that  there  was  not  the  chance  which  Grant  had  of  retreating 
upon  a  new  base,  and  there  was  not !  the  justification  which 
Grant  had  of  a  largely  superior  army  and  a  theatre  of  opera- 
tions where  supplies  were  abundant.  The  Prussian  Colonel 
Korner  argued  against  the  movement  and  advised  an  attack  on 
Vina  del  Mar  for  the  reason  that  the  city  could  be  defended 
from  an  attack  at  the  south  in  positions  just  as  favorable  as 
those  at  the  north.  In  this  he  seems  to  have  been  correct. 
Del  Canto  says  that  his  reason  for  taking  the  southern  route 
was  to  save  a  Chilian  city  from  an  open  assault.  It  seems 
more  probable  that  the  Chilian  Congress  expected  to  deceive 


63 


the  Government  generals  as  to  the  direction  of  their  attack, 
relying  upon  secrecy  and  rapidity  of  movement  and  upon 
the  difficulty  the  enemy  would  find  in  taking  up  new  positions. 

(Fort  Callao  to  Quilpue  4  miles. 

Renaca  to  Quilpue  8  miles. 

Quilpue  to  Las  Pal  mas  12  miles. 

Las  Palmas  to  Las  Cadenas  9  miles. 

Las  Cadenas  to  La  Placilla  6  miles.) 
To  accomplish  that  march  of  twenty-seven  (27)  mile.* 
the  troops  marched  mostly  at  night  on  two  days.  A  large 
portion  of  the  artillery  was  left  behind  on  account  >f  the  dif- 
ficulty of  getting  across  the  rough  country  between  Renaca 
and  Quilpue.  In  addition  to  the  natural  difficulties  of  the 
country  the  troops  suffered  greatly  from  exposure,  from  rain 
and  cold.  The  Government  troops,  under  as  great  or  greater 
difficulties,  managed  to  change  the  position  of  the  army  to  a 
formidable  position  at  La  Placilla  across  the  road  by  which 
the  Congressional  troops  advanced. 

The  battle  that  ensued  was  well  contested.  Out  of 
20,000  men  engaged,  5,000,  or  twenty-five  per  cent,  were 
killed  and  wounded.  The  battle  was  won  by  a  charge  of 
cavalry  in  a  way  that  cannot  fail  to  excite  our  admiration 
and  wonder  in  these  days  when  cavalry  is  not  supposed  to 
win  victories  as  in  the  days  of  Frederick  and  Napoleon. 

Three  hundred  of  these  troopers,  whom  we  may  easily 
imagine  were  not  the  embodiment  of  a  high  type  of  cavalry, 
because  thev  were  new  levies  mounted  on  the  underbred, 
undersized  horses  of  the  country,  threw  themselves  upon  the 
flank  of  the  Government  troops  with  a  vigor  and  dash  that 
was  truly  extraordinary.  They  lost  74  men  and  eight  officers, 
of  whom  44  men  and  five  officers  belonged  to  the  leading 
squadron. 

Valparaiso  was  entered  in  a  few  hours  and  the  war 
was  ended. 

We  have  now  seen  that  on  several  occasions  small  armies 


64 


have  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Andes  and  entering  Chili  from 
the  east  but  they  met  with  no  resistance  .and  they  suffered 
greatly.  However  we  have  little  interest  in  such  a  line  of 
operations.  We  have  also  seen  that  small  armies,  not  strong- 
ly opposed,  have  penetrated  Chili  from  the  north,  but  a 
study  of  the  difficulties  of  such  a  march  mould  deter  most 
commanders.  We  have  found  that  the  true  key  to  the  situa- 
tion lies  in  control  of  the  sea.  The  strategy  of  all  recent 
campaigns  has  been  the  same,  that  is  to  obtain  supremacy  at 
sea  before  anything  else  is  attempted.  Military  operations 
will  not  occur  along  the  greatest  length  of  the  country. 
Few  movements,  independent  of  a  co-operating  naval  force, 
can  be  attempted.  Attacks  by  the  fleet  upon  sea-ports  can 
have  only  a  local  effect  owing  to  the  impossibility  oi  extending 
its  operations  over  more  than  a  limited  territory.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  capture  place  after  place  along  the  coast  and  work  in- 
to the  interior  from  these  ports  as  bases.  For  these  purposes 
an  active  field  army  of  10,000  to  25,000  men  must  be  formed, 
and  each  part  of  the  country  becomes  the  objective  of  a  cam- 
paign by  itself.  Such  an  army,  supported  by  such  a  navy, 
with  its  advantages  in  choosing  its  point  of  attack  each  time, 
must  surely  overpower  the  country,  in  the  end. 

In  two  campaigns  the  nitrate  provinces,  although  unpro- 
vided with  everything  that  we  rely  on  to  sustain  life,  have 
been  important,  strategic  points.  The  export  duties  on  ni- 
trate of  soda  amount  to  about  thirty  million  dollars  in  a  year. 
By  their  loss  in  1879  the  Peruvian  government  was  impov- 
rished.  By  their  possession  in  1890  the  Congressional 
party  gained  the  means  for  carrying  on  the  war. 

The  strategical  advantage  of  the  possession  of  the  Nica- 
raugua  Canal  by  the  United  States  would  be  great.  As  it 
now  stands  Chili  has  a  central  position  while  we  have  a  coast 
line  on  the  Pacific  as  well  as  one  on  the  Atlantic  to  defend, 
both  separated  by  many  thousands  of  miles.  While  the  Chi- 
lian navy  may  be  concentrated  for  attack  or  defense,  ours 


65 


must  be  dispersed  in  either  case.  J  MID  not  sure  what  influ- 
ence the  possession  of  the  Straits  of  Magellan  and  the  neigh- 
boring lands  and  islands  may  have,  but  t  imagine  that  a  small 
force  could  there  be  used  effectively  by  Chili  against  a  greatly 
superior  force  from  our  Atlantic  coast. 

Since  the  last  war  great  changes  have  taken  place  in  the 
rail-road  system  of  Chili.  A  trans-Andean  rail- way  is  pro- 
bably now  completed  by  way  of  the  Uspallata  pass— I  may 
say  under  the  pass — with  a  single  tunnel  three  miles  long. 
Several  other  trans-Andean  roads  are  contemplated.  It  is 
also  intended  to  attempt  to  connect  the  rail-way  systems  of 
Chili  by  a  north  and  south  line.  Such  improvements  would 
add  immensely  to  the  defensive  power  of  the  country.  With 
rail-roads  running  into  friendly  territory  in  the  interior  of 
South  America  and  to  its  seaports  on  the  Atlantic,  a  blockade 
would  not  mean  starvation  or  surrender  to  many  portions  of 
the  country  as  it  would  at  a  prior  date.  There,  too,  allies 
might  be  found  beyond  the  Andes  to  send  their  armies  to  the 
assistance  of  Chili  by  these  roads.  The  projected  road  in  the 
interior  would  make  it  easy  to  supply  and  reinforce  distant 
points,  but  it  would  always  be  in  easy  reach  of  a  superior 
navy  with  a  mobile  field  force  which  could  raid  any  point  of 
a  line  several  thousand  miles  long. 

Since  1891  Chili  has  added  to  her  navy  and  within  a  few 
weeks  nineteen  German  officers  have  been  granted  a  leave 
by  the  Emperor  to  take  service  in  the  Chilian  army. 

(BOOKS  CONSULTED.) 

Estadistica  y  Geografica  de  laRepublica  de  Chili. 
Manual .  Hispano — Americano. 

Une  Campagne  de  Huit  Jours,  par  le  General  Lamintux. 
La  Guerre  de  Pacifique,  par  Don  Diego  Barros  de  Arana. 
Chili  by  B.  V.  M. 
Dark  Days  in  Chili. 

The  Chilian    Revolution    of  1891    by  Lieutenants  Sears  and 
Wells,  U.  S.  N. 


66 


THE  MILITARY  GEOGRAPHY  OF  MEXICO. 


By  1st  Lieutenant  A.  L.  MILLS,  1st  Cavalry. 
Assistant  Instructor. 


— o- 


I  V  I  EXICO  extends  from  the  United  States  to  Central 
^  ^^ America,  and  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the 
Caribbean  Sea  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  In  extreme  limits  it  em- 
braces about  thirty  degrees  of  longitude  and  eighteen  degrees 
of  latitude.  Its  superficial  area  is  about  744,000  square  miles, 
equal  to  about  two  and  three-fourths  times  that  of  the  State 
of  Texas.  The  length  of  the  northern  frontier  line  is  about 
1,900  miles,  of  which  1,000  miles  is  formed  by  the  Rio  Grande 
River;  that  of  the  eastern  coast  line  is  about  1,600  miles. 
The  Pacific  coast  line,  including  that  of  the  Gulf  of  California, 
is  about  4,500  miles  in  length;  the  southern  boundary  is 
about  500  miles. 

Mexico's  greatest  length  is  about  2,000  miles;  her  great- 


67 


est  breath  is  about  750  miles.  At  the  Isthmus  of  Tehuante- 
pec  her  width  is  only  140  miles.  Geographically,  Mexico, 
lying  between  two  great  oceans,  is  highly  favored. 

TOPOGRAPHY. 

The  Cordillera  of  the  Andes,  as  the  mountains  of  Mexico 
are  called,  enter  Mexican  Territory  from  Gautemala,  and,  to 
about  latitude  18°  extend  east  and  west,  almost  midway  be- 
tween the  two  oceans.  From  this  line  the  mountains  follow7, 
in  a  general  way,  both  t^e  eastern  and  western  coasts.  Be- 
tween these  branch  chains  lies  a  great  central  table-land, 
called  the  Plateau  of  Anahuac,  embracing  nearly  three-fifths 
of  the  entire  area  of  Mexico.  The  highest  portion  of  the  pla- 
teau is  in  the  vicinity  of  the  City  of  Mexico,  south  and  east, 
where  it  cu.minates  in  four  volcanic  peaks,  ranging  in  height 
from  15,271  to  17,720  feet.  From  this  locality,  where  the 
general  elevation  is  more  than  7,600  feet,  the  plateau  has  a 
general  inclination  toward  the  north-west,  gradually  subsid- 
ing until  the  United  States  is  reached.  Low  mountain  ran- 
ges divide  the  great  plateau  into  smaller  ones,  the  general 
but  gradual  northerly  tilt  being  shown  by  the  altitudes  of 
Mexico  City,  Durango,  Chihuahua,  and  Paso  del  Norte,  on 
the  frontier,  which  are  respectively  7,600,  6,630,  4,600  and 
3,800  feet.  There  is  no  point  of  the  great  plateau  from 
which  mountains  may  not  be  seen  in  clear  weather;  they  arc 
all  the  same  in  appearance — abrupt,  bleak,  and  without  ve- 
gatation.  No  great  valleys  traverse  the  plateau,  nor  art' 
there  many  small  ones.  By  avoiding  the  mountains,  accord- 
ing to  authority,  "there  is  a  good  natural  carriage  road  fiom 
Santa  Fe,  N.  M.,  to  the  city  of  Mexico,  a  distance  of  1,400 
miles,  with  only  slight  variations  from  the  level."  Between 
Saltillo  and  San  Luis  Potosi,  a  distance  of  240  miles,  the  pla- 
teau is  a  treeless  region,  containing  but  little  water,  and  fc 
practically  a  desert,  the  greater  part  of  the  remainder  is  a 
habitable  region,  largely  under  cultivation.  In  1883,  Cap- 
tain Dorst,  Fourth  Cavalry,  made  a  horseback  journey  through 


68 


Mexico;  he  gives  the  following  general  description  of  the 
plateau:  "Some  fifty  or  sixty  miles  from  Laredo,  Texas,  tra- 
veling by  rail  to  Monterey,  a  long,  flat  topped  hill  is  seen 
some  miles  to  the  right,  extending  in  the  distance  nearly 
parallel  to  the  road.  Alter  traveling  fifteen  or  twenty  mile.- 
further,  this  hill  is  higher  and  broken,  its  top  has  become 
serrated  and  jagged,  and  it  finally  merges  into  a  range  of 
mountains.  Other  mountains  then  appear  to  the  left,  and 
all  increase  in  height  towards  Monterey.  From  thence  south- 
ward to  every  place  visited  on  the  Mexican  plateau,  moun- 
tains were  always  in  sight,  either  near  or  distant,  and  gener- 
ally in  every  direction.  Saltillo  is  regarded  as  located  at  n 
point  on  the  northern  edjje  of  the  Mexican  table  land.  Start- 
ing from  it  and  proceeding  southward,  the  traveler  at  once 
enters  a  chain  of  mountains  extending  in  an  easterly  and 
westerly  direction  and  more  than  forty  miles  in  breadth. 
After  passing  through  it  he  comes  upon  a  broad  and  almost 
desert  plain,  flanked  by  distant  mountains,  which  produces 
scarcely  anything  besides  a  few  stunted  bushes  and  cacti,  is 
sparcely  populated,  wholly  uncultivated,  poorly  watered,  and 
extends  without  change  one  hundred  miles  .further  to  the 
south.  He  then  meets  a  few  towns,  some  evidences  of  culti- 
vation, and  near  Charcas, — a  town  more  than  two  hundred 
miles  from  Saltillo, — the  first  stream  of  running  water.  The 
plain  has  become  more  or  less  hilly  and  broken,  and  both 
population  and  cultivation  increase  perceptibly  as  he  nears 
San  Luis  Potosi.  The  country  to  the  west  of  that  city,  how- 
ever, as  far  as  Zacatecas,  is  barren  and  almost  uninhabited. 
Farther  south  lie  more  fertile,  though  partly  sterile  plains 
and  valleys,  cultivated  by  irrigation  to  as  great  an  extent  as 
the  water  supply  will  permit,  and  separated  from  each  other 
by  intervening  mountains.  This  alternation  of  plains  and 
valleys  with  mountains  extends  southward  to  the  City  of 
Mexico,  and  eastward  from  thence  to  the  edge  of  the  plateau. 
Except  where  the  soil  is  tilled,  nearly  all  this  great  expanse 


69 


of  country  is  bare,  and  the  whole  is  almost  treeless  and  but 
scantly  supplied  with  water.  *  As  far 

south  as  the  state  of  Guanajuato,  the  mountains  are  bleak, 
dry,  and  desolate  in  appearance;  but  there,  and  farther  south, 
a  partial  covering  of  bushes,  stunted  live  oak,  or  occasionally 
pine,  is  not  unusual."  Scarcity  of  water  and  fuel  will  be  the 
greatest  obstacles  to  military  operations  on  the  great  plateau, 
as  they  have  been  to  the  developement  of  its  resources. 

The  mountains  of  the  western  coast,  the  Sierra  Madre  of 
the  Pacific,  are  continuous,  extending  from  Oajaca  to  Arizo- 
na, at  a  mean  elevation  of  over  10,000  feet.  The  mountains 
of  the  eastern  coast,  the  Sierras  Madres  of  Nuevo-Leon  and 
Tamaulipas,  have  a  mean  elevation  of  about  6,000  feet;  they 
gradually  subside  toward  the  north,  and  finally  merge  into 
the  great  plains  of  the  Rio  Grande  river.  The  eastern  range 
slopes  abruptly  to  the  sea,  while  the  ranges  of  the  western 
and  southern  coasts  fall  through  a  series  of  well  marked  ter- 
races to  the  Pacific. 

Between  the  foot  of  each  of  the  great  mountain  chains, 
bounding  the  plateau,  and  the  sea,  lies  a  strip  of  low  flat  coun- 
try, called  the  Tierras  Calientes,  or  Hot  Lands.  Along  the 
western  coast,  these  lands  form  a  strip  from  thirty  to  seventy 
miles  in  width.  They  are  much  more  extensive  along  the 
eastern  coast,  where  they  include  the  greater  part  of  the 
States  of  Tamaulipas,  Vera  Cruz,  Tabasco,  and  Yucatan. 

The  Territory  of  Lower  California,  comprising  the  penin- 
sula of  that  name,  has  an  area  of  61,544  square  miles.  It  it 
about  750  miles  long  and  from  30  to  150  miles  broad.  The 
Peninsula  is  traversed  throughout  its  length  by  a  continua- 
tion of  the  Sierra  Nevada  Mountains  of  California,  which 
range  from  1,000  to  5,000  feet  high,  and  are  bare  of  verdue. 
The  soil  of  the  Peninsula  is  wonderfully  fertile  where  there  is 
water,  but  the  greater  part  of  it,  being  subject  to  excessive 
droughts,  is  but  thinly  settled.  It  is  credited  with  a  popula- 
tion of  less  than  30,000.  Separated  from  Mexico  proper  by 


70 

the  great  Gulf  of  California  and  the  Colorado  River,  and  its 
resources  being  comparatively  small,  the  importance  of  Low- 
er California  in  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico 
would  be  confined  probably  to  some  point  on  its  coast  being 
taken  as  a  secondary  base  in  operations  against  the  ports  ofi 
the  West  coast  of  the  main  country;  the  original  base  being 
some  point  on  the  coast  of  California,  probably  Ban  Diego,  or 
on  the  Colorado  River  below  Yuma,  Arizona. 

HARBORS. 

The  seaboard  of  Mexico  is  little  varied  either  by  deep  in- 
lets, bold  headlands,  broad  estuaries,  or  large  islands.  On 
the  west  side  is  the  Gulf  of  California,  the  open  Bay  of  Te- 
hauntepec,  and  the  smaller  inlets  of  Acapulca  and  San  Bias; 
the  two  last  named  are  two  of  the  finest  harbors  in  the  world, 
and  almost  the  only  safe  ones  in  Mexico.  The  coast  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  is  low,  Hat  and  sandy,  and  is  without  one 
good  harbor.  Those  of'Progreso,  Carnpeachey,  Tabasco,  Ve- 
ra  Cruz,  Tuxpau  and  Tarnpico,  (the  last  three  being  of  the 
greatest  strategic  importance),  are  mere  open  roadsteads,  af- 
fording little  or  no  protection  from  the  ''northers,"  which 
frequently  blow,  with  great  violence,  along  this  coast.  Ves- 
sels lying  in  these  harbors  are  liable  to  be  wrecked  during 
these  storms  and  often  are  compelled  to  put  to  sea  to  avoid 
their  dangers.  The  best  anchorage  on  this  coast  appears  tobe 
at  Anton  Lizardo,  south  of  Vera  Cruz,  where  the  fleet  con- 
veying General  Scott's  army  assembled  before  disembarking 
the  troops  to  attack  that  city.  The  harbors  on  the  Caribbean 
Sea  are  excellent,  but  owing  to  their  distance  from  what  must 
necessarily  be  the  main  objective  in  the  event  of  war  they 
have  but  little  strategic  value. 

RIVERS  AND  LAKES. 

Mexico  is  imperfectly  watered.  Its  rivers  as  a  rule  arc 
small  and  unimportant,  and  owing  to  the  peculiar  topogra 
phy  of  the  country,  but  a  small  number  are  navigable,  and 


71 


then  but  for  a  short  distance.  On  the  north,  the  Kio  Grande 
is  navigable  for  large  vessels  but  a  few  miles  above  its  port, 
Matamoras.  The  Panuca,  290  miles  long,  and  the  Coatza- 
coalcos,  112  miles,  are  the  principal  rivers  of  the  eastern 
coast;  the  former  is  navigable  for  small  vessels  for  over  100 
miles,  and  the  latter,  were  it  not  for  a  bar  at  its  mouth,  might 
be  navigated  for  a  considerable  distance  by  large  vessels.  The 
Grijalva,  or  Tabasco  river,  rises  in  Guatemala,  flows  through 
the  two  states  of  Chiapas  and  Tabasco,  and  empties  into  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  through  two  mouths;  it  is  navigable  for  small 
vessels  for  about  one-half  its  course.  The  longest  rivers  of 
the  Pacific  coast  are  the  Santiago,  540  miles  long,  and  the 
Balzas,  420  miles;  both  of  these  rivers  rise  in  the  State  of 
Mexico,  the  former  entering  the  sea  at  the  small  but  good 
port  of  Zacatula,  and  the  latter  at  San  Bias.  Neither  are 
navigable  on  account  of  rapids;  nor  are  any  of  the  other  riv- 
ers flowing  into  the  Gulf  of  California,  except  the  Colorado, 
which  is  open  to  the  largest  vessels  from  its  mouth  to  the 
frontier  of  the  United  States. 

Mexico  has  59  lakes.  Most  of  them  are  shallow  lagoons, 
ihe  remains  of  what  were  once  large  basins  of  water.  Like 
ihe  rivers,  they  are  all  small  and  of  little  value  for  the  pur- 
poses of  commerce  or  communication.  The  most  consider- 
able one  is  Lake  Chapalla,  in  the  State  of  Jalisco,  which  is 
about  70  miles  in  length  and  from  10  to  20  in  width.  The 
Santiago  river  flows  through  this  lake.  The  valley  of  Mexico, 
tibout  42  miles  long  by  30  wide,  contains  six  lakes,  which 
were  originally  one  large  lagoon.  Their  total  area  is  about 
58  square  miles.  The  largest  is  Lake  Texcoco,  directly  east 
of  the  city.  It,  and  the  three  lakes  to  the  north,  are  salt, 
while  the  two  remaining  ones,  about  ten  miles  south-east  of 
the  city,  are  fresh.  Many  of  the  so-called  lakes  along  the 
Gulf  coast,  such  as  the  Laguna  Madre,  Laguna  deTerminos, 
etc.,  are  really  arms  from  the  sea. 

Upon  the  whole,  Mexico  is  poorly  supplied   with   water. 


72 


and,  upon  the  great  plateau,  the  supply  has  been  steadily  de- 
m'lising  since  the  Spanish  Conquest. 

CLIMATE. 

Intersected  about  midway  by  the  Tropic  of  Cancer,  and 
stretching  across  seventeen  parallels  of  latitude,  Mexico  nec- 
essarily enjoys  a  great  diversity  of  climate.  The  four  seasons 
are  more  or  less  distinctly  marked  in  the  northern  port'on, 
but  in  the  central  and  southern  portions  there  are  but  two 
seasons — Summer,  or  the  Rainy  Season, which  lasts  from  May 
to  October,  and  Winter,  or  the  Dry  Season,  comprising  the 
remainder  of  the  year.  Tne  heaviest  rains  fall  in  August 
and  September.  With  reference  to  temperature,  Mexico,  in 
common  with  all  the  countries  of  Spanish  America,  isdivided 
into  three  great  terraces:  the  coast  regions,  or  tierras  calientes 
(hot  lands);  the  mountain  slopes,  or  tierras  templadas  (tem- 
perate lands);  and  the  elevated  plateaus,  or  tierras  frias  (cold 
lands). 

The  Hot  Lands  include  the  region  along  each  coast  lying 
between  the  sea  and  an  elevation  of  2,500  feet.  In  these 
lands  the  usual  temperature  ranges  from  70°  to  85°  F.;  but 
near  the  sea  level,  consequently  at  all  sea  ports,  the  summer 
temperature  frequently  rises  higher  than  100  degrees;  during 
the  winter  months  the  average  temperature  is  only  a  few  de- 
grees lower  than  in  the  summer. 

The  Temperate  Lands  lie  between  2,500  and  5,000  feet 
above  the  sea,  and  here  the  ordinary  daily  temperature  ran- 
ges between  65°  and  70°  F.  throughout  the  year. 

The  Cold  Regions  include  the  portions  of  the  surface 
higher  than  5,000,  and  this  division  embraces  more  than  three- 
fourths  the  area  of  Mexico.  The  extremes  of  45°  and  80°  F. 
are  seldom  exceeded  below  8,000  feet  altitude.  The  climate 
is  cold  as  compared  with  that  of  the  coast  country;  but  not 
as  compared  with  that  of  any  portion  of  the  United  States, 
except  portions  of  Florida  and  the  Gulf  Coast. 

The  healthfulness  of  the  different  regions  of  Mexico  de- 


pends  upon  their  climate;  the  most  healthy  being  those  en- 
joying a  dry  climate,  whether  hot,  temperate,  or  cold;  and 
the  most  unhealthy  being  those  in  which  humidity  prevails. 
The  climate  of  the  Temperate  Lands  is  healthful  and  pleas- 
ant, and  that  of  the  Cold  Regions  is  salubrious  below  the 
elevation  of  8,000  feet;  but  the  climate  of  the  Hot  Lands  is 
one  of  the  worst  and  most  unhealthful  on  the  face  of  the  earth. 
Yellow  Fever  and  Black  Vomit  are  the  great  scourges  of  the 
coast  regions.  They  usually  set  in  at  Vera  Cruz  about  the 
middle  of  May  and  last  until  November.  At  Campeachy, 
Tampico,  and  Acapulco  the  season  often  passes  without  a  sin- 
gle case,  but  no  such  respite  is  ever  enjoyed  by  Vera  Cruz, 
Merida,  or  any  of  the  coast  towns  of  Yucatan,  at  all  of  which  , 
the  mortality  is  generally  great.  Mexico  has  therefore  every 
variety  of  climate  from  tropical  heat  to  cold,  but  it  should  be 
noted  that  the  climate  of  any  particular  place  will  depend  far 
more  on  its  elevation  than  on  its  latitude. 

FOOD  PRODUCTS. 

The  soil  of  Mexico  is  for  the  most  part  extremely  fertile. 
The  comparatively  few  exceptions  are  nearly  all  attributable 
to  insufficient  irrigation  due  to  lack  of  water.  In  the  Hot 
Lands  the  entire  surface,  excepting  certain  small  areas  of 
sand,  is  covered  with  a  very  luxuriant  vegetation.  Oranges, 
bananas,  rice,  hemp,  and  all  kinds  of  tropical  plants  are  found 
in  abundance.  In  the  Temperate  Lands,  coffee,  sugar,  cot- 
ton, tobacco,  and  other  plants  are  cultivated.  In  the  Cold 
Regions,  wheat,  corn,  barley,  and  other  products  of  temper- 
:tte  latitudes  are  found;  the  maguey,  whose  fruit  is  edible 
and  which  supplies  the  famous  "pulque,"  the  national  bever- 
age of  Mexicans,  is  however,  the  principal  object  of  cultiva- 
tion. Wheat  is  cultivated  with  some  success  in  portions  of 
nil  but  five  of  the  Mexican  states,  but  corn,  frijoles  or  browD 
beans,  and  chile  Colorado  constitute  the  subsistence  of  nine- 
tenths  of  the  population,  and  are  extensively  produced  in 
every  state.  On  the  plateau  north  of  the  20th  parallel,  crops 


74 


depend  upon  irrigation.     South  of  this,  the  rain  fall  is  often 
sufficient,  but  cannot  always  be  depended  upon. 

Two  crops  of  either  corn  or  wheat  are  grown  on  the  same 
ground  every  year  in  the  various  parts  of  Mexico,  and  in  the 
States  of  Vera  Cruz  and  Tatasco  on  the  Gulf  coast,  Mexico 
on  th*3  plateau,  and  in  Jalisco,  Guerrero  and  Oaxaca  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  three  crops  of  corn  are  cultivated  on  the  same 
ground  in  a  single  year.  The  yield  per  ,«<cre  per  annum  is 
considerable  greater  than  in  the  United  States.  All  this  is 
done  with  the  simplest  farming  implements.. 

The  following  items  will  afford  an    idea   of  the    annual 
.Mexiconfood  production: 

Corn 200,000,000  bushels. 

Wheat 12,000,000 

Barley 10,000,000 

Potatoes 4,000,000 

Frijolcs 508,000,000  pounds. 

Sugar 158,000,000 

Rice 33,000,000 

.     Coffee 17,500,000 

The  annual  value  of  the  food  crops  of  Mexico  is  esti- 
mated at  $60,000,000,  and  of  all  agricultural  productions  at 
$110,000,000.  A  large  portion  of  the  area  under  cultivation 
jrives  indifferent  results,  but  the  remainder  is  equal  in  fertili- 
ty to  any  country  in  the  woild.  Mexico  has  been  described 
as  composed  of  regions  of  great  fertility,  separated  by  moun- 
tain ranges,  or  by  tracts  of  very  unproductive  country,  which, 
in  many  cases,  are  simply  deserts.  The  portions  of  the  coun- 
try not  suitable  for  agricultural  purposes  are,  in  general, 
more  or  less  suitable  for  grazing,  and  support  large  numbers 
of  horses,  cattle,  sheep  and  goats.  The  rivers  and  lakes 
abound  in  excellent  fish,  as  do  also  the  waters  of  the  coasts. 
Mexico  is  also  rich  in  precious  metals,  which  are  extensively 
mined. 


75 


GOVERNMENT. 

Mexico  is  a  federative  republic,  consisting  of  27  States, 
a  Federal  District  and  2  Territories,  each  of  which  has  a 
right  to  manage  its  own  local  affairs,  while  the  whole  are 
bound  together  in  one  body  politic  by  fuudemental  and  con- 
stitutional laws.  The  powers  of  the  Federal  Government  are 
divided  into  three  branches,  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
judicial.  The  legislative  power  is  vested  in  a  Congress  con- 
sisting of  a  Hou^e  of  Representatives  and  a  Senate,  and  tbe 
executive  in  a  President.  Representatives  and  Senators  are 
elected  by  the  suffrage  of  all  respectable  male  adults  and  hold 
office  for  two  years.  The  President  is  elected  by  electors 
popularly  chosen,  as  in  our  own  country  and  holds  office  for 
four  years.  The  administration  is  carried  on  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  President  and  a  Cabinet  of  seven  secretaries. 

Each  separate  State  has  its  own  internal  constitution, 
government  and  laws,  with  its  governor  and  legislature  popu- 
larly elected. 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  POPULATION. 

In  1892  the  estimated  population  of  Mexico  was  11,885- 
607,  of  which  19  per  cent  are  of  pure,  or  nearly  pure,  white 
race,  43  per  cent  of  mixed  race,  and  38  per  cent  of  Indian 
race.  The  great  mass  of  the  people  are  extremely  poor  and 
densely  ignorant,  the  natural  result  of  their  treatment  by  the 
Spanish  conquerors  and  their  sucessors;  but  under  the  en- 
lightened policy  pursued  by  the  Governmeneof  the  Republic, 
a  great  change  is  in  progress  and  education  is  now  compul- 
sory. The  Indian  population  has  been  very  little  affected  by 
nearly  four  centuries  of  contact  with  the  white  race.  They 
are  to-day  very  similiar  to  their  Aztec  forefathers  in  manners, 
customs  and  mode  of  life.  They  follow  the  same  pursuits 
and  use  exactly  the  same  implements  as  did  the  Aztecs. 

Nearly  the  whole  of  the  Mexican  population  live  in 
cities,  towns  or  villages.  Detached  houses  are  rarely  seen; 
travelers  report  riding  from  town  to  town,  in  the  most  popu- 


lated  districts,  without  observing  a  house.  Except  in  the  Hot 
Lands  the  houses  are  usually  built  of  stone  or  adobe,  and  are 
very  strong  for  defense,  and  almost  impossible  to  set  on  fire. 

The  chief  cities  are  the  capital,  Mexico,  with  a  popula- 
tion of  about  326,000;  Guadalajara,  95,000;  Puebla,  78,000; 
San  LuisPotosi,  62,000;  Guanajuato,  52,000:  Leon,  47,000; 
Monterey,  41,000;  Aguas  Calientes,  32,000;  Merida,  32,000; 
Vera  Cruz,  29,000;  (about  four-fifths  of  the  exchanges  of 
Mexico  pass  through  this  Port.)  Colima,  25,000;  Pachuca, 
25,000;  Jalapa,  18,000. 

For  convenience  in  considering  the  Military  Geography 
of  Mexico,  the  States  of  the  Republic  are  divided  into  three 
groups.  The  northern  groups  comprising  the  States  of  Sono- 
ra,  Chihuahua,  Coahuila,  Nuevo  Leon,  Tamaulipas,  Sinaloa, 
Durango,  and  the  Territory  of  Lower  California;  the  south- 
eastern group  comprising  Yucatan,  Campeachey,  Tabasco, 
and  Chiapas;  and  the  central  group  comprising  all  the  re- 
maining States  and  the  Federal  District.  Of  these  groups, 
the  northern,  containing  more  than  half  the  area  of  Mexico, 
contains  less  than  one-ninth  the  population;  while  the  central 
group,  containing  less  than  one-third  the  total  area,  contains 
more  than  four-fifths  of  the  population.  This  central  region 
must  therefore  be  regarded  as  "the  heart  of  the  country,"  not 
only  in  geographical  position,  but  also  in  population;  it  is  so 
also  in  wealth,  productions,  manufactures,  in  fact,  in  every- 
thing but  the  grazing  and  mining  interests;  its  boundaries, 
approximately,  are  two  east  and  west  lines,  the  one  drawn 
through  San  Luis  Polosi  on  the  north;  the  other  through  Ori- 
zaba on  the  south. 

COMMUNICATIONS. 

Mexico  is  lacking  in  good  roads.  From  the  City  of  Mex- 
ico roads  radiate  to  the  different  cities  of  the  central  plateau, 
but  from  this  plateau,  communication  with  the  coast,  with  a 
few  exceptions,  is  limited  to  bridle  paths.  There  is  a  car- 
riage road  from  Saltillo  to  Monterey  and  Matamoras;  from 


San  Luis  Potosi  to  Tula  and  Tampico;  and  from  the  City  of 
Mexico  to  Vera  Cruz,  Tehauntepec,  Acapulco  and  San  Bias; 
but  the  Sierra  Madre  Mountains  of  the  Pacific  are  crossed  by 
no  road  from  ^Guadalahara  to  Arizona.  Travel  from  the 
State  of  Souora  to  the  Capital  must  be  by  sea  to  one  of  the 
Pacific  ports,  or  by  way  of  El  Paso  in  the  United  States.  The 
roads  of  the  central  plateau,  poor  under  the  most  favorable 
conditions  of  weather,  are  quagmires  during  the  rainy  season; 
those  leading  to  the  coast  are  steep,  rough,  and  always  diffi- 
cult to  travel.  The  government  has  of  late  years  been  en- 
gaged in  improving  its  highways,  but  much  yet  remains  to  be 
accomplished. 

In  railroad  communications  the  country  is  much  better 
off.  It  is  now  pretty  well  intersected  by  railways,  and  their 
construction  is  being  pushed  forward  rapidly.  In  a  short 
time  Mexico  will  possess  a  system  of  railroads  that  will  not 
only  develop  her  great  natural  wealth,  but  will  greatly  in 
crease  her  power  of  defense.  At  present  her  railway  mileage 
is  over  7,000  miles. 

The  principal  lines  are:  The  Mexican  Central,  from  El- 
Paso,  Texas,  to  the  City  of  Mexico,  1,225  miles,  with  branches: 
Irapuato  to  Guadalahara,  160  miles,  and  under  construction 
to  San  Bias:  Aguas  Calientes  to  Tampico,  415  miles. 

The  Mexican  International,  from  Eagle  Pass,  Texas,  to 
Torreon  Junction,  383  miles,  where  it  connects  with  the  Mex- 
ican Central.  Its  branches  are:  Torreon  to  Durango,  157 
miles:  Trevino  to  Tampico,  387  miles. 

The  Mexican  National,  narrow  gauge,  from  Laredo. 
Texas,  to  Mexico  City,  840  miles'.  Branches:  Mexico  to  E) 
Salto,  19  miles:  Acambaro  to  Patzcuaro,  96  miles.  (This 
branch  is  being  constructed  to  Manzanillo,  440  miles);  Mata- 
moras  to  San  Miguel,  75  miles. 

The  Mexican  railroad,  from  Vera  Cruz  to  Mexico,  268 
miles,  with  a  branch  to  Puebla,  29  miles. 

The  Mexican  Inter-Oceanic,   narrow  gauge,  from  Vera 


78 


Cruz  to  Mexico,  with  braDches  from  Mexico  to  Jojulta,  122 
miles;  and  from  Puebla  to  Chiaulta,  64  miles.  This  last 
branch  is  being  continued  to  Acapulco,  200  miles. 

The  Mexican  Southern,  from  Puebla,  through  Oaxaca, 
is  now  in  operation  to  Tehauntepec. 

The  Tehauntepec  Railroad,  from  Coatzacoalcos  to  Te- 
hauntepec, 140  miles. 

The  Sinaloa  and  Durango  Railroad,  from  Altata  to  Culi- 
acan,  60  miles,  is  to  be  continued  to  Durango. 

The  Sonora  Railroad,  from  Nogales,  Arizona,  to  Guy- 
mas,  265  miles. 

The  Eagle  Pass  and  Laredo  lines  are  connected  by  cross 
lines  from  Sabinas  to  Lampaxos,  and  from  Jaral  to  Saltillo. 

A  glance  at  the  direction  of  these  roads  will  show  how 
greatly  Mexico  is  favored  by  them  with  the  advantage  of  in- 
terior lines  for  her  forces. 

Still  more  developed  is  the  telegraph  system  of  Mexico, 
which  is  now  extended  to  all  the  State  capitals  and  the  prin- 
cipal cities,  and  is  connected  with  the  systems  of  the  United 
States.  In  1893,  there  were  37,800  miles  of  telegraph  line? 
in  operation. 

MILITARY  STRENGTH. 

The  total  land  fighting  strength  of  Mexico,  in  1893,  wa*< 
reported  to  be  131,523  infantry,  25,790  dragoons,  and  3,650 
artillery.  As  every  Mexican  capable  of  bearing  arms  is  li- 
able for  military  service  from  his  twentieth  to  fiftieth  year, 
there  would  be  a  general  reserve  of  over  one-half  million  meD 
to  draw  on  in  case  of  necessity. 

Her  naval  strength  consists  of  1  7-knot  gunboat,  2  des- 
patch vessels,  2  unarmoured  gun-vessels,  1  transport,  1  steel 
training  ship,  5  first  class  torpedo-boats,  and  1  police-steamer. 
The  fleet  is  manned  by  84  officers  and  416  men.  In  1890  the 
mercantile  marine,  of  vessels  over  100  tons,  comprised  16 
steamers,  and  16  sailing  vessels.  Her  shipping  also  includes 
many  smaller  vessels  engaged  in  the  coasting  trade. 


79 


The  forces  immediately  available  in  case  of  war  are 
about  2,000  officers  and  36,000  men,  as  follows:— 

1.  The   regular   army — 29    battalions    of  infantry,  13 
regiments   of  dragoons,    4  battalions  of  artillery,  engineers, 
etc.     Total  1,700  officers  and  30,000  men. 

2.  The  Rural  Guards  and  Gendarmes,  mounted,  3,000 
men. 

3.  The  local  troops  of  the  several  states,  about  3,000 
men. 

The  regular  troops  are  well  armed  and  equipped,  the 
artillery  being  provided  with  steel  breech-loading  guns  of 
modern  pattern.  They  do  not  lack  field  experience  and  have 
shown  high  efficiency  in  Indian  warfare.  Remarkable  march- 
ing qualities,  combined  with  ease  of  subsistence,  are  ascribed 
to  the  infantry,  while  the  "Rurales,"  as  a  mounted  body,  is 
said  to  be  without  a  superior  in  the  world.  It  is  to  be  re- 
gretted that  no  information  has  been  received  as  yet  of  Mex- 
ico's partial  mobilization  of  her  forces  for  war,  which  recently 
seemed  iraineut  with  Guatemala,  Such  would  be  of  interest 
now  as  indicating  her  readiness  for  war,  and  on  which  to  base 
un  opinion  of  the  efficiency  of  her  general  staff. 

Railroads  constitute  Mexico's  best  means  of  transporta- 
tion, and  pack  animals  the  next;  wagon  transportation  is  un- 
developed, due  to  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  kind  of 
service  her  regular  forces  have  been  called  upon  to  perform. 

Mexico  has  no  permanent  fortifications  of  modern  design. 
Works  exist  at  the  Capital,  Puebla,  Vera  Cruz,  Perote,  Aca- 
pulco.  and  Mazatlan,  but  they  and  the  guns  manning  them 
are  obsolete.  An  excellent  military  school,  modeled  largely 
after  West  Point,  is  maintained  near  Chapultepec.  The 
country  also  has  in  operation  a  national  armory  for  the  man- 
ufacture of  small  arms,  and  works  for  the  production  of  pow- 
der. 

FINANCES. 

The  fiscal  value  of  property  in  Mexico  in   1892  is  given 


80 


as  $497,865,195,  the  fiscal  value  being  taken  as  one-third  les* 
than  the  actual  value.  The  total  debt  of  the  country,  June 
30,  1892,  was  $174,449,510.  The  exports  of  the  country,  in 
1892-93,  amounted  to  $87,509,221 .  The  budget  estimates  of 
the  government  for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1895,  were  as 
follows:  Revenue,  $43,074,053;  Expenditures,  $43,054,371; 
of  the  latter,  $10,402,866  were  Cor  the  army  and  navy. 

MILITARY  CHARACTER. 

Captain  Shunk,  8th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  in  an  article  on  the 
Military  Geography  of  Mexico  (freely  used  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  this  lecture),  describes  the  military  character  of  the 
Mexican  as  follows: 

"Readers  familiar  with  Mexican  history,  knowing  that 
Mexican  armies  have  been  defeated  repeatedly  by  greatly  in- 
ferior forces  of  Spaniards,  Americans,  and  Frenchmen,  will 
be  inclined  probably  to  regard  the  Mexican  soldier  as  inferior 
to  the  soldiers  of  other  civilized  countries,  and  there  is  much 
in  history  to  justify  such  an  opinion.  However,  before  ac- 
cepting this  conclusion  as  final,  several  facts  should  be  taken 
into  consideration,  among  them  the  following: 

1.  In  the  encounters  referred  to,    the   Mexican    troops 
were  invariably  poorly  instructed,  poorly  armed,    and    desti- 
tute of  good  officers  in  the  lower  grades;  disadvantages  that 
could    not   be   equalized    by  the  efforts  of  a  few  able  men  in 
high  command.     In  future  wars,  this  state  of  affairs  will    no 
longer  obtain  in  their  regular  forces,  nor  to  so  great  an  extent 
as  formerly  in  any  part  of  their  forces. 

2.  Their  want  of  good  communications  and  the  general 
poverty    of  the   country  have  been  such  that  their  resources 
could  not  be  made  available  on  a  threatened  line  in  any,  rea- 
sonable time.     This  condition  has  almost  completely  disap- 
peared. 

3.  The  Mexican  soldier  has  also   been   accustomed   to 
handle   and   use   fire  arms  from  childhood,  and  he  often  dis- 
plays the  recklessness  and  prowess  that  we  are  familiar  with 


81 


among  our  native  Indians.  In  physical  bravery  and  contempt 
for  danger,  he  will  probably  be  found  equal  to  any  soldier  he 
may  be  called  upon  to  meet.  Instances  show  that  Mexican 
troops,  bravely  and  skillfully  led,  fight  well;  poorly  led  they 
are  easily  stampeded. 

4.  The  true  point  of  inferiority  of  the  Mexican    soldier 
lies  in  his  dense  ignorance;   but  compulsory  education  is  cor- 
recting this  evil  and  will  in  time  eradicate  it. 

5.  The    marching  power  of  Mexican  troops  has  been 
commented  upon  by  many  officers  who  have  visited  the  coun- 
try; and  if  it  has  been  corectly  reported,  it  far   exceeds  that 
of  all  other  countries.     It  is  asserted  that  Mexican  infantry, 
in  small  bodies  of  2, 000  or  3,000  men,  has  repeatedly  marched 
about  50  miles  a  day  for   several    consecutive    days.     While 
this    can  scarcely  admit  of  belief,  it  can  not  be  doubted  that 
Mexican  troops  are  accustomed  to  march  with  greater  rapidity 
lhan  is  customery  in  any  other  country." 

From  the  foregoing  it  appears  that  our  neighbor  on  our 
southern  frontier  is  not  unprepared  for  war.  Her  condition 
is  prosperous;  her  finances  are  good;  her  resources  in  soldiers 
and  supplies  are  large.  Nature,  with  mountains,  deserts  and 
climate,  has  made  her  strong  in  defense,  and  her  communica- 
tions, giving  all  the  advantages  of  interior  lines,  increase 
this  strength.  Finally  it  is  apparent,  with  a  determined  de- 
fense, her  conquest  by  an  enemy  from  without  must  prove  to 
be  a  great  undertaking. 

POSSIBLE  LINES  OF  OPERATIONS. 

In  the  event  of  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mex- 
ico, our  country  will  naturally  assume  the  offensive;  if  not  at 
first,  then  shortly  after  the  breaking  out  of  hostilities,  and 
will  carry  the  war  into  Mexican  Territory.  To  prosecute  the 
war  to  a  successful  conclusion,  it  is  evident,  from  what  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  that  our  forces  must  conquer  the 
•^reat  central  plateau  of  Mexico  from  San  Luis  Potosi,  on  the 
north,  to  Orizaba,  on  the  south.  Our  first  objective  there 


32 


would  be  the  capital  city.  Examining  the  map,  we  find  a 
number  of  routes  to  it.  We  might  base  ourselves  on  the 
Rio  Grande  river,  and  assisted  by  the  railroads,  invade  Mexi- 
co by  way  of  El  Paso,  Eagle  Pass,  or  Laredo;  or,  having  con- 
trol of  the  sea,  we  might  establish  ourselves  atone  of  the  Gulf 
or  Caribbean  ports,  or  at  a  Pacific  port  south  of  Guy  mas, 
and  move  thence  towards  the  Capital.  Considering  these 
several  routes,  reflection  will  show  that  the  great  distance  of 
the  Pacific  ports  from  our  resources  and  the  lack  of  roads  to 
the  capital,  puts  these  lines  out  of  the  question  when  compared 
with  nearer  routes;  and  that  similar  reasons — distance  from 
the  objective  and  the  character  and  climate  of  the  intervening 
country — throw  out  all  sea  ports  south  and  east  ofVeraCruz. 
Taking  up  the  other  routes,  the  following  table  gives  the 
lengths  of  the  remaining  lines: 

El  Paso  to  Mexico  City 1,225  miles. 

Eagle  Pass,  via  Torrean,  to  Mexico  City 1,091  " 

Laredo  to  Mexico  City 840  '* 

Tampico,  via  San  LuisPotosi  to  Mexico  City. . .     637  " 

Vera  Cruz,  via  the  Mexican  R.  R,  to  Mex.  City    263  " 

Laredo  to  San  Luis  Potosi : 478  " 

Tampico  to  San  Luis  Potosi   275  " 

These  figures  are  significant.  Controlling  the  sea  as  we 
would  in  the  case  considered,  they  show  Vera  Cruz  to  be  the 
available  point  on  the  Gulf  coast  nearest  the  capital,  374 
miles  nearer  than  Tampico,  and  577  miles  nearer  than  Lare- 
do, the  point  on  the  Rio  Grande  closest  to  the  objective.  The 
shortest  line,  to  fight  for,  if  a  possible  and  an  effective  one,  is 
plainly  the  best.  In  the  past,  Vera  Cruz  has  been  an  effec- 
tive point  of  invasion  as  attested  by  the  fact  that  the  greatest 
successsul  invasions  of  Mexico  have  been  based  on  it — in 
1519,  by  Cortez;  in  1847,  by  General  Scott;  and  in  1863,  by 
the  French.  Cortez  followed  the  route  Vera  Cruz,  Jalapa, 
Tlascala,  Mexico;  General  Scott:  Vera  Cruz,  Jalapa,  Perote, 
Puebla,  Rio  Frio,  Mexico;  the  French:  Vera  Cruz,  Orizaba, 


83 


Esperanza,  Puebla,  RioFrio,  Mexico.  We  are  warren  ted  in 
assuming  that  tliese  lines  are  still  practicable,  for,  although 
the  armament  of  armies  has  been  vastly  improved  since  they 
have  been  tried,  and  railroads  now  follow  the  routes,  yet,  as 
our  studies  show  to  be  true,  the  relative  advantage  of  im- 
provements, to  the  defense  and  offense,  remains  about  the 
same. 

The  absence  of  suitable  roads  to  the  plateau  must  confine 
any  effective  invasion  of  Mexico,  at  the  present  time,  by  the 
Gulf  coast,  to  a  base  at  VeraCruz  or  Tampico.  A  writer  in 
the  Cavalry  Journal,  of  June,  1892,  advocated  the  latter 
point  as  a  better  base  than  Vera  Cruz,  but  its  few  advantages 
do  not  offset  one  great  disadvantage.  The  Mexican  Central 
railroad  runs  directly  from  Tampico  to  the  plateau  at  San 
LuisPotosi,  distant  275  miles.  This  line  is  equally  as  long  as 
the  lines  from  Vera  Cruz,  and  evidence  is  wanting  that  it 
would  be  any  less  difficult  to  force.  The  advantages  of  the 
port  are  that  it  is  some  200  miles  nearer  by  sea  to  the  United 
States  than  Vera  Cruz:  that  we  could  count  on  securing  ear- 
ly in  the  war  the  control  of  the  railroad  from  it  to  Monterey 
and  Laredo,  thus  giving,  in  addition  to  the  sea  route,  an  alL 
rail  route  from  our  country;  and,  lastly,  the  Rio  Panuco  riv- 
er, being  navigable  for  small  vessels  for  over  100  miles  and 
following  closely  the  line  of  the  railroad,  would  afford  greatly 
increased  means  of  advancing-  These  advantages  are  appar- 
ent, but  the  controlling  objection  to  the  port  as  a  base  is  that 
the  point  of  the  plateau  we  would  gain  by  it  would  find  our 
army,  not  at  the  gates  of  the  capital  and  chief  city  of  Mexico, 
but  over  300  miles  north  of  it,  with  a  further  advance  of  140 
miles  to  the  west,  to  capture  the  city  of  Aguas  Calientes,  be- 
fore we  could  turn  towards  it.  The  great  effort  that  would  be 
necessary  to  move  our  army  from  San  Luis  Potosi  to  the  capi- 
tal will  be  shown  later,  in  discussing  invasion  from  the  Rio 
Grande  frontier. 

Returning  to  the  VeraCruz  line,  two  railroads,  the  Inter- 
Oceanic  (narrow  gauge),  and  the  Mexican  (standard  gauge), 


8-1 

parallelling  the  respective  routes  of. General  Scott  and  the 
French  are  now  in  operation  from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  City  of 
Mexico;  they  cross  each  other  at  San  Marcos,  150  miles  from 
Vera  Cruz,  but  for  the  greater  part  of  the  way  are  separated 
by  lofty  and  impassable  mountains.  An  old  carriage  road 
follows  the  course  of  each  railroad  about  one-half  the  way  to 
the  capital.  One  or  both  of  these  railroads  must  be  the  line 
of  advance,  the  possession  of  either  to  San  Marcos  would  give 
control  probably  of  the  other  back  to  Vera  Cruz;  but  posses- 
sion would  be  obtained  only  by  overcoming  great  obstacle? 
and  at  the  cost,  certainly,  of  desperate  fighting.  Both  roads 
abound  in  strong  defensive  positions;  both  ascend  tremendous 
grades,  cross  deep  canons,  traverse  brinks  of  precipices  and 
pass  through  tunnels;  they  will  be  easy  for  the  enemy  to  des- 
troy and  difficult  for  us  to  repair,  but  in  the  light  of  past  ex- 
perience they  ought  not  to  prove  insurmountable  obstacles. 

A  short  description  of  the  course  of  the  Mexican  railroad 
will  be  sufficient  to  give  some  conception  of  the  obstacles  that 
must  be  overcome  in  gaining  the  central  plateau.  Leaving 
Vera  Cruz,  the  road  crosses  a  strip  of  the  hot  lauds,  a  plain 
30  miles  wide,  to  the  Soledad  river,  where  the  ascent  to  Ori- 
zaba, 82  miles  from  Vera  Cruz,  begins.  Orizaba  is  4,000  feet 
above  the  sea,  and  in  attaining  this  height  the  road  ascends  a 
tremendous  grade  and  crosses  the  Barranca  de  Matlac  on  an 
iron  bridge,  350  feet  long  and  90  feet  high.  A  few  miles  be- 
yond Orizaba  the  road  runs  in  the  Barranca  del  In fernillo 
with  numerous  bridges,  tunnels  and  steep  grades,  thence  to 
the  plains  of  La  Joya,  crossing  which  the  road  rises  an  addi- 
tional 3,600  feet  in  a  short  distance  and  attains  the  plateau, 
at  an  altitude  of  7,900  feet,  at  Esperanza,  111  miles  from 
Vera  Cruz.  The  road  then  follows,  for  90  miles,  abroad  and 
generally  level  plain  to  Apam,  58  miles  from  Mexico  city, 
where  it  passes  through  a  narrow  gap  into  a  flat  valley,  gen- 
erally 5  to  6  miles  wide,  which  it  traverses,  past  the  north- 
western shore  of  Lake  Tezcoco,  to  the  capital. 


85 


With  the  difficult  Sierra  Madre  mountains  in  rear  and 
with  insufficient  communications  for  the  prompt  withdrawal 
of  a  large  body  of  troops,  it  is  not  likely  that  Mexico  would 
seriou>ly  oppose  invasion  in  the  State  of  Vera  Cruz.  Her 
nrst  great,  efforts  would  be  met  in  the  defense  of  the  mountain 
chain.  If  these  efforts  should  prove  futile  we  must  then  ex- 
pect to  meet  the  Mexicans  in  large  force  on  the  plateau  in 
the  vicinity  of  Puebla,  which  from  its  position,  would  be  a 
strategic  point  which  we  would  have  to  take.  Victory  there 
will  open  the  way  to  the  capital,  and  to  the  objective  of  the 
campaign — the  destruction  of  the  main  army  of  the  enemy. 
Preliminary,  however,  to  any  sustained  operations  to 
gain  the  central  plateau,  a  large  depot  and  entrenched  camp 
must  be  established  across  the  hot  lauds,  at  a  sufficient  eleva- 
tion above  the  sea  to  afford  the  army  security  from  sickness. 

No  time  should  be  lost  in  doing  so;  the  army  as  soon  as 
debarked  should  be  pushed  forward  rapidly  to  the  point 
selected.  On  the  line  of  the  Mexican  railroad,  Orizaba  would 
be  such  a  point;  or,  the  vicinity  of  Jalapa,  if  the  advance  be 
by  the  Inter-Oceanic  road. 

With  Vera  Cruz  as  the  point  of  invasion,  our  operations 
on  the  northern  frontier  and  the  Pacific  coast  should  be  li- 
mited to  diversions,  having  for  their  object  the  capture  of 
important  points  and  the  detaching  of  bodies  of  troops  from 
the  enemy's  main  army  to  defend  them.  The  sea  port  of  Te- 
huautepec  at  present,  and  when  the  railroads  now  being  con- 
structed are  completed,  Acapulco,  Manzanillo,  SanBlasand 
Mazatlan,  are  all  especially  important  points  and  must  be 
blockaded,  and  occupied  if  possible. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  northern  frontier.  Without 
entering  into  a  discussion  of  the  War  of  1845-7,  it  may  be 
safely  asserted  that  the  expeditions  of  Generals  Taylor  and 
Wool  proved  that  a  decisive  invasion  of  Mexico  from  the  Rio 
Gra'ide  frontier  was  not  then  practicable,  due  to  the  great 
distance  to  traverse,  the  want  of  necessary  supplies  in  the 


86 


country,  the  lack  of  sufficient  wood  and  water,  and  the  ini 
possibility  of  protecting  long  lines  of  supply  from  guerrilla 
warfare  in  which  Mexicans  are  adepts.  General  Taylor  ad- 
vanced with  the  greatest  difficulty  to  Saltillo  although  success- 
ful in  every  battle.  Urged  by  the  War  Department  to  push 
on  to  San  Luis  Potosi,  he  objected  to  doing  so,  and  recom 
mended  that  Saltillo  be  held  only  as  a  defensive  line  and  all 
remaining  troops  be  thrown  into  the  column  operating  from 
Vera  Cruz.  Ambition,  alone,  would  have  spurred  General 
Taylor  on  had  success  been  probable.  The  Saltillo  desert  wa? 
in  front  of  him,  and  its  ruinous  effects  on  Santa  Anna's  army, 
which  crossed  it  to  meet  him  and  be  defeated  at  Buena  Vista, 
was  known  to  him.  Railroads  did  not  then  exist  in  Mexico. 
To-day  they  do,  and  from  our  knowledge  of  the  use  that  may 
be  made  of  them  in  war,  it  is  believed  the  lines  running  from 
our  frontier  now  make  a  decisive  campaign  from  the  Rio 
Grande  practicable.  But  when  we  consider  what  such  a  cam- 
paign will  require  in  men  and  efforts,  it  is  not  likely  our  gov- 
ernment would  undertake  it,  unless  Mexico  should  have  an 
ally  denying  us  control  of  the  sea,  or  making  uncertain  our 
ability  to  establish  ourselves  at  a  suitable  point  on  the  Gulf 
coast.  The  probable  course  of  such  a  campaign  and  the 
efforts  necessary  for  its  successful  prosecution  are  well  set 
forth  by  Captain  Shunk,  in  his  article  already  referred  to,  a* 
follows: — 

"The  choice  of  a  line  of  operation  would  be  from  among 
the  railroads  leading  into  Mexico  from  the  Rio  Grande.  The 
first  effort  of  the  main  army  would  probably  consist  in  a 
movement  upon  Monterey  and  Saltillo.  Eagle  Pass  or  La- 
redo would  be  the  starting  point.  A  choice  would,  no  doubt, 
be  largely  influenced  by  topographical  considerations.  The 
Laredo  route  is  more  direct;  but  the  Eagle  Pass  route  favors 
an  attack  in  a  more  effective  direction,  and  would  probably 
be  preferred  at  first,  for  this  reason,  and  because  it  is  a  stan- 
dard-gauge road,  while  the  Laredo  road  is  a  narrow-guage. 


87 


and  especially  because  points  thereon,  such  as  Trevino  and 
Jaral,  must  be  occupied  to  protect  the  flank  while  moving 
upon  Monterey  and  Saltille, 

Selecting  the  Eagle  Pass  route,  the  army  would  probab- 
ly advance  to  Jaral.  Holding  that  place  by  means  of  a  de- 
tachment, it  could  then  advance  from  Trevino  upon  Monte- 
rey and  then  upon  Saltillo.  The  Mexicans  observing  these 
movements  would  probably  evacuate  the  country  from  the 
Rio  Grande  to  Monterey;  and,  concentrating  all  their  avail- 
able forces,  would  either  fight  a  battle  in  defense  of  Monterey 
or  Saltillo,  or  would  retire  without  much  fighting,  beyond 
the  desert,  using  both  the  railroad  line  to  Tampico  and  that 
to  San  Luis  Potosi  for  the  purpose.  It  is  plain  that  Mexico 
could  not  better  serve  our  interests  than  by  putting  forth  her 
whole  strength  in  this  region;  just  as  the  Russians  in  1812 
might  have  served  Napoleon  by  fighting  him  on  the  Vistula, 
instead  of  which  they  preferred  to  retire  among  their  deserts. 
But  the  probability  is  that  the  Mexicans  would  evacuate  this 
region  without  severe  fighting,  destroying  the  railroads,  and 
the  water  tanks  in  the  Saltillo  desert.  In  any  event,  it  must 
be  occupied,  and  an  intrenched  camp  would  probably  be 
formed  at  Monterey  or  Saltillo  which  would  be  occupied  by  a 
strong  force  to  guard  against  an  attack  from  Tampico  and  to 
^ive  security  to  a  further  advance.  The  strategic  value  of 
this  locality  would  be  very  considerable. 

It  would  next  be  necessary  to  establish  the  army  in  the 
fertile  and  populous  districts  of  the  Great  Central  Plateau. 
The  point  to  be  ultimately  secured  is  San  Luis  Potosi,  as  being 
the  first  important  point  south  of  the  desert,  on  our  direct 
line;  by  which  line  it  is  240  miles  from  Saltillo.  In  the  en- 
tire distance,  water,  in  sufficient  quantities  for  a  force  of  some 
size,  is  found  only  inartificial  tanks,  easily  destroyed  by  the 
retreating  enemy.  If  the  railroad  could  supply  with  water. 
as  well  as  other  necessities,  a  force  large  enough  to  attack 
San  Luis  Potosi  with  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success,  the  at- 


88 

tempt  should,  of  course,  be  made  to  advance  directly.  But, 
as  this  is  out  of  the  question,  the  army  must  pass  to  that 
point  either  by  following  the  railroad  lines  to  the  east  of  the 
desert,  or  by  following  those  to  the  west  of  it. 

The  distances  are  as  follows: 

From  Monterey  to  Tampico 321  miles. 

"     Tampico  to  San  Luis  Potosi 275  " 

Total  via  Tampico. 596  " 

From  Trevino  to  Torreon 160  " 

"     Torreon  to  Aguas  Calieutes 342  " 

"     Aguas  Calientes  to  San  Luis  Potosi 140  •' 

Total  via  Torreon 642  " 

The  Tampico  line  is  somewhat  shorter;  but  the  Torreon 
line,  passes  through  a  far  less  barren  country  and  is  entirely 
secure  from  the  enterprises  of  an  allied  army  that  might  land 
at  Tiimpico,  and  interrupt  the  communications,  should  the 
attempt  be  made  by  the  eastern  line  to  reach  San  Luis  Potosi. 

By  whichever  line  the  attempt  be  made,  the  whole 
strength  of  Mexico  will  certainly  be  encountered.  Her  rail- 
roads furnish  ample  means  for  concentrating  all  her  forces  at 
any  .point  between  Tampico  and  Aguas  Calientes,  or  between 
the  latter  place  and  Torreon.  This  is  her  time  to  beat  back 
the  invading  army,  if  she  can  do  this  at  all;  and  the  greatest 
battle  of  a  war  begun  under  such  conditions  might  be  expected 
before  the  Americans  would  be  allowed  to  get  possession  of 
their  objective,  San  Luis  Potosi. 

The  distance  from  Eagle  Pass  to  Torreon  is  383  miles;  to 
Zacatecas,  651  miles;  thus  the  Americans,  guarding  a  line 
600  or  700  miles  in  length,  would  need  vastly  superior  forces 
in  order  to  put  equal  numbers  in  line  of  battle.  Torreon 
Junction  is  a  point  of  much  strategical  importance  and,  when 
captured,  an  entrenched  camp  would,  no  doubt,  be  estab- 
lished there.  Detachments  would  occupy  Chihuahua  and 
Durango,  and  the  resources  of  the  country  would  be  secured, 


89 


while  Mexico  would  be  cut  off  from  her  north-western  States, 
about  one-fourth  of  her  area. 

Under  the  supposed  conditions,  it  has  not  been  supposed 
that  Mexico  would  fight  a  pitched  battle  north  of  Zacatecas, 
because  guerillas  operating  on  the  American  communications, 
would  compel  them  to  detach  so  many  men  that  their  superi- 
ority of  numbers  would  rapidly  disappear.  But,  it  has  been 
assumed,  that  the  great  battle  would  be  fought  in  defense  of 
Aguas  Calientes,  because,  while  that  point  was  in  their  pos- 
session, the  Americans  would  not  dare  to  attempt  to  march 
on  San  Luis  Potosi.  If  the  Mexicans  win  the  battle,  the 
American  campaign  is  checked  until  reinforcements  enable 
them  to  resume  it.  If  the  Americans  win,  they  establish 
themselves  at  San  Luis  Potosi,  thus  shortening  their  line  of 
communications  about  250  miles,  form  an  entrenched  camp, 
repair  the  railroad  in  their  rear,  and  are  now  prepared  to 
move  upon  the  capital  from  their  new  temporary  base,  mean- 
while guarding  a  line  475  miles  in  length — a  line  about  as 
long  as  Sherman's  line  from  Louisville  to  Atlanta.  But  the 
capital  is  still  365  miles  distant. 

The  Mexican  National  Railroad'is  a  narrow  guage  road, 
while  the  other  lines  are  of  standard  guage.  The  above 
(•hange  of  base  would  be  greatly  facilited  if  the  two  lines  were 
of  the  same  guage,  and  this  change  could  be  made  in  a  few 
days  as  we  know  by  experience.  (The  P.  Ft.  W.  &  C.  R.  R. 
was  changed  in  a  single  day  from  narrow  to  ordinary  guage, 
and  every  regular  train  ran  on  time  as  usual.) 

With  the  principal  army  thus  established  at  San  Luis 
Potosi,  (or  perhaps  at  Aguas  Calientes,)  the  war,  so  far  as 
decisive  results  are  concerned,  has  really  only  begun.  It  has 
progressed  only  so  far  as  a  European  war  has  done  when  one 
urmy  has  crossed  the  frontier  and  has  gained  the  first  action; 
the  army  has  only  reached  a  position  from  which  a  vital  part 
may  possibly  be  struck. 

The  next  operation  would  probably  have   in    view   the 


90 


capture  of  Celaya  Junction  which  would  effectually  isolate 
the  capital  from  the  north  and  west.  But  when  the  army 
finally  arrived  before  the  capital,  there  would  be  behind  it  a 
line  of  communications  840  miles  in  length.  This  would 
have  to  be  guarded  against  the  efforts  of  a  hostile  population, 
greatly  addicted  to  guerilla  warfare.  The  city  itself  would 
be  defended  by  an  army  behind  powerful  works,  and  an  ally 
could  land  troops  at  Vera  Cruz  and  send  them  by  rail  to  their 
assistance. 

To  give  an  idea  of  the  force  necessary  to  g  ard  such  a 
line,  #40  miles  in  length,  let  us  compare  the  supposed  situa- 
tion with  the  very  similiar  one  on  a  much  smaller  scale  of 
Sherman  before  Atlanta.  "On  the  31st  of  August,  1864, 
Sherman  had  at  the  front  about  72,000  men,  and  in  his  rear 
about  68,000.  (These  numbers  represent  combatants  only. 
He  had  besides,  in  his  rear,  an  army  of  civilian  employes  en- 
gaged in  running  his  trains  and  keeping  the  track  in  repair.) 
His  main  line,  Louisville,  Nashville,  Stevenson,  Chattanooga, 
the  Chattahoochee  Bridge,  Red  Oak,  was  about  480  miles. 

*  *  *  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  portion  of 
the  line  north  of  Chattanooga  was  held  by  about  533  men  per 
etape  (distance  of  fifteen  miles),  while  that  from  Chattanooga 
to  Red  Oak  required  a  force  per  etape  of  3,500  men." 

When  we  consider  the  force  necessary  to  conduct  an  oper- 
ation such  as  the  above,  and  estimate  the  strength  that  would 
necessarily  be  employed  in  guarding  the  line  of  communica- 
tions, enforcing  requisitions,  checking  partisan  operations, 
besieging  or  garrisoning  important  places  such  as  Monterey, 
Saltillo,  Torreon  Junction,  Aguas  Calientes,  San  Luis  Potosi, 
Celaya,  and  many  others,  quelling  uprisings,  the  difficulties 
of  supply  so  far  from  the  base,  etc.,  then  we  begin  to  appre- 
ciate the  magnitude  of  such  an  undertaking  in  case  we  did 
not  control  the  sea. 

In  fact,  if  Mexico,  in  the  case  supposed,  should  make  a 
respectable  resistance,  according  to  the  number  of  her  popu- 


91 


lation  and  the  advantages  of  her  topography,  the  conquest  of 
the  country  by  the  overland  line  of  operations  (and  without 
the  use  of  the  sea;  would  constitute  a  task  of  immense  magni- 
tude. And,  even  with  control  of  the  sea,  another  Mexican 
war  will  bear  only  a  faint  resemblance  to  the  war  of  1846-7, 
so  far  as  the  scale  of  the  operations  is  concerned." 

In  that  war,  Mexico  was  poor,  her  people  were  not 
united  and  her  government  was  threatened  with  revolutions 
during  its  progress.  To-day  Mexico  is  prosperous,  her  people 
are  fairly  united,  and  her  government  is  strong.  The  United 
States  employed  forces  in  the  last  invasion  aggregating  about 
100,000  armed  men— 26,690  regular  troops,  56,926  volun- 
teers, and  the  balance  in  the  navy  and  supply  departments. 
In  another  war,  these  numbers  will  be  but  a  fraction  of  the 
force  that  will  be  necessary  to  bring  Mexico  to  terms. 


92 


NOTES  ON  THE  MILITARY   GEOGRAPHY  OF 
CENTRAL  AMERICA. 


By  1st  Lieutenant  CARL  REICHMANN,  9th  Infantry. 
Assistant  Instructor. 


HE  continents  of  North  and  South  America  are  cou- 
uected  by  a  narrow  strip  of  land  of  varying  width  and 
irregular  outline.  From  the  purely  geographical  point  of 
view  the  term  Central  America  would  apply  to  all  the  land 
between  the  isthmus  of  Tehauntepec  and  that  of  Darien. 
Several  states  of  the  Mexican  republic  as  well  as  Panama, 
one  of  the  United  States  of  Colombia,  would  thus  be  com- 
prised in  Central  America.  In  its  political  meaning,  how- 
ever, the  term  Central  America  is  exclusively  applied  to  the 
territory  embraced  by  the  republics  of  Guatemala,  Salvador, 
Honduras,  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica.  This  territory  lies  be- 
tween 8°  and  18°  northern  latitude  and  is  thus  wholly  within 
the  northern  torrid  zone.  It  was  discovered  by  Columbus, 
who  landed  at  Point  Casinas,  now  called  Cape  Honduras,  on 


93 


August  14,  1502.  The  Spaniards  rapidly  overran  and  sub- 
dued the  country,  and  foimed  it  into  the  Spanish  kingdom  of 
Guatemala,  which  it  remained  until  182L  In  that  year  the 
Spanish  yoke  was  shaken  off,  the  states  of  Chiapas  and  Soco- 
nusco  joined  Mexico,  while  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador, 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica  formed  the  federal  republic  of  Cen- 
tral America.  This  federation  was  dissolved  in  1848,  since 
which  date  these  several  states  have  remained  independent. 

The  general  topography  of  Central  America  is  entirely 
determined  by  the  Andes,  that  mountain  range  which  extends 
under  various  names  from  Patagonia  to  Alaska  and  forms  the 
backbone  of  the  two  American  continents.  In  Central 
America  this  mountain  range  runs  approximately  parallel  to 
the  Pacific  coast  at  an  average  distance  of  50  miles.  The 
eastern  slope  is  gradual,  the  western  slope  is  abrupt  and  fur- 
rowed by  many  torrents.  The  population  consists  of  whites, 
negroes  and  Indians  and  an  intermixture  of  the  three. 
GUATEMALA. 

Guatemala,  the  northernmost  of  the  five  republics  of 
Central  America,  is  bounded  on  the  west  and  north  by  Mexi- 
co; on  the  east  by  British  Honduras  and  the  Bay  of  Hondu- 
ras; on  the  south-east  by  the  st;  tes  of  Honduras  and  Salva- 
dor; and  on  the  south-west  by  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The  terri- 
tory thus  circumscribed  has  an  area  of  48,238  square  miles, 
a  population  (in  1892)  of  1,510,326,  and  extends  between 
13°45'  northern  latitude,  and  between  88°10'  and  93°12' 
western  longtitude.  For  administrative  purposes  the  repub- 
lic is  divided  into  22  departments;  the  capital  is  the  city  of 
Guatemala  with  a  population  of  70,000,  and  an  elevation 
above  sea  level  of  5,720  feet.  The  city  is  defended  by  the 
adobe  fort  of  San  Jos£, 

The  character  of  the  country  is  essentially  mountainous. 
The  Andes  traverse  the  republic  from  south-east  to  north- 
west with  a  mean  elevation  of  about  7,000  feet;  some  of  the 
peaks,  among  them  volcanoes,  are  as  high  as  14,000  feet*  In 


94 

point  of  climate  the  surface  of  the  state  may  be  divided  into 
three  zones  according  to  altitude.  The  first  zone  comprises 
the  low,  hot  and  unhealthy  districts  along  the  coasts  of  less 
elevation  than  1,300  feet.  The  second  zone  comprises  the 
highlands  with  elevations  between  1,300  and  4,900  feet, 
where  the  climate  is  temperate  and  salubrious.  These 
highlands  constitute  the  greater  part  of  the  surface  of  Guate- 
mala. The  third,  cold,  zone  comprises  all  land  of  5,000  feet 
elevation  and  more. 

The  greater  part  of  the  northeastern  portion  of  the  state 
is  drained  by  the  Usumacinta  river  and  its  numerous  tribu- 
taries. For  a  considerable  part  of  its  course  the  river  form? 
the  boundary  between  Guatemala  and  the  Mexican  state  of 
Chiapas.  It  empties  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  is  naviga- 
ble for  small  vessels  from  its  mouth  to  Tenosique  in  the  Mex- 
ican state  of  Tabasco,  so  that  no  Benefit  accrues  to  Guatema- 
la directly  from  its  navigability. 

The  chief  drain  of  the  southeastern  portion  of  the  state 
is  the  river  Mutagua,  which  has  its  sources  on  the  northern 
slopes  of  the  Andes;  its  valley  is  covered  by  forests  and  the 
head  of  navigation  is  at  Qualan,  whence  a  wagon  road  starts 
and  accompanies  the  river  upward  for  some  distance.  The 
general  direction  of  the  course  of  this  river  is  eastward;  it 
empties  into  the  Bay  of  Honduras.  The  river  next  in  impor- 
tance is  the  Polochic,  north  of,  and  smaller  than,  the  Muta- 
gua, to  which  it  runs  approximately  parallel  and  from  which 
it  is  separated  by  the  Sierra  de  las  Minas.  In  its  lower  course 
the  river  flows  through  the  large  Lake  of  Yzabal  and  through 
the  smaller  one  of  Golfette,  and  empties  in  the  Gulf  of 
Arnatique  under  the  name  of  Rio  Dulce.  Sternwheelers  as- 
cend the  river  from  Lake  Yzabal  to  Panzos,  where  a  wagon 
road  begins.  The  port  of  Yzabal  on  the  lake  of  like  name  is 
defended  by  an  old  fort  to  the  west  of  the  town.  The  nar- 
row gorge  through  which  the  river  leaves  the  lake  is  defended 
by  the  old  and  tumble-down  fort  of  San  Felipe. 


The  rivers  flowing  into  the  Pacific  are  numerous  and 
.small  with  abrupt  courses.  In  the  rainy  season  they  become 
furious  torrents  and  obstacles  to  land  communication  along 
the  coast. 

Numerous  lakes  are  spread  over  the  surface  of  the  state. 
In  the  highlands  of  the  northern,  thinly  settled,  part  of  Gua- 
temala there  is  a  multitude  of  small  lakes,  the  largest  one, 
that  of  Peten,  being  45  miles  long  and  3  wide.  The  Lake  of 
Yzabal,  which  has  been  mentioned  before,  extends  30  miles 
east  and  west  with  a  width  of  12  miles.  It  is  deep  enough 
for  all  vessels,  but  a  bar  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Dulce  pre- 
vents any  but  small  vessels  from  coming  up  into  this  lake. 
In  the  southern  portion  of  the  state  is  the  Lake  of  Atitlan, 
completely  landlocked,  5300  feet  above  the  sea,  18  miles  long 
and  10  wide.  Lake  Amatitlan  lies  about  4, 000 .feet  above 
sea  level.  Astride  of  the  border  between  Guatemalaand  Sal- 
vador lies  the  Lake  of  Gulja,  2,100  feet  above  sea  level,  and 
20  miles  long  by  12  wide. 

The  harbors  are  all  of  indiiferent  character.  On  the  At- 
lantic, Livingston  is  a  free  port,  but  the  water  is  so  shallow 
that  vessels  have  to  lie  a  great  distance  off  shore.  The  har- 
bor of  San  Thomas  in  the  southernmost  recess  of  the  Gulf  of 
Am atique  has  18  feet  of  water,  but  is  unhealthy;  its  port, 
Puerto  Barrios,  is  three  miles  to  the  northeast,  and  the  termi- 
nus of  a  planned,  but  not  yet  constructed,  transcontinental 
railway,  San  Jose  on  the  Pacific  being  the  other  terminus. 
So  far  this  railroad  has  been  constructed  from  San  Jose  to  the 
city  of  Guatemala.  The  chief  ports  on  the  Pacific  are  Cham- 
perico  and  San  Jose,  but  both  have  poor  harbors,  shallow 
water  and  unprotected  anchorages.  San  Jose  has  a  pier  600 
feet  long,  but  the  water  is  too  shallow  for  vessels  to  come  up 
to  it. 

Two  railroads  are  in  operation; 

One  from  San  Jose  to  Guatemala,  75  miles,   which   it   is 
proposed  to  extend  to  Puerto  Barrios,  186  miles  from  Guate- 


96 


mala.     This  railroad  is  owned  by  an  American  company  and 
subsidized  by  the  government  of  Guatemala. 

The  other  railroad  runs  from  Champerico  to  Ketalhuleu, 
25  miles,  and  thence  to  San  Filipe,  15  miles  further;  it  is 
proposed  to  extend  this  road  to  Quetzaltenango,  50  miles 
from  Retain  uleu. 

Quite  a  number  of  wagon  roads  exist  in  Guatemala,  but 
many  of  them  are  not  to  be  relied  upon.  Three  roads  lead 
from  the  Pacific  shore  to  the  highlands  north  of  the  main 
chain  of  the  Andes:  one  from  Champerico  to  Quetzaltenango 
and  Totonicapan,  another  from  Ocos  to  San  Marcos,  and  a 
third  from  San  Jose  to  Escuintla  and  Guatemala. 

There  are  several  roads  running  in  the  foothills  of,  and 
parallel  to,  the  main  course  of  the  Andes;  these  should  be 
regarded  with  suspicion  on  account  of  the  many  watercourses 
they  cross.  An  east  and  west  road  in  the  highlands,  men- 
tioned before,  serves  to  connect  most  of  the  prominent  towns: 
San  Marcos,  Quetzaltenango,  Totonicapan,  Quiche,  Solola, 
Chimaltenango,  Antigua,  Amatilla,  Guatemala,  Guajuiquila- 
pa,  and  Jalapa.  No  wagon  roads  run  from  the  interior  to 
the  Atlantic  coast. 

There  are  2,411  miles  of  telegraph  with  127  offices.  A 
line  to  Libertad  in  Salvador  reaches  the  cable  at  that  point. 

The  principal  articles  of  export  are  coffee,  cacao,  hides 
and  wool.  The  mines  produce  gold,  silver  and  copper.  In 
1893  the  imports  and  exports  amounted  to  6,384,000  pesos 
nnd  19,087,000  pesos.  For  the  fiscal  year  1893-94  the  reve- 
nue and  expenditures  were  10,422,752  and  11,401,418  pesos 
respectively,  while  the  interior  and  foreign  debts  amounted  to 
6,020,062  pesos  and  £920,000  respectively.  (The  peso  is  no- 
minally equal  in  value  to  a  silver  dollar,  in  fact  it  is  worth 
but  77  cents,) 

In  1891  the  army  consisted  of  3,718  men,  the  expenses 
for  which  constituted  one-tenth  of  the  public  expenditures. 
The  militia  numbers  33,700  men  (on  paper). 


97 

The  country  is  capable  of  producing  great  wealth,  but 
the  prime  requisite  for  development,  as  in  all  Central  Amer- 
ican states,  is  the  construction  of  roads  and  railroads,  which, 
however,  presents  unusual  difficulties  on  account  of  the  very 
irregular  surface,  and  is  at  present  beyond  the  means  of  the 
states.  The  next  great  requisite  is  the  development  of  agri- 
culture. 

The  Mutagua  river  leads  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  very 
heart  of  the  state  and  the  harbor  of  San  Thomas  is  but  a  short 
distance  from  the  valley  of  this  river,  through  which  as  yet  no 
wagon  road  runs  from  the  coast  to  the  capital.  By 
means  of  light  draught  vessels  an  invading  force  might  enter 
the  Lake  of  Yzabal  from  Livingston  and  have  its  supplies 
transported  by  water  up  the  Polochic  as  far  asPanzos,  whence 
a  wagon  road  leads  to  Coban  and  Salama.  The  occupation 
of  these  points  would  cut  the  northern  half  of  the  state  off 
completely,  but  on  the  other  hand  this  force  would  be  practi- 
cally cut  off  from  troops  operating  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
*tate,  as  no  wagon  roads  cross  the  Sierra  de  las  Mi  nas  or  lead 
to  Guatemala  from  the  two  places  just  named.  Invasion 
from  San  Jose  or  Champeiico  or  both,  would  reach  more  di- 
rectly the  capital  as  well  as  the  highlands  which  produce  and 
contain  the  wealth  of  the  state.  In  any  event,  from  what- 
over  point  an  invader  may  start,  he  will  find  in  his  path 
many  strong  natural  positions  and  mountain  passes,  he  will 
have  difficulty  in  moving  his  artillery  and  have  to  rely  on 
pack  animals  for  transportation  and  on  mounted  infantry  for 
fighting.  The  highlands  once  conquered,  the  invader  is  mas- 
ter of  the  country. 

SALVADOR. 

This  is  the  smallest  of  all  Central  American  states,  hav- 
ing an  area  about  8,000  square  miles,  with  a  population  of 
780,000.  The  state  extends  between  13°15'  and  14°30' 
northern  latitude,  and  between  87°45'  and  90°15'  western 
.longitude,  and  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  Honduras,  on  the 


98 


east  by  Honduras  and  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  on  the  south  by 
the  Pacific  and  on  the  north-west  by  Guatemala.  The  capi- 
tal is  San  Salvador  with  20,000  inhabitants  and  an  altitude 
of  2,800  feet.  For  administrative  purposes  the  state  is 
divided  into  14  departments.  The  outline  of  the  state  is 
practically  a  rectangle  with  sides  of  1 40  and  60  miles  in 
length. 

The  greater  part  of  the  country  consists  of  a  plateau, 
with  an  average  elevation  of  about  2,000  feet  above  sea  level, 
broken  by  a  large  number  of  volcanic  cones.  The  main  chain 
of  the  Andes  lies  to  the  north,  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the 
state. 

The  river  Lempa  drains  the  greater  part  of  the  state;  it 
rises  in  the  Lake  of  Gulja,  follows  for  two-thirds  of  its  course 
an  easterly  direction,  then  curves  to  the  south  and  empties 
into  the  Pacific.  It  discharges  a  considerable  body  of  water 
throughout  the  year,  but  is  not  navigable  on  account  of  rapids. 
The  harbors  are  those  of  Acajutla,  La  Libertad  and  La 
Union.  The  first  has  a  pier,  but  the  water  is  so  shallow  that 
vessels  have  to  lie  quite  a  distance  offshore  and  lighters  have 
to  be  employed.  La  Union  is  situated  in  a  recess  of  the  Gulf 
of  Fonseca,  forms  a  landlocked  basin  with  four  or  five  fathoms 
of  water,  aud  is  spoken  of  by  some  writers  as  the  best  harbor 
of  Central  America.  This  statement  is  disputed  by  others, 
who  maintain  that  the  harbor  has  but  eight  feet  of  water.  La 
Libertad  has  an  iron  pier  running  three-quarters  of  a  mile 
out  into  the  sea,  but  the  water  is  so  low  that  vessels  cannot 
approach  within  less  than  two  miles  of  it. 

A  railway  connects  the  port  of  Acajutla  with  the  inland 
towns  of  Santa  Anna  and  Ateos,  53  miles,  and  is  nearly 
completed  to  San  Tecla  (1892).  The  country  is  said  to  be 
traversed  by  many  miles  of  good  wagon  road.  ''Although 
San  Salvador  is  the  smallest  in  area  of  the  group  of  republics, 
and  only  a  little  larger  than  Connecticut,  it  is  the  most  pros- 
perous, the  most  enterprising,  and  the  most  densely  populated, 


99 

having  even  a  greater  number  of  inhabitants  than  the  land 
of  wooden  nutmegs.  The  population  averages  about  80  to 
the  square  mile,  almost  twenty  times  that  of  its  neighbors. 
The  natives  are  inclined  to  civilized  pursuits,  being  engaged 
not  only  in  agriculture,  but  quite  extensively  in  manufacture. 
They  are  more  energetic  and  industrious  than  the  people  in 
other  parts  of  Central  America,  work  harder,  and  accomplish 
more,  gain  wealth  rapidly,  and  are  frugal;  but  the  constant- 
ly recurring  earthquakes  and  political  disturbances  keep  the 
country  poor.  When  the  towns  are  destroyed  by  volcanic 
eruptions,  they  are  not  allowed  to  lie  in  ruins,  as  those  of 
other  countries  are,  but  the  inhabitants  at  once  clear  away 
the  rubbish  and  begin  to  rebuild.  The  city  of  San  Salvador 
has  been  twice  rebuilt  since  Leon  of  Nicaragua  was  laid  in 
ruins,  but  the  debris  in  the  latter  city  has  never  been  dis- 
turbed. The  capital  of  San  Salvador  has  been  thrice  almost 
entirely,  and  eleven  times  in  its  history  partially,  destroye  d 
by  earthquakes  and  volcanic  eruptions  corning  together. 

San  Salvador  has  always  taken  the  lead  in  the  poli  tica] 
affairs  of  Central  America.  It  was  the  first  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  Spain,  and  uttered  the  first  cry  of  liberty,  as  Vene- 
zuela did  among  the  nations  of  the  southern  continent."* 

In  1893  the  revenues  and  expenditures  were  $7,133,000 
and  $7,153,000,  the  internal  and  foreign  debts  $3,964,000 
and  $1,305,000,  the  imports  and  exports  $1,853,000  and 
$7,491,000.  The  chief  articles  of  export  are  coffee,  indigo, 
minerals  and  tobacco. 

There  are  in  existence  1,803  miles  of  telegraph  with  138 
offices;  La  Libertad  is  the  cable  office. 

The  army  numbers  4,000  men  and  the  militia  15,000,  all 
males  between  18  and  40  years  of  age  being  liable  to  military 
service. 


*W.  E.  Curtis,  "The  Capitals  of  Spanish  America." 


100 


HONDURAS. 

The  state  of  Honduras  extends  between  13°10'  and  15° 
45'  northern  latitude,  and  between  85°30'  and  89°45'  western 
longtitude,  and  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  Caribbean  Sea, 
on  the  south-west  by  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  and  the  state  of 
Salvador,  on  the  north-west  by  Guatemala.  The  population 
is  306,048,  the  area  about  45,500  square  miles.  The  capital 
of  the  state  is  Tegucigalpa,  which  has  12,000  inhabitants  and 
is  situated  3,200  feet  above  the  sea.  The  state  is  divided  into 
13  departments. 

The  character  of  the  country  is  mountainous  and  very  ir- 
regular. The  general  direction  of  the  watershed  between 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  is  east  and  west,  its  course  tortuous- 
The  river  system  is  the  best  developed  in  Central  America, 
the  principal  rivers,  all  of  which  flow  into  the  Atlantic  and 
are  navigable  by  small  vessels  for  considerable  distances, 
being  the  following: 

The  Ulua,  which  drains  nearly  one-third  of  the  area  of 
the  state  and  is  navigable  for  small  vessels  for  many  miles;  i  t 
flows  into  the  Bay  of  Honduras. 

The  Aguan,  emptying  into  the  Antilles  Sea  east  of  Tu- 
jillo. 

The  Rio  Negro, 

The  Rio  Patuca  and 

The  Rio  Segovia  (also  called  Wanks  or  Cocos),  which 
rises  in  the  Corpus  Christi  Mountains  within  35  miles  of  the 
Gulf  of  Fonseca,  and  in  the  lower  half  of  its  course  forms  the 
boundary  between  Honduras  and  Nicaragua. 

The  three  principal  rivers  which  flow  into  the  Pacific 
(Gulf  of  Fouseca),  the  Goascaran — forming  the  boundary 
between  Guatemala  and  Salvador  in  the  lower  half  of  its 
course — the  Nacaome  and  Choluteca,  are  smaller  than  tnoso 
flowing  into  the  Atlantic  and  not  navigable. 

The  headwaters  of  the  Ulua  and  the  three  rivers  flowing 
into  the  Pacific,  enclose  a  plateau  in  the  center  of  the  state. 


101 

The  climate  as  in  other  Central  American  states,  depend? 
on  the  altitude;  the  greater  part  of  Honduras  consists  of 
salubrious  highlands. 

The  principal  harbors  are  those  of  Ornoa  and  Trujillo  on 
the  Atlantic  and  Amapala  on  the  Pacific.  Omoa,  near  Puer- 
to Caballos,  which  it  has  supplanted,  hasdocks"on  which  the 
largest  steamers  can  tie  up"  (?)  and  "is  defended  by  a  strong 
(?)  work  'El  Castillo  de  San  Fernando.'  "  The  harbor  of  Tru- 
jillo has  little  depth  and  the  ships  have  to  anchor  a  mile  from 
shore  in  an  unprotected  roadstead.  The  best  harbor  is  that 
of  Amapala  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca.  This  magnificant  gulf, 
50  miles  long  and  30  wide,  is  entered  through  a  gate  18  miles 
wide,  a  massive  volcano  on  either  side  foiming  the  gate  posts 
as  it  were.  The  gulf  is  dotted  with  islands  belonging  to 
Honduras  and  Salvador.  On  Tigre  island,  belonging  to  Hon- 
duras, is  the  port  of  Amapala  with  a  harbor  which  is  safe  and 
has  sufficient  depth  for  seagoing  vessels.  The  traffic  between 
the  port  and  mainland,  the  towns  of  LaBrea  and  San  Loren- 
zo, is  carried  on  by  lighters.  "The  first  impression  on  land- 
ing at  Tigre  Island  is  its  splendid  facilities  for  fortification, 
and  the  formation  of  a  irreat  central  commercial  depot  from 
which  to  command  the  trade  of  the  three  states  bordering  on 
the  Bay  of  Fouseca.  Its  resources  fully  developed,  Amapa- 
la might  be  made  the  most  important  port  on  the  Pacific  south 
of  San  Francisco."  In  the  southern  portion  of  the  gulf  is  the 
mouth  of  the  Nicaraguan  river  Estero  Real,  which  is  naviga- 
ble for  large  vessels  for  a  considerable  distance. 

The  construction  of  a  transcontinental  railroad  was  be- 
gun some  time  ago,  and  shared  the  fate  of  all  such  railroads 
in  Central  America  except  those  of  Tehauntepec  and  Pana- 
ma, i.  e.,  it  has  not  been  completed.  Beginning  at  Puerto 
Caballos  the  railroad  runs  to  San  Pedro  Sula,  its  present  ter- 
minus; from  here  it  is  to  follow  the  course  of  the  Ulua  river, 
cross  the  watershed  and  terminate  at  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca. 
The  length  of  road  in  operation  is  37  miles.  A  good  wagon 


102 

road  leads  from  San  Lorenzo  to  Tegucigalpa,  and  thence  to 
Puerto  Caballos,  but  its  quality  over  the  latter  course  is  not 
vouched  for. 

1,800  miles  of  telegraph  with  70  offices  are  in  operation. 

Agriculture  is  in  a  most  primitive  state,  the  chief  pro- 
ducts being  tobacco,  sugar  and  bananas.  In  minerals  Hondu- 
ras is  the  richest  of  all  Central  American  states,  but  mining 
like  other  industries,  is  of  primitive  character.  In  view  of 
this  undeveloped  state  and  the  recent  wars  in  which  Hondu- 
ras has  been  engaged,  we  need  not  be  surprised  at  finding  in 
matters  financial  a  large  balance  against  her.  The  foreign 
debt,  on  whicn  no  interest  has  been  paid  since  1872,  amounts 
to  $26,992,850  and  the  internal  debt  to  $2,742,574.  In  1892 
the  revenues  and  expenditures  were  $1,764,137  and  $2,603,- 
000.  In  the  same  year  the  imports  and  exports  were 
$2,005,000  and  $1,873,000,  the  chief  exports  being  livestock, 
bananas  and  silver. 

The  army  numbers  500  men;  the  militia  consists  (on 
paper)  of  some  20,500  men. 

The  Ulua  river  and  Gulf  of  Fonseca  form  the  natural 
gateways  of  the  country.  The  capital  is  65  miles  from  the 
latter  and  150  miles  from  the  former.  In  view  of  this  differ- 
ence in  distance,  in  view  of  the  facilities  offered  by  the  Gulf 
of  Fonseca  and  the  harbor  of  Amapala,  and  in  view  of  the 
good  communication  from  San  Lorenzo  to  Tegucigalpa,  an 
invader  would  naturally  base  himself  on  Amapala. 
NICARAGUA. 

This  state,  lying  between  10°30'  and  15°  northern  lati- 
tude, and  between  83°11'  and  87°40'  western  longtitude,  con- 
tains an  area  of  49,500  square  miles  and  a  population  of  312- 
845  souls;  it  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  Honduras,  on  the  east 
by  the  Caribbean  Sea,  on  the  south  by  Costa  Rica  and  on  the 
west  by  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The  capital,  Managua,  has  16,700 
inhabitants. 

The  territory  is  traversed  by  the  Andes  from  the  south- 


103 


east  to  the  north-west,  with  a  mean  elevation  of  about  5,000 
feet.  The  eastern  slope  is  gradual,  and  the  land  falls  in 
broad  terraced  plateaus  down  to  the  Mosquito  Coast  and  is 
drained  by  the  Wanks,  Wawa,  Rio  Grande  and  Escondido 
rivers, all  unsuitable  for  navigation.  In  the  northern  part  of  the 
state  the  Andes  send  out  a  spur,  the  Sierra  of  Yeluca,  which 
penetrates  far  to  the  north-east  between  the  Wanks  and  Wawa 
rivers.  The  east  coast  is  flat  and  unhealthy,  fringed  with  la- 
goons and  keys. 

The  western  slope  of  the  Andes  is  abrupt;  at  its  foot  lies 
an  extensive  depression  stretching  300  miles  from  the   south- 
east to  the  north-west,  parallel  to  the  coast,  and  with  a  mean 
elevation  of  about  100  feet.     In  this  basin  lie  the  great  lakes 
of  Nicaragua    and  Managua,    the  former  of  which  measures 
100  miles  in  length  and  40  miles  in  width  and  has  about    15 
feet  less  elevation  than  Lake  Managua,  which  is  50  miles  long 
by   25   wide.     The  communication  between  these  two  lakes 
bears  the  name  of  Tipitapa  river:  it  contains  water  only  when 
the  rainy  season  has  swelled  Lake  Managua,  and,  at  any  rate, 
cannot  be  utilized  for  navigation  because  of  the  abrupt  drop 
of  15  feet  into  Lake  Nicaragua.     The  Nicaragua  Canal  Com" 
pany  is  required  by  its  contract  to  build  a  canal    connecting 
the  two  lakes.     Between  the  lakes  and  the  steep  rocky  coast 
of  the    Pacific    intervenes   an    elevation  which  from  a  mere 
range  of  hills  in  the  south-west  swells  to  a  high  ridge    dotted 
with  volcanic  peaks  and  runs  to  the  north-west  parallel  to  the 
coast.     A  similar  chain  of  volcanoes  extends  from  the    north- 
western  shore   of  Lake   Managua   to  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca, 
where  its  northernmost  volcano,  Conseguina,  forms  the  south- 
ern gatepost  of  the  gulf.     In  the  depression    in    which    the 
lakes    lie,    is   concentrated  the  civilization  and  wealth  of  the 
state,  here  lies  the  capital  Managua,  the   commercial   center 
Leon,  which  formerly  was  the  capital,  and  most  of  the  towns 
of  any  importance.     Here  are  also  the  large  estates  and  plan- 
tations which  produce  the  wealth  of  the  country.  The  eastern 
>Iopes  of  the  Andes  are  almost  uninhabited. 


104 


Nicaragua  boasts  of  two  railways,  one  from  Corinto  (also 
called  Realejo)  to  Momotombo,  on  Lake  Managua,  58  miles 
in  length,  and  another  from  Managua  to  Grenada,  38  miles  in 
length.  Concessions  for  several  other  roads  have  been 
granted.  "There  is  only  one  road  in  the  country  suitable 
for  carriages  and  that  is  seldom  used  except  by  carts.  It  runs 
from  Grenada,  the  easternmost  city  of  importance  on  the 
shore  of  Lake  Nicaragua,  to  Realejo,  the  principal  seaport; 
and  over  this  road,  which  was  built  300  years  ago  by  the 
Spaniards,  all  the  commerce  of  the  country  passes.  *  * 
Over  it  have  passed  hundreds  of  armies  and  no  end  of  insur- 
gent forces,  and  the  whole  distance  has  been  washed  in  blood, 
shed  in  public  and  private  quarrels." 

The  harbors  are  those  of  Corinto  and  San  Juan  del  Sur 
on  the  Pacific,  and  San  Juan  del  Norte  (Greytown)  on  the 
the  Atlantic  coast.  The  latter  has  a  very  poor  harbor  (not 
many  years  ago  it  had  sufficient  water  for  the  largest  vessels, 
but  has  been  rapidly  filling  with  sand),  which  is  now  being 
improved  by  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Company.  San  Juan  del 
Sur  is  an  open  roadstead,  vessels  anchoring  five  miles  from 
shore.  Corinto  is  said  to  be  a  magnificant  harbor  with  deep 
water,  but  there  are  also  statements  to  the  contrary. 

The  mines  produce  gold  and  silver,  other  products  and 
chief  articles  of  export,  are  coffee,  rubber,  woods,  indigo, 
sugar,  cacao  and  bananas.  There  is  practically  no  manufac- 
ture. The  revenues  and  expenditures  in  1892  were  $1,764,- 
1)28  and  $2,983,576,  the  interior  and  foreign  debts  $2,742,565 
and  (estimated)  $6,000,000;  the  imports  and  exports  in  1890 
were  $2,780,000  and  $3,500,000. 

The  army  numbers  about  700  men,  the   militia   25,000. 

"There  is  no  spot  of  equal  area  upon  the  globe  in  which 
so  much  human  blood  has  been  wasted  in  civil  war,  or  so 
much  wanton  destruction  committed.  Nature  has  blessed  it 
with  wonderful  resources,  and  a  few  years  of  peace  and  indus- 
try would  make  the  country  prosperous  beyond  comparison; 


105 


hut  so  much  attention  has  been  paid  to  politics  that  little  is 
left  for  anything  else.  Scarcely  a  year  has  passed  without  a 
revolution,  and  during  its  sixty-five  years  of  independence 
the  republic  has  known  more  than  five  times  as  many  rulers 
us  it  had  during  the  three  centuries  it  was  under  the  do- 
minion of  Spain.  It  was  seldom  a  principle  or  policy  that 
brought  the  inhabitants  to  war,  but  usually  the  intrigue  of 
some  ambitious  men.  It  is  a  land  of  volcanic  disturbance, 
physical,  moral  and  political,  and  the  mountains  and  men 
have  between  them  contrived  to  almost  compass  its  destruction. 

For  sixty  years  the  country  has  been  going  backward; 
its  population  is  less  than  when  independence  was  declared, 
and  its  wealth  has  decreased  even  more  rapidly.  Its  cities 
are  heaps  of  ruins,  and  its  commerce  is  not  so  great  as  it  was 
at  the  beginning  of  the  century"  * 

COSTA  RICA. 

Costa  Rica,  the  southernmost  of  the  five  republics  of 
Central  America,  extends  between  8°  and  11°  16'  northern 
latitude,  and  between  81°40'  and  75° 40'  western  longtitude. 
The  area  is  31,220  square  miles,  the  number  of  inhabitants 
262,700.  The  state  is  bounded  on  the  north  by  Nicaragua; 
on  the  east  by  the  Caribbean  Sea;  on  the  south-east  by  Pa- 
nama and  on  the  south-west  and  west  by  the  Pacific  Ocean. 
The  state  is  divided  into  five  departments  and  two  provinces. 

The  boundary  between  Costa  Rica  and  Panama  seems  as 
yet  unsettled;  on  some  maps  it  is  shown  as  an  irregular  line 
from  Punta  Burica  on  the  Pacific  to  Punta  Tervi  on  the  At- 
lantic, which  is  the  boundary  claimed  by  Panama.  Other 
maps  make  the  boundary  an  imaginary  line  from  Punta  Buri- 
ca to  Punta  de  Chiriqui,  which  is  the  boundary  claimed  by 
Costa  Rica  and  is  the  ancient  boundary  under  Spanish  domin- 
ioo.  The  northern  boundary  has  only  quite  recently  been 
settled  by  President  Cleveland,  by  arbitration  between  Nica- 

*W,  E.  Curtis,  "The  Capitals  of  Spanish  America." 


106 


ragua  and  Costa  Rica.  On  the  Atlantic  side  the  boundary 
begins  at  the  Puntade  Castilla  and  follows  the  San  Juan  river 
as  far  as  Castillo  Viejo;  at  this  point  the  line  recedes  two 
miles  to  the  south  of  the  river  and  continues  westward  in  this 
relative  position  to  the  river  and  to  Lake  Nicaragua  until 
the  Sapoa  river  is  reached,  whence  the  line  turns  to  the 
south-west  and  runs  in  one  straight  course  to  the  Bay  of  Sali- 
nas. 

The  east  coast  is  flat,  fringed  with  lagoons  and  stretches 
in  almost  straight  line  from  south-east  to  north-west.  The 
water  is  shallow.  The  only  port  is  that  of  Limon  which  has 
A  pier  900  feet  long  and  22  feet  of  water  at  low  tide.  The 
town  is  surrounded  by  marshes,  has  bad  drinking  water  and 
is  unhealthy.  The  Pacific  coast  is  more  diversified  and  pos- 
sesses numerous  gulfs  and  bays,  the  most  important  of  which, 
beginning  from  the  north,  are  those  of  Salinas,  Santa  Elena, 
Murcielago,  Culebras,  Nicoya,  Herradura  (said  to  be  a  mag- 
nificant  harbor  (?)  ),  and  Dulce.  There  are  also  two  consi- 
derable peninsulas,  those  of  Nicoya  and  Dulce,  both  embrac- 
ing gulfs  of  like  names.  In  the  northern  one  of  the  two 
gulfs  lies  the  port  of  Punta  Arenas;  there  is  but  seven  feet  of 
water  in  the  harbor  so  that  vessels  have  to  lie  a  long  distance 
offshore.  The  locality  is  hot  and  unhealthy.  Culebra,  lying 
farther  to  the  north  at  the  head  of  a  small  bay  of  the  same 
name,  is  said  to  have  a  very  fine  harbor  and  anchorage  for 
the  largest  vessels. 

The  Andes  traverse  the  country  from  the  south-east  to 
the  north-west  in  a  course  more  nearly  parallel  to  the  west 
than  the  east  coast.  In  its  northern  portion  this  range  cuts 
off  the  peninsula  of  Nicoya  from  the  rest  of  the  state. 

The  Pacific  slope  is  abrupt  and  furrowed  by  numerous 
watercourses,  which  in  the  rainy  season,  November  to  May, 
come  rushing  down  the  mountain  side  with  great  force  and 
carry  everything  before  them.  The  Atlantic  slope  is  more 
gradual  and  contains  the  greater  area.  Along  the  coast  the 


107 

climate  is  hot,  but  in  the  highlands  of  the  interior  it  is  mild 
and  very  pleasant.  On  the  Atlantic  side  of  the  mountains 
are  vast  stretches  of  impenetrable,  virgin  forests;  the  north- 
eastern part  of  the  state,  which  is  comparatively  level  and 
unexplored,  is  likewise  covered  in  part  by  great  wooded  dis- 
tricts, in  part  by  extensive  prairies,  and  traversed  by  two  riv- 
ers,the  San  Carlos  and  Sarapiqui,  tributaries  of  the  San  Juan, 
and  navigable  for  some  distance  by  small  craft. 

At  about  10°  northern  latitude  the  mountain  chain 
shows  a  broad  gap  in  the  direction  from  east  to  west.  In 
this  gap  lie  highlands  of  an  elevation  of  5,000  feet,  which  de- 
scend on  the  one  side  to  Puuta  Arenas,  on  the  other  to  Limon. 
These  highlands  constitute  the  healthiest,  most  populous  and 
cultivated  part  of  the  state.  Here  lies  the  capital  San  Jose, 
the  city  of  Cartago  and  most  of  the  large  towns. 

Calvo  in  his  work  on  Costa  Rica  states  that  all  the  towns 
and  villages  are  connected  by  more  or  less  well  built  wagon- 
roads.  The  only  good  wagon  road  vouched  for  is  that  from 
Punta  Arenas  to  Cartago.  Other  roads,  as  those  from  Punta 
Arenas  north  to  Rivas  and  Managua,  from  Cartago  to  Grey- 
town,  from  Cartago  to  Terraba  and  David  (Panama),  and 
from  Cartago  to  Limon  are  stated  by  some  to  be  mere  trails; 
they  should  therefore  not  be  unconditionally  relied  upon. 

The  construction  of  a  transcontinental  railroad  from 
Punta  Arenas  to  Puerto  Limon  was  undertaken  in  1871.  It  is 
a  narrow  gauge  and  the  portion  from  Esparta  to  Alajuela, 
some  thirty  or  forty  miles,  has  not  yet  been  completed.  Li- 
mon and  Punta  Arenas  are  the  termini  of  the  road. 

620  miles  of  telegraph  with  43  stations  are  in  operation. 

The  resources  of  the  country  are  great  but  poorly  devel- 
oped. There  are  practically  no  manufactures.  Coffee  and 
bananas  form  the  chief  exports.  The  forests  abound  in  valu- 
able timbers  and  cabinet  woods,  the  mines  produce  gold,  sil- 
ver and  copper.  Of  live  stock  there  were  in  1888,  50,000 
horses,  262,000  cattle  and  2,152  sheep  in  the  country,  which 


108 


does  not  produce  all  the  cereals  it  consumes,  as  flour  figures 
largely  among  the  imports  from  the  United  States.  The 
revenues  in  1892  amounted  to  5,808,474,  and  the  expendi- 
tures 5,449,290  pesos.  The  interior  and  foreign  debts  in  the 
same  year  were  2,811,102  and  18,864,541  pesos.  No  interest 
has  lately  been  paid  on  the  foreign  debt,  and  the  state  is  now 
trying  to  compromise  with  its  creditors  on  50  per  cent. 

The  standing  army  numbers  600  men,  the  militia  (on 
paper)  31,824  men;  every  male  between  18  and  50  years  of 
age  is  liable  to  military  service. 

From  what  little  has  been  stated,  it  is  evident  that  the 
highlands  in  the  gap  of  the  Andes  form  the  key  to  the  coun- 
try. The  gap  contains  the  only  communication  between  the 
east  and  west  coast.  From  the  towns  in  this  gap  radiate 
what  few  communications  the  country  boasts  of.  The  culti- 
vation, civilization  and  wealth  of  the  state  are  concentrated 
in  this  gap.  To  an  invader  either  Limon  or  Punta  Arenas 
might  serve  as  a  base.  If  Limon  were  selected,  no  benefit 
would  be  likely  to  accrue  from  the  railroad  as  it  runs  over  so 
many  high  bridges,  that  it  could  easily  be  disabled  beyond 
repair,  for  a  long  time  at  least.  The  only  communication 
with  the  interior  would  then  be  a  fairly  good  trail  suitable 
for  pack  animals  only,  for  the  road  from  Cartago  to  Limon 
is  nothing  more  than  that.  To  these  disadvantages  should 
be  added  the  deathly  climate  of  Limon.  On  the  other  hand 
if  an  invader  base  himself  on  Punta  Arenas,  he  will  have  good 
wagon  roads  assured  him;  the  climate  of  Punta  Arenas,  if  bad, 
is  better  than  that  of  Limon,  and  last,  but  not  least,  the  dis- 
tance from  the  coast  to  the  capital  is  much  shorter  and  more 
easily  traversed  from  the  Pacific  than  from  the  Atlantic  side. 

A  new  railroad  has  lately  been  planned  starting  from 
Rio  Jimenez  on  the  Limon — Cartago  railroad,  to  the  north, 
crossing  the  San  Carlos  and  Sarapiqui  at  the  head  of  naviga- 
tion and  terminating  at  some  point  on  Lake  Nicaragua.  This 
railroad  is  designed  as  a  competitor  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal. 


In  the  area  described  in  the  preceding  pages  are  two 
districts,  which  of  late  have  come  prominently  before  the 
American  public,  but  have  not  yet  been  described  here. 
They  aie  British  Honduras,  or  Belize,  and  the  Mosquito 
Coast. 

British  Honduras  is  a  strip  of  territory  in  northern  Gua- 
temala to  which  state  it  originally  belonged.  The  boundary 
begins  at  the  mouth  of  the  Sarstoon  River  in  the  Gulf  of 
Amatique,  ascends  the  river  to  the  rapids  of  Gracias  a  Dios, 
turns  to  the  right  in  a  straight  line  to  Garbutt's  rapids  in  the 
river  Belize,  whence  it  runs  due  north  until  it  meets  the  Rio 
Bravo;  from  this  point  it  follows  the  Bravo  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Hondo,  of  which  the  Bravo  is  a  tributary.  The  first 
British  settlement  was  made  here  by  log  cutters;  by  succes- 
sive treaties  the  settlement  was  enlarged  until  it  assumed  it& 
present  boundaries.  In  the  treaties  with  Spain  as  well  as  in 
the  treaties  made  by  Great  Britain  subsequently  o  the  inde- 
pendence of  Central  America  with  other  states,  it  was  express 
ly  stipulated  that  Great  Britain  should  not  acquire  aiiy- 
sovereignty  over  this  district.  If,  nevertheless,  Belize  is  a 
British  colony  to-day,  it  is  chiefly  to  be  ascribed  to  the  fact 
that  in  the  Clayton — Bulwer  treaty  concluded  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  in  1850,  an  exception  was 
made  in  favor  of  the  British  settlement  in  Belize  as  in  favor 
of  everything  else  that  might  enable  Great  Britain  to  gain  a 
foothold  in  Central  America  or  the  West  Indies  and  prevent 
us  from  doing  the  same.  This  treaty  was  for  the  United 
States  a  diplomatic  defeat  of  the  first  magnitude  and  since  ite 
conclusion  our  people  have  vainly  endeavored  to  find  out 
whether  its  ratification  was  due  to  culpable  indifference  or 
gross  lack  of  foresight. 

The  area  of  Belize  is  7,652  square  miles,  with  a  population 
of  31,000.  The  climate  along  the  coast  is  unhealthy.  The 
chief  exports  are  mahogany,  logwood  and  fruits.  "The  ap- 
proach to  the  coast  is  through  keys  and  coral  reefs  and  is  both 


110 


difficult  and  dangerous.  The  population  is  mainly  negro,  in- 
troduced originally  as  slaves,  whence  has  sprung  a  hybrid 
race  from  intermixture  with  Europeans  and  Indians."  The 
chief  importance  of  Belize  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  constitutes  a 
British  foothold  on  the  mainland  of  Central  America  and 
that  it  is  situated  so  as  to  flank  the  water  route  from  the 
eastern  outlet  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 

The  Mosquito  territory  is  a  quadrangular  piece  of  laud 
extending  about  180  miles  north  and  south  and  40  miles  east 
and  west,  and  constituting  the  greater  part  of  Nicaragua'^ 
Atlantic  coast.  The  southern  boundary  begins  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Rama  river,  ascends  the  same  about  40  miles,  turn> 
due  north  until  it  meets  the  Wawa  river,  which  it  follows  to 
its  mouth.  Great  Britain  exercised  a  protectorate  over  the 
Mosquito  coast  from  1660  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Clayton — 
Bulwer  treaty.  In  accordance  with  this  treaty  Great  Bri- 
tain ceded  the  protectorate  of  the  Mosquito  Coast  along  with 
the  Bay  Islands  to  Honduras,  a  proceeding  which  gave  rise 
to  much  discontent  among  the  natives  of  the  coast  and  a  com- 
plete rebellion  of  the  islanders.  By  a  subsequent  treaty,  con  - 
eluded  January  26,  1860,  the  whole  territory  was  finally 
handed  over  to  Nicaragua. 

The  principal  settlement  is  Bluefields,  of  recent  notorie- 
ty. The  coast  is  flat,  fringed  with  keys,  and  difficult  to  ap- 
proach. The  chief  exports  are  mahogany,  cacoa,  ginger  and 
sarsaparilla.  The  population  is  much  like  that  of  Belize, 
and  is  insignificant  in  numbers.  Importance  attaches  to  this 
strip  of  land  only  on  account  of  its  proximity  to  the  eastern 
outlet  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  and  to  the  evident  endeavors 
of  Great  Britain  to  recover  her  foothold  there  under  one  pre- 
text or  another. 


After  giving  this  brief  outline  of  climatic,  topographical, 
and  political  conditions  of  Central  America,  it  becomes  the 
further  task  of  military  geography  to  discuss  the  relative  ad- 


Ill 


vantages  aud  disadvantages  that  would  accrue  in  time  of  war 
from  the  configuration  and  nature  of  the  frontiers  and  the 
geographical  situation  of  each  state  relative  to  its  neighbors, 
and  to  consider  the  probable  lines  of  operation  and  communi- 
cation, and  theaters  of  war.  In  this  task  we  are  greatly  re- 
stricted by  the  limited  information  as  to  topographical  detail 
and  routes  of  communication.  With  the  exception  of  San 
Salvador  the  Central  American  States  are  very  sparsely 
settled,  in  fact  the  greater  part  of  the  territory  they  comprise 
may,  for  our  purposes,  be  considered  uninhabited.  This  is 
true  ol  the  northern  half  of  Guatemala,  a  large  part  of  Hon- 
duras, nearly  all  of  Nicaragua  east  of  the  Andes  (with  the 
exception  of  a  small  portion  of  the  Mosquito  Coast),  and  the 
northeastern  as  well  as  the  southwestern  portion  of  Costa 
Rica.  That  is  the  real  reason  why  the  sources  of  information 
are  deficient,  yet  for  placing  an  estimate  on  the  military  adap- 
tibility  of  theaters  of  operation,  topographical  knowledge  is 
the  first  requisite.  Still  what  information  we  have,  will  al- 
low us  to  draw  some  military  conclusions  of  a  general  charac- 
ter. 

The  military  forces  of  the  Central  American  states  consist 
of  small  standing  armies  and  of  the  militia.  The  former  all 
writers  agree  are  of  the  most  miserable  character  and  unwor- 
thy of  the  term  ''armies"  as  understood  by  the  military  stu- 
dent. The  regular  forces  are  recruited  from  the  lowest 
classes,  and  as  regards  intelligence,  training,  armament  and 
equipment,  are  as  sorry  a  lot  of  men  as  ever  styled  themselves 
soldiers.  The  lower  classes  of  the  people  are  a  mixture  of 
white,  negro  and  Indian  blood,  uneducated  and  ignorant,  lazy 
and  averse  even  to  what  little  labor  the  fertile  soil  requires  to 
furnish  them  with  subsistence.  In  the  veins  of  the  whites 
runs  the  fiery  southern  blood,  but  their  arrogance  and  pride 
are  equaled  only  by  their  ignorance.  The  militia,  which  is 
called  out  in  cases  of  emergency,  would,  on  account  of  the  ad- 
mixture of  this  white  stock,  no  doubt  prove  far  superior  to 


112 


the  regular  army  as  a  fighting  body.  In  the  absence  of  any 
training  of  this  militia  in  time  of  peace,  it  is  not  believed  that 
in  war  it  would  amount  to  more  than  an  assemblage  of  armed 
bands;  but  if  ably  led  and  with  its  fierce  passions  roused,  it 
would  no  doubt  give  a  good  account  of  itself.  If  it  were  con- 
fronted, however,  by  good  regular  troops,  it  would  be  the  old 
story  of  enthusiasm,  patriotism  and  valor  pitted  against  or- 
ganization, training  and  discipline,  so  frequently  and  luridly 
illustrated  in  war  history.  The  country  would  succumb  to- 
day to  any  civilized  power  as  readily  as  it  did  300  years  ago 
to  a  handful  of  avaricious  cavaliers  from  Spain.  Once  dis- 
persed these  armed  bands  would  probably  carry  on  a  trouble- 
some guerrilla  warfare  and  be  hard  to  hunt  down. 

It  lies  iu  the  nature  of  such  forces  to  operate  in  small, 
mobile  columns.  Unencumbered  by  the  impedimenta  of  a 
modern  army,  they  are  able  to  move  by  routes  impracticable 
for  regular  troops.  Moreover  in  such  sparsely  settled  coun- 
tries as  those  under  consideration,  forces  of  this  character, 
besides  being  the  only  ones  available,  may  be  perfectly  able 
to  bring  the  war  to  a  decisive  issue.  In  the  following  discus- 
sion no  notice  can  of  course  be  taken  of  such  operations,  for 
there  may  be  many  passes  over  the  many  mountain  chains  on 
the  frontiers  and  elsewhere  of  which  we  are  not  aware  and  of 
which  they  may  avail  themselves.  The  discussion  is  there- 
fore limited  to  such  considerations  as  would  be  important  to 
regularly  organized  and  trained  troops. 
GUATEMALA. 

This  state  has  lately  attracted  some  attention  by  its  dis- 
pute with  Mexico,  which  at  one  time  threatened  to  become  a 
<'osus  belli.  On  the  west  and  north  Guatemala  is  bounded  by 
the  Mexican  states  of  Chiapas,  Tabasco  and  Yucatan.  This 
frontier  may  be  divided  into  three  unequal  portions  as  follows: 

1 .  The  Pacific  portion  from  the  mouth  of  the  Suchiate 
-river  to  the  crest  of  the  Andes. 

2.  The  central  portion  from  the  crest  of  the  Andes  to 


113 

the  poiut  on  the  Usumacinta  river  where  the  frontiers  of  Ta- 
basco, Chiapas,  and  Guatemala  meet. 

3.  The  northern  portion  from  the  Usumacinta  river  to 
the  Hondo. 

The  territory  contiguous  to  both  sides  of  this  northern 
frontier  seems  to  be  almost  uninhabited  and  devoid  of  com- 
munications; both  sides  would  therefore  find  great  difficulty 
in  assembling  their  forces  here.  The  valley  of  the  Rio  San 
Pedro,  a  tributary  of  the  Usumacinta,  might  serve  either  side 
as  a  route  for  a  raiding  invasion. 

Along  the  northern  half  of  the   central    portion  of  the 
frontier,  according  to  one  division,  the  course  of  the  Usuma- 
cinta marks  the  boundary  line.     The  territory  on  either  side 
is  mountainous,  sparsely  settled  even  for  those  parts,  and  de- 
void   of  communications.     For  these  and  other  reasons,  it  is 
not  expected  that  in  case  of  war  we  shall  hear   of  strategic 
feats   based  on  the  salient  and  re-entrant  angles  formed  here 
by  the  S  shaped  course  of  the  Usumacinta.     The   southern 
half  of  this  central  portion  of  the  frontier  is  crossed  by  many 
ridges   and    water   courses,  tributaries  of  the  Chiapas  river, 
which  empties  into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.   The  maps  here  show 
a  road  from  San  Cristobal,  the  capital  of  Chiapas,  to  Huehue- 
tenango  in  Guatemala.     A  Mexican  army  taking  this   road 
would  thus  reach  the  settled  and  cultivated  parts  of  Guatema- 
la, the  highlands  mentioned  in  the  first  part  of  this  paper  and 
the  roads  by  which  its  towns  are  connected.     Operations   on 
this  road   would   therefore  strike  at  the  heart  of  Guatemala. 
It  is  probable  that  difficulties  of  supply  would  detract  much 
from  the  eligibility  of  this  road  as  the  principal  line  of  com- 
munication.    A  Guatemalan  army  invading. Chiapas  by  this 
road   would   of  course  encounter  similiar  difficulties,  though 
perhaps  to  a  less  degree,  since  it  would  descend  into  the  more 
open  country  on  the  banks  of  the  Chiapas.     The  selection  of 
this  line  by  Guatemala,  were  she  able  to  assume  the  offensive, 
would  enable  her  to  meet  her  superior   opponent   on   more 


114 


nearly  equal  terms  by  depriving  him  of  the  services  of  his 
shipping  in  supplying  his  forces,  which  would  not  be  the  case 
if  the  operations  took  place  near  the  coast;  for  Mexico  has  a 
few  war  vessels  and  some  merchant  shipping,  while  Guate- 
mala has  neither. 

The  Pacific  portion  of  the  frontier  would  seem  to  con- 
stitute the  natural  line  of  operations  for  Mexico  which,  by 
its  great  superiority  over  Guatemala,  ought  to  force  the  latter 
on  the  defensive  from  the  beginning.  Advancing  along  the 
coast  against  Champerico  the  invading  army  could  march 
light,  having  its  supplies  carried  and  subsistence  insured  by 
a  fleet  moving  abreast  of  the  army.  Champerico  might  be 
made  into  an  immediate  base.  This  place  gains  all  the  more 
importance  from  the  fact  that  it  is  not  only  a  port,  but  the 
terminus  of  the  railroad  to  Retalhuleu.  At  the  latter  point, 
if  it  could  be  gained  and  the  railroad  be  made  available,  the 
invading  force  would  be  within  a  few  marches  of  the  rich  part 
of  Guatemala  with  short  and  commodious  communications  in 
its  rear.  Still  more  decisive  would  be  a  direct  descent  on 
San  Jose*,  the  port  of  the  capital  and  terminus  of  a  railroad 
leading  to  that  city.  There  the  invader  would  find  himself 
on  the  shortest  road  to  the  most  important  part  of  Guatema- 
la. Whether  Mexico  possesses  sufficient  shipping  for  such  a 
.  move  is  not  known .  It  is  likewise  impossible  to  state  what 
difficulties  the  invader  would  encounter  when  striking  out  for 
the  interior  either  from  Champerico  or  San  Jose,  but  it  seems 
safe  to  assert  that  they  would  be  many  and  considerable  on 
account  of  the  mountainous  character  of  the  terrain  and  the 
many  defensive  positions  offered  by  such  ground.  Mexican 
4ufantry  %  has  been  known  to  march  forty  miles  per  day  in 
midsummer  on  the  lower  Rio  Grande,  and  for  all  we  know, 
the  road  from  San  Cristobal  to  Huehuetenango  may  be  as 
practicable  for  it  as  is  a  chausse"e  for  an  European  army. 

Perhaps  it  is  not  out  of  place  here  to  point  out  the  advan- 
tages Mexico  derives  from  her  trans-isthmian  railway   of  Te- 


115 


huantepec   which  places   the   resources  of  her  east  and  west 
coast  alike  at  her  disposal  on  either  coast. 

In  the  discussion  of  the  other  frontiers  of  Guatemala,  as 
well  as  of  those  of  the  remaining  Central  American  states,  it 
will  be  found  that  the  spaces  are  few  where  armies  could  move 
with  effect.  This  is  due  partly  to  the  uninhabited  state  of  the 
contiguous  territories,  partly  to  the  impenetrable  obstacles 
offered  by  the  frontiers.  It  is  only  along  the  Pacific  coast 
that  communication  throughout  seems  to  exist. 
GUATEMALA — HONDURAS. 

The  line  of  demarcation  between  Guatemala  and  Hon- 
duras lies  on  the  crests  of  the  Sierras  del  Espirito  Santo  and 
Merendon,  which  extend,  one  in  prolongation  of  the  other, 
from  the  bay  of  Honduras  to  Lake  Culja  (situated  astride  of 
the  Guatemala-Salvador  frontier.)  What  kind  of  passes,  if 
any,  lead  across  these  mountains,  we  do  not  know.  This 
chain  of  mountains  is  the  water-shed  between  the  Mutagua 
in  Guatemala  and  the  Ulua  in  Honduras.  The  valleys  of 
both  form  the  natural  thoroughfares  from  the  east  coast  to  the 
interior.  These  rivers  converge  as  they  approach  the  Bay  of 
Honduras,  and  are  less  than  40  miles  apart  at  their  mouth. 
GUATEMALA — SALVADOR. 

The  frontier  between  these  countries  offers  two  highroads 
of  invasion,  the  <-ne  along  the  Pacific  coast,  the  other,  separ- 
ated from  the  first  by  an  intervening  range  of  mountains, 
along  the  shores  of  Lake  Gulja.  The  valleys  leading  down 
to  the  lake  on  the  Guatemalan  side  and  up  to  it  on  the  Salva- 
dorian  side,  furnish  the  shortest  thoroughfare  from  the  center 
of  one  state  to  that  of  the  other.  Of  their  practicability  or 
otherwise  nothing  is  known. 

SALVADOR. 

The  frontier  between  Salvador  and  Honduras  is  irregular 
in  outline  and  intersected  by  mountains  and  watercourses. 
Too  little  is  known  to  allow  us  to  venture  any  statement  on 
this  point  beyond  this,  that  the  valleys  of  the  Lempa  and  its 


116 


tributary  Guarambala  seem  to  constitute  the  only  natural 
communication  between  the  two  states  along  the  northern 
frontier  of  Salvador.  The  eastern  boundary  of  this  state  runs 
almost  due  north  and  south  and  is  formed  by  the  Goascoran 
river  which  empties  into  the  Gulf  of  Fouseca.  Nothing  fur- 
ther can  be  stated  here  except  the  fact  that  a  Salvadorian 
force  on  the  Goascoran  would  threaten  the  highroad  from  the 
gulf  to  Tegucigalpa,  while  a  Honduran  force  similiarly  placed 
on  this  river  would  not  threaten  the  communications  of  the 
Salvadorian  capital  with  its  port.  Of  the  islands  situated  in 
the  gulf,  that  of  Amapala  has  been  mentioned  before  on  ac- 
count of  the  many  advantages  it  offers.  To  the  south  of 
Araapala,  just  inside  of  and  opposite  the  center  of  the  en- 
trance to  the  gulf,  lies  the  island  of  Manguera  so  as  to  com- 
mand the  entrance.  When  Honduras  and  Salvador  shall 
have  developed  into  powerful  states  on  land  and  sea,  these  is- 
lands are  bound  to  play  a  great  role  in  matters  military. 
HONDURAS. 

The  frontiers  of  this  state  toward  Guatemala  and  Salva- 
dor have  been  discussed,  and  it  only  remains  to  deal  with  th«- 
Nicaragua  frontier.  Beginning  at  Cape  Gracias  a  Dios  on  th;k 
eastern  coast  the  boundary  is  marked  by  the  course  of  the 
Wanks  river  for  about  150  miles  (on  the  air  line)  and  is  then 
taken  up  by  a  series  of  sierras  continuing  to  within  25  miles 
of  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca.  The  uninhabited  state  of  the  coun  - 
try  on  both  banks  of  the  Wanks  and  the  long  mountain 
barrier  point  to  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  as  the  pro- 
bable theater  of  hostilities  in  case  of  war  between  these  states. 
NICARAGUA. 

As  in  the  north,  so  in  the  south,  Nicaragua  is  limited  as 
regards  maneuvering  ground,  to  the  narrow  strip  adjoining 
the  Pacific.  Those  parts  of  Costa  Rica  which  adjoin  the  great 
lake  and  the  San  Juan  river,  consist  of  extensive  plains,  densi1 
forests  and  some  hilly  country  almost  unexplored  and  unin- 
habited. North  of  the  San  Juan  the  Nicaraguan  territory 


117 


next  to  the  lake  is  very  rugged,  and  what  few  settlements 
there  are,  are  in  the  low  lands  adjacent  to  the  eastern  coast. 
There  remains  thus  but  the  small  part  of  the  frontier  marked 
by  the  line  from  the  Sapoa  to  the  Bay  of  Salinas,  in  which  to 
conduct  operations.  By  advancing  thence  toward  the  head 
of  the  Bay  of  Nicoya,  a  Nicaraguan  army  would  skirt  the 
western  slopes  of  the  Andes,  that  side  of  the  mountains  on 
which  the  wealth  and  population  of  Costa  Rica  are  to  be 
found.  A  Costa  Rican  force  taking  the  same  route  forinvad- 
ing  Nicaragua  would  have  to  gain  in  the  first  place  the  com- 
mand of  the  lakes  as  otherwise  it  might  be  assailed  in  rear 
and  have  its  communications  intercepted.  On  the  other  hand 
the  control  of  the  lakes  would  confer  enormous  advantages  on 
the  invader  as  this  control  means  the  control  of  the  wealthy 
and  settled  part  of  Nicaragua. 

COSTA  RICA. 

The  northern  frontier  of  this  state  has  just  been  con- 
sidered. Of  the  southern  boundary  nothing  can  be  said,  of 
course,  since  that  boundary  is  not  as  yet definately  established. 

We  cannot  conclude  this  part  of  the  subject  without 
making  a  few  remarks  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  and  its  adap- 
tability as  a  central  base  of  operations  in  Central  America, 
by  land  and  sea.  It  has  previously  been  pointed  out  that  the 
Pacific  surpasses  the  Atlantic  coast  in  salubrity  of  climate, 
number  and  quality  of  its  harbors,  density  of  population,  pro- 
duction, wealth  and  routes  of  communication.  To  all  of  these 
considerations  so  important  from  the  commercial  as  well  as 
from  the  military  point  of  view,  we  must  add  the  advantages 
offered  by  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  to  any  power  which  might  en- 
tertain designs  of  general  conquest  in  Central  America. 

Situated  about  midway  between  the  northwestern  and 
southeastern  extremities  of  the  Pacific  coast  of  Central  Amer- 
ica, the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  may  be  termed  the  doorway  to  the 
whole  country.  The  Gulf  itself  makes  a  splendid  place  of 
rendezvous  for  any  fleet  or  fleets  of  whatever  size.  Of  the 


118 


southeastern  arm  of  the  Gulf  Mr.  Wells,  in  his  ''Adventures 
and  Explorations  in  Honduras,"  says:  "It  would  be  safe  to 
say  that  the  whole  mercantile  fleet  of  America  might  ride  in 
security  together  in  this  great  southern  bay,  inferior  in  no 
respect  to  that  of  San  Francisco  and  bordered  by  three  states 
possessed  of  the  greatest  natural  resources  within  the  tropics, 
their  hills  stored  with  the  richest  mineral  deposits  in  Spanish 
America."  And  of  the  northern  half  of  the  gulf  the  author 
remarks  in  the  same  place:  "We had  now  shut  out  the  ocean 
beyond  the  outer  islands,  and  were  cutting  through  an  ex- 
panse of  water,  smooth  as  a  trout  lake,  but  deep  enough  to 
float  the  largest  vessels  in  the  world;  not  a  hidden  rock  or 
shoal  in  any  direction;  the  playas  or  beaches  approachable 
with  large  ships  to  within  pistol  shot  of  the  rock  and  room  to 
anchor  or  move  a  thousand  vessels,  even  in  the  comparative 
nook  made  by  the  four  islands,  which  here  form  almost  a  com- 
pletely landlocked  circle  of  water,  in  which  the  frailest  canoe 
might  safely  navigate."  The  island  of  Amapala  offers  a  com- 
modious harbor  and  place  for  a  grand  central  depot  and  can 
readily  be  strengthened  by  fortifications.  The  island  of  Man- 
guera,  situated  south  of  Amapala,  protects  the  latter  and  at 
the  same  time  commands  the  entrance  as  well  as  the  interior 
of  the  Gulf.  Once  firmly  established  here  decisive  operations 
by  land  and  sea  may  be  begun.  For  operations  by  sea  the 
Gulf  of  Fonseca  would  be  a  magnificent  central  point  for 
blockading  the  Pacific  coast  of  Central  America.  All  the 
harbors  can  be  reached  from  here  in  less  than  24  Lours,  for 
the  most  distant  harbors,  Champerico  in  Guatemala  and 
Punta  Arenas  in  Costa  Rica,  are  but  300  miles  away  (measured 
on  the  air  line),  San  Jose*  in  Guatemala  and  San  Juan  del  Sur 
(outlet  of  the  Nicaragua  canal)  are  but  200  miles  from  the 
Gulf,  while  Acajula  and  Libertad  in  Salvador  and  Corintoin 
Nicaragua  can  be  reached  in  a  few  hours  steaming,  and  the 
Salvadorian  harbor  of  La  Union  and  the  Honduran  landings 
at  La  Brea  and  San  Lorenzo  as  well  as  the  Estero  Real  would 
be  closed  by  the  occupation  of  the  Gulf. 


119 

For  operations  on  land  the  situation  of  the  Gulf  of  Fon- 
seca is  no  less  favorable.  A  semicircle  described  from  the  is- 
land of  Manguera  as  a  center  with  a  radius  of  125  miles,  in- 
closes the  most  populous  and  productive  portions,  as  well  as 
the  capitals  of  Salvador,  Honduras  and  Nicaragua.  The 
capital  of  Honduras  is  but  75  miles  inland  and  were  it  de- 
sired to  open  communication  with  the  eastern  coast,  the  val- 
ley of  the  Ulua  would  seem  to  present  the  shortest  and 
otherwise  most  favorable  route  from  Tegucigalpa  to  the  Bay 
of  Honduras.  As  regards  the  capital  of  Salvador,  it  may  be 
remarked  that  it  is  situated  but  18  miles  from  the  coast  (air 
line)  and  25  miles  from  its  port  of  LaLibertad,  which  latter 
is  but  100  miles  from  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca. 

In  the  southeastern  recess  of  the  gulf  is,  as  previously 
stated,  the  mouth  of  the  Estero  Real,  said  to  be  navigable 
by  large  vessels  for  a  considerable  distance  inland;  how  far  it 
has  not  been  possible  to  ascertain.  The  mouth  of  this  river 
is  but  50  miles  from  the  waters  of  Lake  Managua,  on  whose 
Chores  lie  the  capital  of  same  name  and  the  termini  of  the  two 
Nicaraguan  railroads,  the  one  connecting  the  lake  with  the 
port  of  Corinto  and  passing  the  city  of  Leon,  the  commercial 
metropolis,  the  other  connecting  the  cities  of  Managua  and 
Granada  and  furnishing  the  transportation  between  the  two 
lakes.  Brito  is  the  western  outlet  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  and 
within  short  steaming  distance  from  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca.  The 
strip  of  land  which  separates  Lake  Nicaragua  from  the  ocean, 
is  here  but  15  miles  wide.  The  command  of  Lake  Nicaragua 
would  imply  command  of  the  southern  half  of  that  portion  of 
Nicaragua  which  lies  west  of  the  Andes.  The  shallowness  of 
the  water  near  the  shore  would  be  a  disadvantage  which, 
however,  may  not  be  insuperable.  Brito  would  therefore  be 
an  attractive  point  to  an  invader. 

THE  NICARAGUA  CANAL. 

The  strip  of  earth  which  we  have  attempted  to   describe 
from  the  military  point  of  view,  is  destined  to  play  a  promi- 


120 


nent  part  in  the  future.  Yet  such  prominence  seems  hardly 
in  keeping  with  present  conditions.  The  resources  of  the 
states  are  undeveloped,  their  treasuries  empty,  their  people 
arrogant  and  ignorant,  their  governments  unstable,  their 
powers  insufficient  to  preserve  peace  at  home,  their  land  de- 
fenseless against  aggression  from  without,  their  existence 
guaranteed  only  by  what  tardy  respect  our  not  always  force- 
ful foreign  policy  has  heretofore  been  able  to  exact  from  for- 
eign powers.  It  is  neither  by  virtue  of  her  people,  her  civi- 
lization, her  policy  or  her  power  that  Central  America  to-day 
forms  a  prominent  topic  in  diplomatic  circles,  it  is  entirely 
due  to  her  geographical  situation.  America  may  be  said  to 
occupy  a  central  position  on  the  surface  of  the  earth,  with  her 
face  toward  Europe,  and  her  back  toward  Asia,  and  Central 
America  lies  in  the  middle  of  America.  The  construction  of 
a  trans-isthmian  ship  canal,  the  water  communication  between 
the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  which  has  been  the  dream  of 
the  nations  since  the  days  of  Charles  V.,  is  about  to  be  rea- 
lized. Tttis  canal  is  to  be  constructed  across  Nicaraguan  ter- 
ritory, and  for  a  short  distance  will  skirt  the  Costa  Rican 
boundary.  It  is  this  canal  that  raises  Central  America  to 
such  high  ^importance. 

The  construction  will  be  an  American  enterprise,  and  the 
work  will  be  done  by  the  Maritime  Canal  Company,  an 
American  corporation.  This  company  is  at  present  laboring 
under  financial  difficulties,  and  needs  but  the  moral  support 
of  our  government  to  enable  it  to  complete  the  work  already 
begun.  So  far  this  support  has  been  denied,  but  patriotic 
and  far  seeing  statesmen  have  advocated  it,  chief  among  them 
Senator  Morgan,  from  Alabama,  and  demonstrated  the  im- 
portance of  the  work  for  ourselves  and  the  world  at  large. 
Owing  to  the  dismal  failure  of  the  French  enterprise  at  Pana- 
ma, some  doubts  are  still  entertained  as  to  the  feasibility  of 
the  work,  but  the  good  cause  has  made  such  progress  that, 
although  the  congress  just  passed  has  declined  its  support,  it 


121 


lias  authorized  the  President  to  appoint  a  commission  to  veri- 
fy the  claims  of  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  as  to  the  prac- 
ticability of  the  scheme,  and  voted  the  necessary  funds.  The 
President  has  appointed  the  commission  and  it  is  to  be  hoped 
that,  when  its  report  is  rendered,  another  congress  will  be 
friend  the  Maritime  Canal  Company  and  thereby  pave  the 
way  to  that  commercial  and  political  supremacy  on  the  west- 
ern hemisphere,  to  which  our  republic  is  rightfully  entitled. 
The  subject  has  been  so  thoroughly  discussed  in  all  its 
details  by  abler  pens  than  mine,  that  nothing  new  can  be  pro- 
duced here;  and  it  is  merely  intended  to  outline  the  chief 
features  the  construction  of  the  canal  will  produce. 

With  regard  to  our  own  commercial  interests  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  point  out,  that  the  water  route  from  New  York  to 
San  Francisco  around  Cape  Horn  is  15,100  miles,  and  that 
the  Nicaragua  canal  will  reduce  this  distance  to  5,640  miles. 
This  means  a  great  reduction  in  time  and  cost  of  transporta- 
tion; the  products  of  the  east  will  be  cheaper  on  our  Pacific 
coast,  in  eastern  Asia  and  on  the  whole  coast  of  South  Amer- 
ica, and  the  reverse,  than  heretofore.  The  market  will  there- 
fore be  enlarged.  To  what  degree  it  will  stimulate  our  indus- 
try is  impossible  to  calculate  now. 

From  the  military  point  of  view  the  possession  of  such  a 
canal  will  greatly  augment  our  naval  power  in  the  adjacent 
as  well  as  in  more  distant  waters.  Not  only  could  our  Atlan- 
tic and  Pacific  squadrons  combine  on  either  side  of  the  isth- 
mus, but  a  fleet  might  be  maintained  in  the  waters  of  Lake 
Nicaragua  as  a  central  reserve,  with  which  to  reinforce  either 
of  our  squadrons,  while  the  fresh  water  of  the  lake  would  re- 
move many  features  which  impair  the  efficiency  of  vessels  in 
salt  water  and  render  their  maintaiuance  costly.  In  his  able 
and  truly  patriotic  speech  on  the  Nicaragua  Canal,  Senator 
Morgan  says  in  this  connection:  '-It  is  a  simple  and  inade- 
quate illustration  of  the  military  feature  to  say  that  it  requires 
two  fleets,  separated  by  12,000  miles  of  sailing  distance,  to 


122 


blockade  cme  fleet  of  equal  power  to  either  in  Lake  Nicaragua. 
But  this  doubling  of  the  power  of  a  fleet  at  anchor  in  Lake 
Nicaragua  over  that  of  any  great  maritime  power  that  is 
moving  across  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific  to  attack  our  coasts, 
is  but  a  small  part  of  the  strategic  advantage  of  such  a  situa- 
tion." 

"As  &.  point  d' appui,  a  foothold  from  which  to  attack  or 
defend,  to  threaten  or  protect,  all  the  coasts  of  this  hemis- 
phere and  the  islands  and  adjacent  seas,  it  is  more  a  point  of 
commanding  power  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  than 
Gibraltar  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea." 

Another  aspect  of  the  canal  is  the  way  in  which  it  affects 
the  world  at  large.  On  this  point  Major  Wachs  of  the  Ger- 
man army  says:*  "As  early  as  1847  Napoleon  III.  compared 
in  a  detailed  essay  this  artificial  water  communication  of  the 
future  with  the  advantageous  geographical  situation  of  the 
European  channels.  Any  comparison  of  the  completed  water 
route  in  the  new  world  with  the  natural  ones  between  the 
Pontus  and  the  Aegean  Sea  must,  in  our  opinion,  be  unfavor- 
able to  the  latter.  For,  though  the  importance  of  the  latter 
is  certain  for  all  times,  yet  they  cannot  compete  with  a  high- 
way on  which  the  whole  world  is  dependent.  When  the  bar- 
riers of  the  isthmus  shall  have  been  pierced  and  the  central 
gate  of  the  Pacific  opened,  then  the  strength  of  the  two  oceans 
must  disclose  itself,  founded  upon  the  incomparable  base  in 
Nicaragua;  the  battlefield  of  peaceful  and  warlike  competition. 
Incomparable  we  call  this  base,  not  merely  because  here  there 
will  be  established  the  great  warehouses  of  the  world,  but  be- 
cause high  politics  will  be  directed  in  other  paths,  and  because 
every  stone  thrown  in  the  canal  will  produce  wide  circles  to 
the  east  and  west.  From  its  completion  will  date  a  transfor- 
mation and  revivifications  of  tthe  great  economical,  political 
and  mili  ta  r y  relations. 

**Tlu-  West  Indies  and  the  Nicaraguan  Canal.'1 


123 


"Because  this  one  is  straightest  and  easiest,  there  will 
be  but  one  world  route,  one  universal  path,  joining  the  Paci- 
fic to  the  Atlantic  and  the  latter  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  and 
thence  leading  back  into  the  Pacific.  This  is  the  great  ring 
whose  eternal  passes,  constructed  by  nature  herself,  are  repre- 
sented by  the  gates  Gibraltar  and  Singapore,  to  which  are 
now  added  the  one  rendered  practicable  by  human  skill  at 
Suez  and  the  one  to  be  rendered  so  in  Nicaragua.  Natural 
superiority  is  assured  the  possessor  of  the  Nicaragua  canal; 
this,  however,  does  not  in  itself  entail  strategic  superiority." 
Such  is  the  geographical  location  of  the  canal  that  is  to  be. 
It  lies  on  an  air  line  from  western  Europe  to  Polynesia  and 
Australia,  and  almost  on  an  air  line  from  New  York  to  the 
Pacific  coast  of  South  America. 

Notwithstanding  our  previous  remarks  on  the  great 
military  advantages  the  possession  of  the  canal  will  confer  on 
us,  the  strategic  situation  to  the  east  of  the  isthmus  is,,  never- 
theless, not  altogether  favorable  to  us  under  existing  condi- 
tions. We  would  control  the  canal  but  not  its  approaches. 

The  watery  elements  have  encroached  upon  the  central 
part  of  our  western  continent  until  nothing  is  left  but  the 
narrow  strip  of  Central  America  and  a  chain  of  islands  mark- 
ing what  would  be  the  natural  eastern  coast  line  of  America. 
The  body  of  water  to  the  west  of  this  chain  of  islands  is  di- 
vided in  to  two  1)  isins  of  unequal  size,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
the  Caribbean  Sea.  The  Gulf  of  Mexico  is  encircled  on  the 
east  and  north  by  Florida  and  our  gulf  states,  on  the  west 
and  south  by  the  states  of  the  Mexican  republic,  and  is  open 
only  to  the  south-east  where  an  opening  500  miles  wide  is  left 
between  the  peninsulas  of  Florida  and  Yucatan.  Squarely 
opposite  the  center  of  this  opening,  lies  the  western  extremi- 
ty of  Cuba  which  diverges  from  the  general  direction  of  the 
island  and  bends  away  to  the  south-west.  In  this  manner  two 
passages  are  formed:  the  Yucatan  strait  connecting  the  Gulf 
with  the  Caribbean  Sea,  lying  between  Cape  San  Antonio  of 


124 


western  Cuba  and  Cape  Catoche  of  northeastern  Yucatan, 
110  miles  distant  from  each  other;  and  the  Florida  Strait 
connecting  the  Gulf  with  the  Atlantic  and  situated  between 
the  southern  extremity  of  Florida  and  the  north-west  coast  of 
Cuba,  which  are  here  about  85  miles  distant  from  each  other. 
Opposite  this  passage  lie  the  Bahama  islands  which  extend 
from  opposite  the  eastern  shore  of  Florida  in  a  southeasterly 
direction  to  opposite  the  island  of  Haiti,  thus  commanding 
the  Florida  strait  as  well  as  the  Windward  Passage  between 
Cuba  and  Haiti,  which  furnishes  the  direct  route  from  the 
isthmus  to  New  York.  The  Bahama  islands  belong  to  Great 
Britain  which  has  established  a  station  for  coaling  and  repair 
on  the  island  of  New  Providence  (Nassau).  Opposite  Key 
West,  our  military  station,  lies  Havanna,  the  strongly  forti- 
fied and  garrisoned  capital  of  Cuba. 

The  Caribbean  Sea  is  encircled  on  the  west  by  Central 
A  merica,  on  the  south  by  the  isthmus  and  the  northern  coast 
of  Colombia  and  Venezuela,  on  the  east  by  the  Lesser  Antil- 
les, on  the  north  by  the  Greater  Antilles,  and  communicates 
with  the  Gulf  by  ihe  strait  of  Yucatan,  with  the  Atlantic  by 
the  Windward  Passage  (between  Cuba  and  Haiti)  and  the 
Mona  Passage  (between  Haiti  and  Porto  Rico).  Porto  Rico 
belongs  to  Spain  as  does  Cuba,  and  that  power  is  thus  placed 
in  position  to  command  the  three  principal  approaches  to  the 
Nicaragua  canal.  Since  we  are  more  than  a  match  for  Spain 
on  land  and  sea,  her  favorable  position  gives  us  no  disquietude. 

A  more  powerful  rival  is  Great  Britain,  both  on  account 
of  her  sea  power  and  her  commanding  position  in  the  Carib- 
bean. There  she  owns  the  island  of  Jamaica  and  many  of 
the  islands  which  bound  the  Caribbean  toward  the  Atlantic. 
In  Kingston  (Jamaica)  Great  Britain  possesses  a  strongly  for- 
tified naval  base.  The  island  is  situated  100  miles  west  of 
Haiti  and  90  miles  south  of  Cuba.  Its  situation  as  regard* 
the  Caribbean  is,  therefore,  central,  it  commands  the  Wind- 
ward Passage  directly  and  flanks  the  approaches  to  the  Nica- 


125 

ragua  canal  through  the  strait  of  Yucatan  and  the  Mona  Pas- 
sage. To  the  west  of  Jamaica  Great  Britain  possesses  the 
Caymans,  and  (the  Monroe  doctrine  notwithstanding)  has 
gained  a  footing  on  the  mainland  in  Belize  in  the  same  man- 
ner in  which  she  is  now  trying  to  regain  a  footing  on  the 
Mosquito  Coast,  at  the  very  mouth  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal. 
The  islands  on  the  eastern  front  of  the  Caribbean  belong 
nearly  all  to  England  except  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  and  a 
few  minor  islands  which  are  French.  Trinidad  has  a  good 
roadstead  and  is  fortified.  Tobago,  north-east  of  Trinidad, 
has  good  anchorages  in  Man  of  War  Bay  and  Cumberland 
Bay,  while  St.  George's  Bay  is  almost  completely  landlocked 
and  encircled  by  heights.  "The  island  capital  of  the  same 
name  lies  in  terraces  along  the  northern  edge  of  the  basin,  the 
entrance  to  which  is  constricted  to  800  metres  by  two  pro- 
montories. The  harbor,  city,  and  all  military  establishments 
(hospital,  arsenal,  coal  depot,  etc.)  are  protected  by  strong 
forts  and  water  batteries.  The  aspect  of  St.  George  remind? 
one.  of  La  Valetta  at  Malta,  only  this  Malta  is  as  luxurious  a,* 
that  of  the  old  world  is  bleak  and  rocky."  The  island  of  St. 
Vincent,  where  the  American  and  European  cables  meet,  has 
a  harbor  protected  by  fortifications.  Barbados,  the  British 
military  headquarters  in  the  West  Indies,  has  a  splendid  har- 
bor and  strong  fortifications.  Santa  Lucia  also  boasts  of  good 
harbors,  anchorages  and  fortifications.  Of  the  many  islands 
possessed  by  Great  Britain  in  these  waters,  those  enumerated 
are  the  most  important. 

Among  the  French  possessions  in  the  West  Indies  are  to 
be  noted,  besides  a  number  of  small  islands,  those  of  Guade- 
loupe and  Martinique,  the  latter  of  which  possesses  a  good 

harbor  and  is  defended  by  forts. 

The  Virgin  Islands  belonging  partly  to  England,  partly 
to  Denmark,  form  the  connecting  link  between  the  Greater 
and  Lesser  Antilles.  St.  Thomas,  the  principal  Danish  is- 
land, is  a  coaling  station,  has  a  good  harbor  with  docks,  and 
is  defended  by  strong  batteries. 


126 


The  Netherlands  also  have  possessions  here,  i.  e.,  Curayao 
and  two  smaller  islands  off  the  coast  of  Venezuela,  and  a  few 
small  islands  of  the  Leeward  group.  A  small  garrison  i* 
maintained  at  Curacao  and  a  vessel  kept  cruising  between  the 
several  islands. 

Spain,  as  we  have  seen,  commands  by  her  West  Indian 
possessions  the  three  principal  approaches  to  the  Nicaragua 
canal.  This  is  still  more  the  case,  however,  with  Great  Bri- 
tain. Leaving  her  superior  sea  power  out  of  consideration 
she  commands  the  interior  of  the  Caribbean  Sea  from  Jamai- 
ca, she  owns  most  of  the  Lesser  Antilles  on  the  eastern  edge 
of  the  Caribbean,  she  owns  the  Bahamas  north  of  the  Spanish 
islands,  and  within  convenient  distance  she  has  a  great  naval 
base  in  the  Bermudas.  Thus  if  Spain  commands  the  passages 
to  the  Nicaragua  canal,  Great  Britain  does  the  same  and 
more  directly  so,  and  more  than  that,  she  commands  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  Caribbean  as  well  as  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico; 
She  has  isolated  Spain  in  the  West  Indies.  The  Bermudas 
are  connected  by  separate  cable  with  the  naval  fortress  of 
Halifax,  rendering  concert  of  action  on  he  part  of  her  scat- 
tered fleets  possible, 

Wnile  many  nations  thus  have  footholds  in  the  West 
Indies  near  the  Nicaragua  canal,  we  have  none.  Worse  than 
that,  by  the  Clay  ton-Bui  wer  treaty  concluded  July  4y  1850, 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  agreed  on  a  joint  pro- 
tection of  the  canal  and  mutually  pledged  their  faith  that 
neither  of  them  would  ever  colonize,  annex,  fortify,  or  exer- 
cise exclusive  dominion  over  any  portion  of  Central  America. 
At  the  time  when  this  treaty  was  concluded,  the  United  States 
possessed  a  vast  undeveloped  territory  and  had  just  acquired 
from  Mexico  an  immense  district.  In  view  of  this  fact  and 
the  love  of  peace  ever  professed  by  our  country,  it  may  seem 
excusable  at  the  time  that  the  military  part  of  the  question 
was  disregarded  and  that  the  present  rather  than  the  future 
was  kept  in  view.  The  fact  nevertheless  remains  that  w< 


127 


were  outgeneraled.  We  had  no  possession  of  any  kind  in  the 
West  Indies  or  in  Central  America;  Great  Britain  had  both, 
and  fortresses,  arsenals,  etc.,  to  boot.  Great  Britain  gave  up 
nothing  except  a  defective  title  to  the  Mosquito  Coast,  we 
gave  up  the  right  of  exclusive  control  of  the  canal,  the  pre- 
requisite for  our  future  commercial  and  political  supremacy. 
The  treaty  has  become  a  thorn  in  our  flesh.  Until  recently 
the  disregard  of  the  military  features  of  such  questions  has 
been,  on  our  part,  a  notorious  and  deplorable  fact,  Great  Bri- 
tain on  the  other  hand  has  kept  them  steadily  in  view.  For 
illustration  we  will  only  quote  that  Great  Britain  has  pro- 
vided the  means  for  assembling  a  powerful  naval  force  on  the 
great  lakes,  we  have  done  nothing  of  the  kind.  In  conse- 
quence our  great  cities  on  the  lakes  would  in  case  of  war  lie 
helplessly  under  the  guns  of  British  gunboats.  But  the  sen- 
timents that  animated  us  in  1850  are  no  longer  the  same. 
Even  now  our  boundaries  are  becoming  too  narrow  for  us. 
The  immense  importance  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  has  been 
fully  recognized  and  we  are  chafing  under  the  obligations  im- 
posed on  us  by  the  Clay  ton -Bulwer  treaty. 

We  are  to-day  but  seven  days  steaming  from  Europe. 
We  are  gradually  corning  under  the  operation  of  the  same 
laws  which  affect  the  nations  of  Europe  and  render  naval 
power  a  necessity.  The  element  of  overpopulation  which 
<^uses  the  overflow  of  European  boundaries  by  tides  of  emi- 
gration, does  not  affect  us  yet.  But  we  are  affected  as  Euro- 
pean countries  are,  by  the  conditions  created  by  the  age  of 
inventions,  the  19th  century.  The  introduction  of  labor  sav- 
ing machines  has  enormously  increased  industrial  production, 
rendered  the  home  market  inadequate  and  has  made  compe- 
tition sharp  and  acrimonious.  The  electric  telegraph  and 
,4eam  transportation  have  contributed  largely  in  this  direc- 
tion. Every  nation  seeks  to  gain  new  territory'  by  which  to 
expand  its  market,  to  antagonize  those  nations  which  are  the 
strongest  competitors,  to  enhance  its  markets  where  they  are 


128 


existing,  and  last  but  not  least,  to  provide  the  means  for  pro 
tecting  its  commerce,  the  source  of  wealth  and  strength.  The 
principles,  that  combined  effort  is  superior  to  isolated  action, 
in  politics  and  war,  in  industry  and  commerce;  that  com- 
merce means  wealth  and  wealth  means  power;  that  military 
strength  on  the  sea,  the  bearer  of  commerce,  insures  its  safety; 
have  never  been  more  generally  lived  up  to  than  now.  They  have 
given  rise  to  grander  combinations  commercially,  to  grander 
territorial  aggregations  politically.  To  promote  his  ends  in 
the  struggle  for  existence  man  has  opened  passages  between 
waters  heretofore  separated  by  land  barriers.  Notice  the 
Suez  canal,  the  cut  across  the  isthmus  of  Corinth,  the  Man- 
chester ship  canal,  the  Amsterdam  ship  canal,  the  canal  be- 
tween the  Baltic  and  North  Sea,  the  proposed  canals  across 
Italy  and  France  connecting  the  Adriatic  with  the  Tyrrhenian, 
the  Atlantic  with  the  Mediterranean.  Wherever  there  is 
wealth  or  a  source  of  wealth,  there  a  nation  must  safeguard  it 
from  the  covetousness  of  others.  Great  Britain  has  shown 
great  foresight  in  obeying  these  laws  and  principles.  She  is 
linked  to  India  by  a  water  route  defended  by  a  series  of  mili- 
tary and  naval  strongholds,  Gibralter,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Aden, 
Singapore,  Hongkong,  Esquimalt.  She  has  supplemented 
the  strongholds  by  powerful  fleets,  she  has  converted  the  In- 
dian Ocean  into  a  British  lake,  as  she  has  the  West  Indian 
waters  and  the  Mediterranean.  A  glance  at  the  map  shows 
her  flag  on  every  continent.  What  we  are  pleased  to  call  the 
British  game  of  grabbing,  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  true 
foresight,  though  it  may  be  selfish.  If  Great  Britain  now 
should  gain  control  of  the  Nicaragua  canal,  she  would  control 
the  commercial  routes  of  the  world.  Even  now  she  is  said  to 
cast  longing  glances  at  the  Galapagos  Islands,  from  which  to 
control  the  approaches  to  the  western  outlet  of  the  canal. 
Other  nations  are  developing  the  same  policy  of  expansion, 
foremost  among  them  France,  who  has  indeed  become  a  pow- 
erful rival  of  Great  Britain,  and  gives  promise  of  seriously 


contesting  the  latter's  supremacy  on  the  seas.  Wherever  tht1 
cross  of  St.  George  floats  in  the  breeze,  there  the  French  tri- 
color waves  from  the  neighboring  shore.  If  France  has  no 
foothold  on  the  North  American  continent,  she  holds  two  is- 
lands at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  Clipperton 
Island  opposite  the  western  outlet  of  the  Nicaragua  canal. 

The  commercial  struggle  of  the  nations  which  is  now  go- 
ing on  before  our  eyes  and  becoming  more  embittered  every 
year,    this   struggle  which  is  in  fact  a  contention  for  power 
and  supremacy,  compels  every  nation  to  make  provisions  for 
the  future,  for  extending  and  protecting  its  sources  of  wealth. 
It  will  readily  be  perceived  how  the  control  of  the  Nicaragua 
canal  will  enable  us  not  only  to  hold  our  own  in  the  interna- 
tional competition,  but  will  give  us  the  means  for  acquiring 
that  supremacy  in  American  waters  to  which  we  Americans 
feel  ourselves  entitled  by  virtue  of  the  civilization  and  genius 
of  our  people.     The  control  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  is  as  ne- 
cessary for  our  development  and  greatness  as  was  in  the  past 
that   of  the  harbors  of  New  York  and  San  Francisco.     The 
control  of  that  canal  will  also  prove  in  our  hands  n  powerful 
instrument  for  enforcing  the  Monroe  doctrine.   This  national 
creed  of  ours  implies  more  perhaps  to-day  than  its  author  fore- 
saw.    Occasionally,  disclaimers  notwithstanding,   it  may  be 
said    to  mean  the  championship  of  the  United  States  for  the 
cause  of  all  America  against  all  others,  however  various  may 
he  the  interests  involved.     The  principal  people  we  have  to 
reckon  with,  are  our  cousins  across   the   Atlantic;  their  in- 
terests and  ours  are  even  now  coming  in  daily  conflict,  and 
will  do  so  still  more  in  the  future.     If  history    teaches   any- 
thing,   it  is  that  no  nation  worthy  of  the  name,  will  tamely 
surrender  valuable  possessions  and  highly  prized    privileges. 
However  averse  we  may  be  to  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  our 
interests  will  continue  to  clash  until  history  repeats  itself,  i. 
o.,  until  friendly  negotiation  can  no  longer  reconcile  the  con- 
flicting interests  and  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword  is  appealed 


130 


to.  No  nation  will  arbitrate  where  vital  interests  are  at 
.stake;  Great  Britain  has  amply  proved,  that  she  will  not  sub- 
mit to  arbitration  unless  she  is  sure  she  has  a  clear  case,  nor 
is  she  in  the  habit  of  giving  up  valuable  rights  or  privileges 
such  as  a  share  in  the  control  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  without 
receiving  something  equivalent  in  return.  In  view  of  the 
importance  of  the  Nicaragua  canal  to  Great  Britain,  none  but 
a  blind  opinionist  will  assert  that  we  shall*  ever  be  the  sole 
possessors  of  the  canal  without  a  determined  and  protracted 
struggle  with  Great  Britain. 

When  the  great  struggle  comes,  the  possession  of  the 
Nicaragua  canal  will  place  us  in  much  better  position  for 
meeting  our  opponent  than  is  the  case  at  present.  But  as  is 
evident  from  the  present  conditions  in  the  West  Indian  waters, 
we  shall  still  be  under  grave  disadvantages  until  in  one  way 
or  another  we  gain  a  firm  foothold  there.  It  has  often  been 
suggested  that  we  purchase  the  Spanish  islands  in  those 
waters.  That  would  plaee  us  at  once  on  a  par,  strategically, 
with  Great  Britain.  Whether  it  be  these  or  any  other  islands, 
a  firm  footing  in  the  West  Indies  is  a  prerequisite  for  our  fu- 
ture national  welfare.  Its  absolute  necessity  will  be  clear  to 
all  the  moment  the  struggle  begins.  That  struggle  is  una- 
voidable. We  shall  not  be  supreme  on  the  American  conti- 
nent, until  we  free  ourselves  from  the  influence  Great  Britain 
exercises  by  means  of  her  American  possessions.  That  we  can 
no  more  hope  to  accomplish  without  war,  than  Germany  could 
rid  herself  of  Austrian  and  French  influence  without  the  wars 
of  1866  and  1870.  We  are  not  advocating  wanton  national 
aggrandizement,  but  merely  such  prudent  measures  as  will 
guarantee  us  that  future  supremacy  in  America  which  every 
American  is  deeply  convinced  we  must  have.  Commerce 
means  wealth,  wealth  means  power.  The  nation  that  fails 
correctly  to  interpret  the  signs  of  the  present,  to  make  suita- 
ble provisions  for  safeguarding  its  future  welfare,  to  pave  by 
.a  wise  policy  its  way  to  the  high  plain  it  feels  itself  destined 


131 


to  reach,  will  fall  behind  in  the  international  struggle  for  ex- 
istence. At  no  time  could  a  nation  disregard  the  military 
feature  of  her  policy  with  less  safety  than  now.  To  do  so 
would  be  a  sign  of  hopeless  inferiority.  The  fortincation  of 
our  seacoast  was  the  first  step  taken  upon  the  correct  inter- 
pretation of  the  military  question  of  our  situation,  the  increase 
of  the  navy  was  the  second  wise  step.  The  control  of  the 
Nicaragua  canal  will  be  the  corner  stone  of  our  future  great- 
ness. To  carry  out  our  policy  consistently,  we  must  further 
increase  our  offensive  and  defensive  forces  on  land  and  sea, 
and  we  must  acquire  a  strong  foothold  in  the  West  Indies. 
Then  we  shall  be  ready  to  enter  the  lists  and  do  battle  for  tin- 
hegemony  in  our  hemisphere,  a  prize  which  no  nation  yet  has 
been  permitted  to  gain  without  hard  battle  and  spilling  of 
much  precious  blood. 

The  foregoing  are  some  of  the  reasons  that  make  tlu- 
geography,  political  as  well  as  military,  of  Central  America, 
so  important  to  us. 


